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71. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

72. Energising eastern Europe: How the EU can enhance energy sovereignty through cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Sovereignty, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

73. Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects

Author:
EUROPEUM
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On April 18th, EUROPEUM’s Brussels Office in partnership with PISM Brussels Office under the Think Visegrad platform hosted a discussion titled “Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects”. This event was attended by 15 experts from think tanks and representatives of EU institutions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe

74. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:
Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

75. Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO

Author:
Steven Pifer
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
For some 20 years after regaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine wavered in how far to take its relationship with NATO. That changed following Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea and engagement in fighting in Donbas in 2014. Ukraine’s leaders and people increasingly came to view the alliance as the best answer for their country’s security needs. A growing number of NATO allies support Ukraine’s membership as important for Europe’s security and are ready to extend Kyiv an invitation to join. Other allies, however, are reluctant to take that step now, particularly while Ukraine remains at war with Russia. Division within NATO over this issue broke into the open in the run-up to the alliance’s July 2023 summit in Vilnius. Allies seemed determined to avoid a repeat at the July 2024 summit in Washington. That summit described Ukraine’s path to membership as “irreversible,” and NATO decisions focused on providing Kyiv the military wherewithal to defend itself against Russia’s continuing assaults. The “when” of Ukraine’s membership remains a question for the future.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

76. Putin verbatim: Ukraine’s Use of NATO Deep Strike Missiles Would Put West at War with Russia

Author:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Pres. Putin says that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range high-precision weapons to strike deep inside Russia would require Western satellite guidance and personnel support to “assign flight missions to these missile systems.” Thus, as he sees it, the West would be directly involved in such strikes, and this would put “NATO countries… at war with Russia.” Contains full official statement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

77. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine

78. Russian Decoy Drones that Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses

Author:
Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia has developed and deployed several types of decoy drones to assist missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. This report discusses two of those decoy drones, the Gerbera (also known as Gerber) and the Parody (also known as Parodiya) UAVs that mimic the Shahed 136 and other drone systems. Both of these drones can be mass produced quickly and are built from simple materials like plywood, foam, and a few electronics, making them inexpensive compared to their more costly counterparts. Ukraine has become increasingly proficient at identifying, tracking, and intercepting Russian airborne platforms, like missiles and drones. To increase the effectiveness of Russian barrages, these decoy drones are launched in large numbers alongside missiles and attack drones, like the Shahed 136 and Lancet-3, to overwhelm and confuse Ukrainian defenses to draw anti-aircraft fire on the decoys, allowing other weapons to reach their targets. Ukrainian defenders can never be entirely certain that an incoming drone does not carry an explosive warhead, forcing them to expend valuable munitions intercepting these drones. Because Ukraine has limited stockpiles of interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, and hunter-killer-drones, deploying decoy drones is a viable strategy to wear down Ukrainian defenders. Using decoy drones can also help Russian forces identify where Ukraine has positioned anti-aircraft defenses, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and target those in subsequent attacks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Drones, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

79. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

80. Russian Company Drake LLC’s Procurements for JSC Alabuga’s Military Drone Projects - JSC Alabuga’s Weaponization of Commercial Drones for Military Use in Ukraine

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JSC Alabuga shifted from centering on hosting domestic and international civilian manufacturing facilities at its Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to direct military production of military drones, in particular the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone under a supply and franchise contract with Iran. This shift has necessitated the large-scale procurement of a variety of different types of goods abroad. One of JSC Alabuga’s important procurement arms has been Drake LLC, aka Dreik LLC, which contracts with Alabuga Development Company, JSC Alabuga’s main construction and production arm. Drake’s role in outfitting military industries was recognized on February 23, 2024, when it was sanctioned by the United States. However, its precise dealings which warranted this designation have received little public scrutiny. The case of Drake exposes a part of Alabuga’s drone production supply chain and its broader interest in military drones in addition to the Shahed 136 drone. This case study reveals how Alabuga Development Company purchased in early 2023 via Drake and a third party in Kazakhstan, DRONE.kz, up to 30 Dragonfish drones from Autel Robotics, a major Chinese drone manufacturer with a strong U.S. presence, for modification at Alabuga for military use in Ukraine. The planned changes included extending the drone’s range, strengthening its ability to defeat jamming from enemy electronic warfare systems, and/or attaching a universal delivery system for a variety of ordnance, such as grenades and video-guided rocket propelled grenades.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Manufacturing, Procurement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine