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Begin New Search Political Geography United Arab Emirates Publication Year within 5 Years

31. The UAE at 50

Author:
Gerald Feierstein, Afshin Molavi, and Courtney Freer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Gerald Feierstein, Afshin Molavi, and Courtney Freer discuss the state of the United Arab Emirates as the country celebrates its 50th anniversary, including its history, economic development, and domestic and regional policy objectives.
Topic:
History, Economic Development, Domestic Policy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
United Arab Emirates and Gulf Nations

32. Turkey’s love-in with Qatar: A marriage of convenience

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report assesses the impact of Turkish-Qatari cooperation between 2002 and 2020 on conflict and geopolitical competition across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa based on close examination of its drivers. The report notes that neither ideological nor economic drivers adequately explain the recent blossoming of Turkish-Qatari relations. Converging political interests and pragmatism offer a more compelling explanation. On the one hand, Turkey aspires to play a regional leadership role and uses its cooperation with Qatar to strengthen its soft power claim to leadership of the Sunni world. On the other hand, Qatar seeks to ensure its territorial and dynastical safety from Saudi Arabia and its allies – the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain (the Quartet) – by working with Turkey, the recent thaw of the Al-Ula declaration notwithstanding. Turkish-Qatari collaboration is therefore best seen as a pragmatic partnership enabled by compatible geopolitical perspectives, particularly regarding the Muslim Brotherhood.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

33. Changes in Oil Markets and New Technology: The Effects of COVID-19 and Climate Change

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi: The Middle East Economy, Paul Rivlin discusses the near and long term prospects for oil pricing, with special attention to new technologies being developed in wealthy Gulf States. In the first two months of 2021, the price of oil rose by almost 38 percent to just over $65/barrel. Was this because of rising demand, supply constraints or increased confidence? All these factors were relevant, but a glance at the OPEC basket price of oil over the past decade puts the rise in prices into perspective. At the end of February, the oil price was well below its 2011-2014 and 2018 highs both nominally terms and even more so when inflation is considered.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Markets, Oil, Science and Technology, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

34. The UAE and Israel: Developing Relations and the Challenge Ahead

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this issue of Iqtisadi, Paul Rivlin discusses the developing economic ties between the United Arab Emirates and Israel with an emphasis on investments in the energy sector. In April 2021, the Israeli firm Delek Drilling announced plans to sell its 22 percent direct stake in the Tamar gas field to investors led by the Abu Dhabi based state-owned Mubadala Petroleum for $1.1 billion. The Tamar field has an estimated 297 billion cubic meters (bcm) of reserves. This would be by far the largest commercial deal yet between Israel and the UAE. Mubadala Petroleum is a wholly owned subsidiary of Abu Dhabi state investor, Mubadala Investment Company. Its plans to move into Israel’s upstream gas sector have the backing of the UAE and Israeli governments. In March 2021, the UAE announced the establishment of a $10 billion fund to invest in energy and other strategic sectors of the Israeli economy. According to the official statement, the UAE will invest in and with Israel in sectors including energy, manufacturing, water, space, healthcare, and agro-tech. The investment fund will support development initiatives to promote regional economic cooperation between the two countries. Funding will come from government and private sector institutions and the Delek deal is part of this framework,
Topic:
Energy Policy, Treaties and Agreements, and Economy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United Arab Emirates

35. UN Security Council Elections for 2022-2023 and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
Today, 11 June 2021, the UN General Assembly elected Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates to the UN Security Council for the period of 2022-2023. With their election, 9 of the 15 members of the Council in 2022 will be “Friends of the Responsibility to Protect” – having appointed an R2P Focal Point and/or joined the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva. Albania, Brazil and Ghana all co-sponsored and voted for the recent UN General Assembly resolution on R2P. The United Arab Emirates also voted in favor of the resolution while Gabon did not participate in the vote. Despite its role as the UN body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often the Security Council has been unable to take timely action on mass atrocity situations due to deep political divisions inside the Council over human rights, conflict prevention and national sovereignty. In recent years this has had a debilitating effect on the Council’s capacity to respond to atrocities in Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia and elsewhere. It is therefore more important than ever for Council members to work in creative ways to ensure that the international community is able to take timely, practical action to prevent atrocities and protect vulnerable populations. Since 2005 the Security Council has adopted 92 resolutions and 21 presidential statements that refer to the Responsibility to Protect, including with regard to situations in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria and eight other country situations, as well as a number of thematic issue areas. It is our hope that the Security Council will consistently uphold their commitment to R2P by taking decisive action to avert emerging crises and halt atrocities wherever they are threatened. The Global Centre has compiled basic profiles on each of the newly elected Security Council members. These provide an overview of their engagement with R2P, including whether they have appointed an R2P Focal Point, their respective contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, and their status with relevant international legal regimes, including the Genocide Convention and Arms Trade Treaty.
Topic:
United Nations, Elections, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Brazil, Albania, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Global Focus, and Gabon

36. UN Human Rights Council Elections for 2022-2024 and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
Today, 14 October, the UN General Assembly elected Argentina, Benin, Cameroon, Eritrea, Finland, The Gambia, Honduras, India, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Montenegro, Paraguay, Qatar, Somalia, United Arab Emirates and the United States of America to the Human Rights Council (HRC) for the 2022-2024 term. With the elections of Argentina, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Paraguay, Qatar and the United States of America, 19 of the 47 Council members in 2022 will be “Friends of the Responsibility to Protect” – having appointed an R2P Focal Point and/or joined the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva. The Human Rights Council and its mechanisms and procedures – including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), investigative mechanisms, special procedures and treaty bodies, as well as the technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – all play an essential role in providing early warning of the risk factors that can lead to crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and genocide, and provide recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The election of Cameroon, Eritrea and the United Arab Emirates – states that have a history of violating human rights and perpetrating atrocities at home or abroad – undermines the credibility of the HRC. States elected to the HRC are supposed to demonstrate their commitment to the highest standards of human rights, including their full cooperation with all UN mechanisms. These are conditions set forth in UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. The fact that potential mass atrocity crimes are being perpetrated by a number of HRC member states is deeply disturbing. The Global Centre has compiled profiles on each of the newly elected Human Rights Council members. These provide a basic overview of their commitment to prevent mass atrocities by protecting and promoting human rights.
Topic:
Human Rights, United Nations, Elections, and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Political Geography:
Malaysia, India, Finland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Argentina, Qatar, Somalia, Honduras, Montenegro, Paraguay, Eritrea, United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg, Cameroon, United States of America, Benin, and Gambia

37. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:
Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

38. Evolving UAE Military and Foreign Security Cooperation: Path Toward Military Professionalism

Author:
Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The UAE has an opportunity to professionalize the military by building its strategic planning and force development capabilities and by committing to international principles of professional military conduct and greater transparency and accountability. After two decades of concerted investment and operational experience, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces, dubbed “Little Sparta,” are now one of the leading militaries in the region. With approximately 63,000 active uniformed personnel for a population of 9.9 million (only 1.2 million of which are Emirati), allegedly augmented by foreign auxiliary and mercenary forces, the UAE has gained global attention for its role in countering Iran and violent extremist networks and for interventions in Yemen and Libya. It is one of the United States’ closest military partners in the Middle East. American scholar Kenneth Pollack assesses that, taken as a whole, the UAE’s military is the most capable among the Arab states, while there may be variance across the force.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

39. June 2021 Issue

Author:
Florian Flade, Jason Warner, Alex Newhouse, and Peter Kirechu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“A series of extreme far-right cases among members of Germany’s military and police highlight the threat of the enemy within: radicalized extremists within security services, with access to weapons, training, and confidential information,” Florian Flade writes in this month’s feature article. According to Flade, “The specter of armed underground cells being trained by former or current members of the security services has been a wake-up call for authorities. New measures have already been implemented within Germany’s domestic and military intelligence agencies to more effectively root out enemies of the state wearing uniforms. Nevertheless, the threat will most likely persist in the coming years.” He adds that “with the United States and other countries also grappling with this problem set, it is vital to share lessons learned and best practices at the international level.” This month’s interview is with Idriss Mounir Lallali, the Deputy Director and Acting (Interim) Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), a structure of the African Union Commission (the secretariat of the African Union). Alex Newhouse examines “the multi-node structure” of a global network of violent neo-fascist accelerationists seeking system collapse. He writes that “evidence from Atomwaffen’s development and collapse reveals that it was not the apex of a hierarchy of groups, but rather one node in a larger network of violent accelerationists. This network is built on membership fluidity, frequent communications, and a shared goal of social destruction. This framework is vital to understanding how and why action against individual groups is not sufficient, and why the threat from Atomwaffen has not faded in spite of its reported ‘collapse.’ The lesson to be drawn from the history of the Atomwaffen Division is that the current threat of neo-fascist accelerationism exists more in the evolution of the network as a whole, rather than in any one individual group.” Peter Kirechu examines “Iran’s Currency Laundromats in the Emirates.” He writes that “Since 2014, the United States has sanctioned dozens of Iranian nationals and commercial entities for the illicit acquisition of U.S. and other foreign currencies. A close review of these designations reveals the organized character of Iran’s illicit currency laundering operations and the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in their orchestration. It also shows that Iran relies on a diverse network of illicit commercial entrepreneurs to covertly access foreign currencies abroad. These actors operate under the cover of legitimate commerce and exploit the vulnerabilities of regional economic centers—such as the United Arab Emirates—to provide covert financial resources to the Revolutionary Guards.”
Topic:
Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Fascism, Far Right, and Police
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, Germany, and United Arab Emirates

40. Regional Solutions to Regional Challenges in the Middle East?

Author:
Brandon Friedman
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Members of two rival camps in the Sunni Middle East — Qatar and Turkey on one side, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, on the other — have continued a sustained diplomatic effort at reconciliation that began early this year. In a sign of the delicate progress between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors, on September 17, the Saudi Gazette tweeted a picture of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman standing beside Qatari Emir Tamim Al Thani and Emirati Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed, all dressed informally, in the Egyptian resort city of Sharm al-Sheikh. More recently, on November 24, Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of the UAE, met in Ankara with Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in a dramatic reversal of what had appeared to be a hostile rivalry.[1] The visit resulted in the Emiratis establishing a $10 billion fund for investment in Turkey.[2]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Sectarianism, Regional Integration, Sunni, and Shiism
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates