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421. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

422. REVISITING THE EMBOLDENING POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Author:
Kyungwon Suh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Do nuclear weapons make their possessors more aggressive? A series of high-profile aggressive actions by some nuclear-armed states appear to substantiate the argument that nuclear weapons enable aggressive behavior. Since its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February, Russia has continued to conduct brutal, coercive operations, including missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and population centers. North Korea has continued to test launch a wide array of missiles, one of which recently landed close to South Korea’s territorial waters. Policymakers also echo the view that nuclear weapons are more than simply defensive weapons. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review argues that Russian leaders have exploited their nuclear arsenal as a “shield” behind which they launched military aggression against Ukraine. When he was CIA Director, Formal Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons “beyond self-preservation.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russia-Ukraine War, and Mike Pompeo
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

423. FOOD INSECURITY AND UNREST: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

Author:
Thomas S. Benson, Ore Koren, and Benjamin E. Bagozzi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked fears that skyrocketing commodity prices—especially of wheat (Ukraine and Russia together account for about one-quarter of the world’s exports), oil, and gas—will cause a global wave of food protests. War, coupled with rapidly rising inflation—which has also been linked to bread riots—and more frequent climatic shocks suggest that concerns about food insecurity creating global unrest are timely and warrant further examination. At the same time, framing the complexities of sociopolitical environments as simple “kneejerk” reactions to rising food insecurity risks oversimplifying the situation and our ability to address it. Previous studies that identify a clear relationship between food prices and protests emphasize this risk.
Topic:
Food Security, Civil Unrest, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and Papua New Guinea

424. Geopolitical Struggle between Russia and Turkey: The Intersection of Ukraine and Syrian Crises

Author:
Rahman Dag
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
As a new but uncertain international system has been operating for decades that can be regarded as a transition from unipolarity to something resembling multipolarity. Therefore, established and possible future great powers have been determining their foreign policies according to their future projections of the regional conflicts. This paper investigates Turkey and Russia’s stances in the Syrian and Ukrainian Crises. It might sound odd that Russia and Turkey are comparable in a struggle for the sphere of influence that intercepts each other. However, their good bilateral relations and different, even conflictual, approaches to regional and international issues provide a suitable ground to claim that a new international system is about to emerge. It will continue until the positions of established and newly emerged great powers are embedded. In practice, Russia's stance in the Ukrainian crisis and Turkey's stance in the Syrian crisis represent ontological threads to the vision of their own countries. However, they can still work together at a certain level because of third-party involvement in the issues
Topic:
Hegemony, Crisis Management, Humanitarian Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

425. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

426. Rethinking & Revisiting Diplomacy Volume XXIII, Number 1

Author:
Richard M. O'Meara, Sylvia Paola, Claude Rakisits, William Maley, Stephen F. Sener, Mathew J. Martin, Ivelaw L. Griffith, and Ilan Kelman
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Since the turn of the century, we have seen conflicts emerge, stabilize, and deteriorate as the world has shifted towards a period of post-colonization and globalization. In the past two decades, we have seen the rise, fall, and resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. We have seen the near-century-old conflict in Palestine-Israel and Jammu-Kashmir heighten with civilian lives at stake. Myanmar marched forward with a democratically elected leader yet fell victim to a military coup d’état. The COVID-19 pandemic brought a multitude of conflicts, impacting individual countries and the global world on three levels: political, economic, and social. This global health crisis brought to the forefront a new type of diplomacy: health diplomacy. The current status of these conflicts, amongst others, pushes us to question the traditional nature of diplomacy and understand what must be done to reconfigure diplomacy for the next era. This year’s issue seeks to serve as a discourse on the failures and the future of diplomacy processes. The twenty-third volume of the Journal contains seven articles on a variety of different conflicts and current diplomacy processes, serving either as case studies or recommendations. The first four articles focus on traditional diplomacy processes and the last four focus on health diplomacy. Richard M. O’Meara analyzes the cases of wars in Afghanistan and Ukraine, arguing that not only is it crucial for practitioners and scholars to understand the beginning and end of war, but that we they must also understand as well as the conduct of battle. Examining the historical and legal definition of preventative diplomacy, Sylvia Paola evaluates the contemporary approaches and non-traditional security threats to preventative diplomacy, focusing on Mexico’s strategy for preventive diplomacy during its time as a United Nations Security Council member. Alluding to the possibility of peace in the South Asian subcontinent, Claude Rakisits outlines a three-step grand plan to carve the path to a free and demilitarized Jammu and Kashmir. Utilizing a 1½ track dialogue, focusing on the rights of self-determination, Rakisits posits that the resolution of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as a result, lead to peace between Pakistan and India. William Maley explores why “regional solutions” to refugee crises, especially in the case of Australia, may not be the answer to solving the refugee problem because of the influence of a state’s domestic politics favoring itself over the good of the people. When these traditional modes of diplomacy fail, what comes next? As Stephen F. Sener and Matthew J. Martin explore this same question, their answer is: health diplomacy. Focusing on past efforts of health diplomacy, Sener and Martin offer solutions to contribute to global health diplomacy and expand on how this will become a lifeline for state relations. As vaccination continues to be a key driver in the discourse of health diplomacy, Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith studies the gap in vaccine diplomacy dynamics in relation to the power players and the nature of their investment in a combination of humanitarianism and geopolitics. With the diplomatic arena expanding beyond nation-states, it is key to take into consideration the influence of non-state actors such as pharmaceutical companies and multi-lateral organizations. Ilan Kelman examines the potential for health diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic from a disaster diplomacy perspective, analyzing its impact on peace, cooperation, and diplomacy between countries. His analysis suggests that while pandemic-related actions may complement existing peace and cooperation efforts, COVID-19 alone is unlikely to lead to new and sustainable diplomatic initiatives for a more peaceful future. As the world continues to grapple with conflicts, traditional modes of diplomacy are being challenged, and health diplomacy is emerging as a critical element in state relations. The articles presented in this volume provide insights into the complexities of various conflicts and offer recommendations for practitioners and scholars alike. It is clear that diplomacy in the next era must be reconfigured to adapt to the changing global landscape, and health diplomacy must be embraced as a vital component of state relations.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Health, War, Refugees, Vaccine, COVID-19, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Ukraine, Kashmir, Caribbean, and Mexico

427. Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations

Author:
Gavin Wilde
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A review of academic, doctrinal, and journalistic writing covering the last three decades of Russian military theorizing on cyber-related issues yields three hypotheses that may explain the mismatch between the expectations of many Western observers and the reported impact of Russian cyber operations in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.1 By exploring the unique and oft-overlooked facets of Moscow’s conceptualization of “cyber,” this paper provides a foundation for better assessing Russia’s performance in cyberspace in Ukraine in early 2022, along with a more nuanced understanding of its capabilities and possible expectations going forward. These hypotheses are as follows: Russia’s Information Operations Troops—a rough analog to Western military cyber commands—remains in its infancy and appears optimized more for counterpropaganda than for offensive cyber operations. The operational command structure over offensive cyber operations, meanwhile, remains murky and is possibly more political than military in nature. Russia’s premier offensive cyber capacities are housed within agencies focused on intelligence and subversion—the key tool kits used against Ukraine since 2014—rather than combined-arms warfare. Moscow’s secretive and poorly executed February 2022 invasion precluded optimal performance in the initial period of the war, which is particularly pivotal in Russian thinking about effectiveness in the information domain. These are each examined through Russia’s own information warfare prism, which differs in crucial ways from Western conceptions of “cyber”—foremost in that it is more expansive, encompassing and emphasizing the psychosocial impacts of information and communication technologies on both the polity and the public.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

428. Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This paper examines the military effectiveness of Russia’s wartime cyber operations in Ukraine,1 the reasons why these operations have not had greater strategic impact, and the lessons applicable to other countries’ military cyber efforts. It builds on previous analyses by taking a more systematic and detailed approach that incorporates a wider range of publicly available data. A major purpose of this paper is to help bridge the divide between cyber-specific and general military analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war. Most analysis of Russian cyber operations in Ukraine has been produced by cyber specialists writing for their own field, with limited integration of non-cyber military sources and concepts. Conversely, leading accounts of the war as a whole include virtually no mention of cyber operations.2 To begin filling the gap, this paper places Russian cyber operations in Ukraine within the larger frame of Moscow’s military objectives, campaigns, and kinetic activities.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

429. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

430. My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine

Author:
Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Western governments, including the United States, immediately condemned what they described as “Vladimir Putin’s war.”1 Surely, this formulation was no accident. It was aimed, first and foremost, at drawing a distinction between the actions of the Kremlin and the attitudes of ordinary Russians. There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.2 But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Partly in response to these indicators, figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have called for a visa ban for all Russian passport holders, with an exception for people whose safety is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution.3 According to Zelenskyy, “[T]he most important sanctions are to close the borders—because the Russians are taking away someone else’s land” and Russians should “live in their own world until they change their philosophy.” He added, “The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it.” Such sentiments are echoed in calls by some European politicians, such as Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, for an EU ban on tourist visas. “It’s not right that at the same time as Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It’s not right,” Marin said in mid-August.4 At the same time, a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect. A more careful reading of sociological data, including conversations with focus group participants and quantitative research, presents a far more complex picture of Russian society.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Society, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine