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51. No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The West supports Ukraine as a non-belligerent. China purports to be neutral, but the West increasingly sees it as a non-belligerent on the side of Russia. In a way, the West’s and China’s approaches are not dissimilar: doing enough for “their” side to stop it from losing the war, but otherwise sitting it out in the hope that the other side will somehow give up. That can hardly be called a strategy. Both the West and China will have to review their strategies if they want to preserve their interests. Will this inevitably increase tensions between them?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

52. No silver bullet: Aid is not a shortcut to victory for Ukraine

Author:
Michael DiMino
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Delayed or insufficient Western aid is often blamed for Ukraine’s lack of success on the battlefield. The truth is more complicated. There is no aid “silver bullet” for what ails Ukraine’s war effort. More aid alone is unlikely to make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, especially if Ukraine’s structural disadvantages and strategic deficiencies remain unaddressed. More aid is unlikely to fundamentally change the conflict because Ukraine lacks the manpower necessary to use it to generate enough new combat power to retake lost territory. Moreover, the West does not currently possess the industrial capacity needed to fulsomely sustain an indefinite Ukrainian war effort. Russian adaptability and battlefield innovation have successfully blunted the effectiveness of several Western weapon systems. And Ukrainian doctrine and tactics remain suboptimal even in the third year of the war, meaning Kyiv has failed to employ the aid it does receive with maximal effectiveness. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has articulated a clear theory of victory for Ukraine. Western aid was always a stopgap to buy Ukraine time, not a regime-change project to bring about the dissolution of the Russian state. Instead of continuing to placate maximalist fantasies of total victory, the U.S. should advocate for a shift to a defensive strategy and openness to a negotiated settlement that ends the war, such that a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state can be preserved in the face of fighting to collapse.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

53. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Mobilisation in Wartime

Author:
Andriy Stavytskyy
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we launch a new series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the first brief of the series, Andriy Stavytskyy examines Ukraine’s need to mobilise, prepare and train half a million men to relieve those who have fought since the start of the full-scale war. This will not only challenge the military but will also have profound economic effects.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Mobilization, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Evolution of Grand Strategy

Author:
Leonid Polyakov
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we are publishing a second series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the second brief of the series, Leonid Polyakov observes that while Ukraine’s strategic objectives have remained the same throughout the war, the ways and means to achieve them have shifted. Surprise and mass have become less relevant, but technology must be mobilised through society-wide efforts if Ukraine is to prevail. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s longer-term security requires the construction of a credible deterrence posture.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

57. Russia’s War in Ukraine: War and Society

Author:
Mykola Nazarov
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 tested the functioning of both Ukraine’s state apparatus and its entire society. During the period 2022-24, the relationships between civilian society, the political elite, and the military have reflected two distinct phases of the war. The first phase occurred during 2022 when Ukrainians were engaged an existential struggle for their nation and was marked by a surge in civic consciousness, a high level of self-organisation, and a constructive relationship between the military, elite, and civil society. From early 2023, however, the war became ‘routinised’. This second phase has been characterised by war fatigue, habituation to war as the new normal, and a division in society between those who are included in the war’s infrastructure and those who mainly focus on their own lives. In the third brief of the series, Mykola Nazarov writes that the consequent changes in trust in the political and military leadership have significantly complicated cooperation between these parts of Ukrainian society. He concludes that overcoming cleavages in society is essential in building the resilience necessary to resist an aggressor and that the consolidation of power as a response to the challenge of external aggression is to be expected, but it is not the optimal management solution. Political plurality, freedom of speech and the ability of the opposition to criticise the authorities without pressure and propose better solutions are necessary for effective governance in wartime. Also, civil-military relations need to be distanced from personalities and based on a robust culture and a framework of inter-institutional cooperation. The Ukrainian system of power has become hyper-personalised, which negatively affects its effectiveness.
Topic:
Civil Society, War, Resilience, Securitization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

58. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

59. The Washington Summit: NATO-Ukraine

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the first brief of the series, Henrik Larsen looks at the additional steps NATO might take in Washington to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression. There is seemingly no common appetite to advance Ukraine’s membership status, but the Alliance is likely to take a new role in coordinating the delivery of lethal aid. It may also agree an initiative to secure more stable longer-term financing of military assistance. Even so, it is hard to see that NATO’s support and solidarity represent a genuine commitment to Ukraine’s future security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

60. Ukraine’s Practical Steps towards NATO

Author:
Maksym Skrypchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. Ukraine recognises that while it is unlikely to be invited to join NATO any time soon, there is much it can do to prepare itself in advance of a formal invitation. In the final brief of the series, Maksym Skrypchenko describes Ukraine’s progress in implementing its defence reform agenda, focusing on its record of adopting NATO standards, and outlines the challenges of doing so in wartime. The continuing support of NATO Allies will be essential to these efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Reform, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America