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331. Vilnius NATO Summit and Security Guarantees for Ukraine

Author:
Oleksandr Chalyi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The July NATO summit in Vilnius will undoubtedly be a momentum of truth for future relations with Ukraine. NATO will face one of the most difficult strategic dilemmas in its recent history. Namely, it will have to find an answer to the question “What threatens the security of the member states of the organization more - membership or non-membership of Ukraine in NATO?” Today, it is obvious that a consensus among all NATO members for the adoption in Vilnius of a historic decision on Ukraine's membership in the organization has not yet been reached. However, it is also clear that the principle of strategic uncertainty regarding Ukraine's membership in NATO will also not receive consensus support at the Vilnius Summit. At a time when the Ukrainian people, with enormous sacrifices, are successfully resisting full-scale Russian aggression while defending de facto NATO's eastern borders, most NATO members are in favour of a strategiccertainty of security relations with Ukraine. But the key point is that Ukraine itself is no longer ready to be satisfied with the “open door policy” or the rubber formula of the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, which do not contain a clear algorithm (MAP or NATO decision on the adoption procedure) when and under what conditions NATO will be legally obliged to accept Ukraine to the Alliance. In this connection, President Zelensky repeatedly and firmly declares zero tolerance for any attempts during the Vilnius summit to leave Ukraine in a zone of strategic uncertainty regarding its prospects for accelerated NATO membership. Therefore, to give a concrete and honest answer is an imperative that every NATO member must comply with at the Vilnius Summit. It should be remembered that Ukraine pays for this momentum of truth with the blood of its soldiers and civilians, defending also de facto NATO's eastern borders. Such a response also suggests that any previous experience of Ukraine and NATO on security guarantees should be carefully studied and taken into account in the context of new geopolitical realities, so that mistakes and achievements of past periods are taken into account when making new decisions.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Security Guarantees
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

332. A question of balance: India and Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
European officials are frustrated at India’s apparent fence-sitting over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, for Indian policymakers, maintaining a workable relationship with Russia is central to counterbalancing Chinese hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. India also depends significantly on Russia for arms supplies, including advanced systems that help it keep pace with China. Despite this, India has for some time been slowly decoupling from Russia and strengthening its relations with the West, especially the US. Europeans should be aware of how India defines its own strategic positioning, and support India where possible as they negotiate the tricky issues relating to the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Arms Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and India

333. Peace versus Justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
In the first 100 days of Russia’s war on Ukraine, European public opinion helped to solidify Europe’s political response. But a new poll reveals that diverging public preferences could weaken this unity. ECFR’s research shows that, while Europeans feel great solidarity with Ukraine and support sanctions against Russia, they are split about the long-term goals. They divide between a “Peace” camp (35 per cent of people) that wants the war to end as soon as possible, and a “Justice” camp that believes the more pressing goal is to punish Russia (22 per cent of people). In all countries, apart from Poland, the “Peace” camp is larger than the “Justice” camp. European citizens worry about the cost of economic sanctions and the threat of nuclear escalation. Unless something dramatically changes, they will oppose a long and protracted war. Only in Poland, Germany, Sweden, and Finland is there substantial public support for boosting military spending. Governments will need to find a new language to bridge the gap between these emerging camps, in order to strengthen European unity and avoid polarisation between and within countries. The key will be to present arms deliveries and sanctions as part of a defensive war.
Topic:
European Union, Refugees, Peace, Justice, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Poland, and Germany

334. Partnership for Enlargement: A new way to integrate Ukraine and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Author:
Piotr Buras and Kai-Olaf Lana
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine puts the entire future European order at risk. It is already forcing a profound reconsideration of the EU’s and its neighbours’ interests. To address this, the EU needs to devise a new approach to its neighbourhood, similar to the way in which it has rapidly enhanced its security and economic policies to respond to the threat. The EU should establish a Partnership for Enlargement that offers Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Western Balkans states concrete steps towards deeper integration – and a pathway to eventual membership. This new partnership should include three ‘pillars’: single market integration and the reconstruction of Ukraine; a reinforced commitment to energy security and climate transition; and stronger political cooperation in security matters. As countries with key interests in the Ukraine war, Germany and Poland should work particularly closely to drive this new project forward.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

335. Green peace: How Europe’s climate policy can survive the war in Ukraine

Author:
Susi Dennison
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has weakened European governments’ commitment to EU climate goals. European leaders should intensify their efforts to build clean, sustainable energy security in practice – not just in theory. They should also address the climate challenge as a matter of EU – rather than national – energy sovereignty. Europeans will be locked into longer-term carbon dependency and unable to benefit from economies of scale if they only operate nationally. Strong thought leadership will be needed to achieve this change of mindset. France has an opportunity to build bridges between groups of member states, working alongside the upcoming presidencies of the EU. Denmark, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Austria are all willing partners in this, as they are already cooperating to implement the European Green Deal.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Leadership, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

336. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:
Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

337. In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Security support and other help from Western partners made a concrete difference to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion and, in some cases, retake territory. Had the EU established a security compact that provided security assistance in a range of areas, Ukraine could have been even more successful in its resistance. A security compact would have enabled Europeans to send more comprehensive packages of support, as they would have already addressed major questions about how to respond to a Russian attack. The West and Ukraine have both learned a significant amount about what support they should consider. The EU should now establish a security compact that enhances assistance for Ukraine. Joint planning between European armed forces and the Ukrainian defence industry to agree schedules for the replacement of key arms would free up equipment to be supplied to Ukraine. The EU should consider drawing up security compacts with Moldova and Georgia, both of which are vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

338. Radioactive Consequences of a War in Ukraine

Author:
Rico Chandra
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
A war in Ukraine could lead to thousands of radioactive sources getting lost, or worse, getting stolen and repurposed for political destabilization. So what is a radioactive “source”? It is a material that is specifically manufactured for the purpose of emitting radiation. For example, some forms of cancer are treated using radiotherapy whereby intense gamma radiation, emitted from a pencil-sized lump of radioactive metal, is directed at the tumor. This lump of highly radioactive metal is a radioactive “source”.
Topic:
Health, Military Strategy, Radiological Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

339. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

340. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
Topic:
Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe