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21. A Year after the Start of the Saudi-Emirati Blockade against Qatar. What Are the Consequences for West Africa?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On June 5th 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and agreed to isolate the Emirate via an air and land blockade. These countries decided to punish Qatar under the pretext of a speech the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, would have made on May 23rd, which reiterated the strong ties between his country and Iran.[1] The situation has been at a deadlock for a year, and Qatar refuses to apply the Emirati and Saudi Arabian list of the 13 demands. The latter mainly include the closure of the Al Jazeera TV station and the Turkish military base on its territory, downgrading diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as a total separation with movements such as Hezbollah or even the Muslim Brotherhood.[2] However, although this crisis only pits Persian Gulf countries against each other, apart from Egypt, both sides have tried to win support. Donald Trump has adopted the stance of the Saudi-Emirati side[3] – but the State Department under Rex Tillerson (2017-2018) has always remained cautious –, Europe remains neutral with no leader daring to choose one side rather than another. The confrontation was particularly marked in West Africa. Four countries in this area – Senegal, Mauritania, Chad and Niger – quickly downgraded their diplomatic relations with Qatar shortly after the start of the crisis. However, their strategy vis-à-vis this wealthy gas Emirate has changed considerably over the last twelve months, as Doha's efforts to obtain new support in the rest of West Africa has started to bear fruit.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, West Africa, Senegal, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Gulf Nations

22. The difficult promise of economic reform in the Gulf

Author:
Karen E. Young
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman—are in a period of profound change, both economic and social. The economic changes are a long overdue reaction to natural resource revenue dependency in their fiscal policies, while the social changes are a reaction to compounded migration and demographic shifts. The resilience of Gulf political economies will be defined by the ability to change both fiscal governance and policies of inclusion. Inclusion, in the context of Gulf political economies, means social protection for vulnerable groups, but it also means access to compete in a rule-based economy. The promise of economic reform, therefore, is a promise to reconfigure relations between citizen and state, and to renegotiate the provision of benefits to citizens in the form of subsidies of fuel, electricity, and water, as well as generous health and education services. And there will be taxes and new fees on everything from toll roads to sugary drinks to tobacco, and employment fees for foreigners. In exchange, citizens are promised—in some way—a retreat of the state from its predatory control over economies, though not its control over the political space and activism. Nonetheless, for many political economies of the GCC, the opening of opportunities in private ownership and investment in the sale of state assets—such as power and water plants, ports, and airports, as well as schools and hospitals—poses a challenge to the state’s track record in the provision of services. These privatizations also pose a risk to a constituency unaccustomed to fees-based service and corporate liability. Will citizens accept services from private entities at cost? Will citizens jump at the opportunity to own new companies that meet the needs of their compatriots for profit? And, perhaps most importantly, who will be left behind? The concept of resilience is often used in the literature on economic development to describe how governments can protect both citizens and their economies from external shocks, whether in the form of natural disasters, black swan events, or dramatic policy shifts. The regulatory environment and the capacity of the state to react and respond to different needs of its population, especially vulnerable groups, are key. For Gulf states, the current reform agenda is not so much a shock as a delayed reaction to a problem identified long ago. Diversification from oil-based revenue is necessary, and population growth has created an oversupply of candidates for public-sector employment that is not very productive. Generating growth has to shift, in its source and its deployment among a larger and more diverse population. The Gulf states have created their own middle-income development trap. This paper offers a wide-ranging analysis of some aspects of the reform agenda underway across the GCC. It explores specific case analyses of challenges facing individual countries (Saudi Arabia and Oman), and the organization of the GCC as a whole. It also addresses subsidy reform, the introduction of taxes and fees, and some experimental policies related to regulating labor markets and encouraging citizens to move out of public-sector employment.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Cooperation Council

23. Power play: The United Arab Emirates’ new approach to geopolitics

Author:
JMEPP
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Power – be it tangible, intangible, natural, military, or economic – shapes the capacities of the state and its role within the international system. The Middle East is no exception to this realist reading of international affairs. The Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict, the war in Yemen and the Iranian nuclear deal have all created a battleground, often quite literally, for state power interests to compete with one another. How are these power configurations linked to identity? The United States sees itself as a stronghold of liberal democracy, Japan as the quintessential trading nation, and Switzerland is comfortably ensconced in its 200-year-old neutralism. This “sense of self,” or who states are, shapes and defines what they do. Power and identity routinely mould and inform each other. For a country like the United Arab Emirates, described by many analysts as a middle, regional, or rising power, these questions hold particular relevance as the UAE reshapes its position in the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Soft Power, Identities, and State
Political Geography:
Middle East, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

24. Solitaire Arabian Style

Author:
A. Frolov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
LAST SPRING, an event in the Arab world shocked everyone. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, the capital of Qatar, their ally. One of the smallest members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) was accused of supporting “anyone threat- ening the security and stability of the GCC whether as groups or individ- uals – via direct security work or through political influence ... and hos- tile media.” On June 5, 2017, the KSA, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt officially dis- continued diplomatic relations and all types of communication with Qatar. Later, they were joined by the Maldives, Mauritius and Mauretania. Jordan and Djibouti lowered the level of their diplomatic representations in Doha. Several African countries – Senegal, Niger and Chad – recalled their ambassadors. Kuwait and Oman, both GCC mem- bers, stayed away from the action. Later, the three initiators handed Doha a list of 13 demands to end a major Gulf crisis, insisting that Qatar should shut down the Al Jazeera network, close a Turkish military base and scale down ties with Iran. They gave Qatar 10 days to comply with the demands and agree to annu- al audits in the following 10 years.1 Qatar rejected this ultimatum as inter- ference in its sovereignty. Possible repercussions notwithstanding, what happened to Qatar can be described as a manifestation of the deeply rooted social and political changes in the Arab East caused by the color revolutions unfolding amid globalization, informatization, democratization, gradual destruction of the traditional values of Eastern societies, and the frantic efforts to find adequate answers to these challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

25. Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy: Spring 2015

Author:
Jennifer Rowland, Nada Zohdy, Brian Katulis, Michael Wahid Hanna, Faysal Itani, Muhammad Y. Idris, Joelle Thomas, Tamirace Fakhoury, Farouk El-Baz, Kheireddine Bekkai, Amira Maaty, and Sarah McKnight
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Our Spring 2015 volume captures the troubling developments of the past year in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2014, the Syrian conflict that has so beguiled the international community spilled over into Iraq, with the swift and shocking rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS is causing the ever-complex alliances in the region to shift in peculiar ways. In Iraq, US airstrikes provide cover for Iranian-backed militias fighting ISIS; while in Yemen, the United States supports a Saudi intervention against a different Iranianbacked armed group that has taken control of the Yemeni capital. Meanwhile, simmering political disputes in Libya escalated into a full-blown civil war, sparking concern in neighboring Egypt, where the old authoritarian order remains in control despite the country’s popular revolution. The Gulf countries contemplate their responses to record-low oil prices, continuing negotiations between the United States and Iran, and the threat of ISIS. And Tunisia remains one of the region’s only bright spots. In November, Tunisians voted in the country’s first free and fair presidential elections. This year’s Journal brings new analysis to many of these complex events and broader regional trends. We begin with the positive: an exclusive interview with former Tunisian Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa. In this year’s feature articles: Brian Katulis zooms out to assess the Obama administration’s record in the Middle East over the past six years; Michael Wahid Hanna refutes the notion that the Iraqi and Syrian borders will need to be redrawn as a result of ISIS’ takeover; and Faysal Itani analyzes the US coalition’s strategy to defeat ISIS, arguing that it cannot succeed without empowering Sunni civilians. Muhammed Idris and Joelle Thomas turn to economics in an assessment of the United Arab Emirates’ efforts to go green. Tamirace Fakhoury points out a blind spot in the study of the Middle East and North Africa: how large diaspora communities affect political dynamics in their home countries. Farouk El-Baz takes us to Egypt, where he proposes a grand economic plan to pull the country out of poverty and set it on a path toward longterm growth. From Egypt, we move west to the oft-neglected country of Algeria, where Kheireddine Bekkai argues for more inclusive education policies on national identity. Finally, Amira Maaty comments on the region’s desperate need for robust civil societies, while Sarah McKnight calls for improvements in Jordan’s water policies.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Development, Environment, Migration, History, Natural Resources, Social Movement, Islamic State, Economy, Political stability, Arab Spring, Military Intervention, Identities, and Diversification
Political Geography:
Middle East, Algeria, North Africa, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

26. Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis

Author:
Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Given that Assad and his backers want to gut the transition process called for in the Geneva Communique, Washington should plan to take other steps in parallel to the Geneva process.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, Armed Struggle, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Geneva, Britain, United States, Iran, Washington, Turkey, Middle East, France, London, Germany, Saudi Arabia, United Nations, Italy, Syria, Switzerland, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

27. The GCC in 2015: Domestic Security Trumps Regional Integration

Author:
Karen E. Young
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The conservative Gulf Arab states are functioning more cohesively again after a year of diplomatic tensions, but questions persist about political reform, economic integration, and demographic issues. The thirty-fifth annual Gulf Cooperation Council summit, held December 10 in Qatar, was probably the most efficient meeting the group has ever held. With the diplomatic schism between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain papered over three weeks earlier, Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani hosted the rulers of Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as senior substitutes for the ailing leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman.
Political Geography:
Kuwait, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and United Arab Emirates

28. The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2013 (English/Arabic)

Author:
Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
The report entails the findings of the fifth annual survey conducted by TESEV Foreign Policy Programme in collaboration with KA Research between August 15- September 13, 2013. As in previous years, the public opinion survey reveals interesting insights into the recent Middle Eastern viewpoints, perceptions and expectations. 2800 Respondents from 16 countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Iraq and Iran) of the region reflect on Turkey’s role and regional challenges in the light of current happenings.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Tunisia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates

29. The Gulf Military Balance Volume III: The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert M. Shelala II, and Omar Mohamed
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula are critical to US strategic interests and collectively represent the single most important theater in the US - Iranian strategic competition. The proximity of the Arab Gulf states to Iran; the region's geostrategic value to the stability of the global economy; the shifting military balance; and the social, demographic, and economic tensions that threaten to create political upheavals in several key states make it a potential flash -point for tensions between Washington and Tehra.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation and Political Power Sharing
Political Geography:
Washington, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates

30. Is sectarian balance in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar at risk?

Author:
Ahmad Khalid Majidyar
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The Persian Gulf states of Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have largely been immune to the rising tide of sectarianism that has rocked the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring. The three monarchies have successfully integrated their Shi'ite minority populations into their countries' sociopolitical and economic spheres, giving those populations little reason to engage in violence or seek political guidance from Iran or Iraq. Omani, Qatari, and Emirati Shi'ites strongly identify themselves as citizens of their respective countries and remain loyal to their ruling regimes. However, the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war—a sectarian conflict between the Shi'ite Iran-Hezbollah-Assad axis and the opposition groups backed by regional Sunni governments—are threatening Sunni-Shi'ite stability in the UAE, Qatar, and to a lesser degree, Oman. The United States should help maintain harmony in these states by reaching out to independent Shi'ite business communities and by working with regional leaders to ensure equal citizenship, political rights, and religious freedom among minority populations.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Islam, Post Colonialism, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates