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281. Conventional and Hybrid Actions in the Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Craisor-Constantin Ionita
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The paper aims to analytically present the existing data and information regarding notable aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, notably through lessons identified in the political-military field, both conventionally and hybrid. The article hypothesis starts from the consideration that even the war is not over, there are some lessons identified that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment. The author uses the analytical method of research to explain the cause-effect relationship between the war itself and its future influence for the European security and world order, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. It will also theoretically test those implications to determine whether they fit the specified hypothesis. The conflict itself has deepened the international consequences of almost two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It magnified the disastrous security situation not only in Europe, but all around the world, by creating additional energy (gas) and food (cereal) crises. Therefore, the Russian – Ukrainian War has significantly modified regional and international security environment and there are tendencies to challenge the current World order. What happened in Ukraine in the past year has and will continue to have direct implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. Therefore, this paper is significant for advising the political-military decision-makers on better understanding the modern operational environment and addapting future defence capabilities to face 21st Century Warfare.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

282. Rebuilding Ukraine: What the International Community Now Needs to Consider

Author:
Jörn Grävingholt and Jörg Faust
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq. • Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted. • Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time. • Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect. • Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them. • Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included. • Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war. • Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees. • Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society.
Topic:
Reconstruction, International Community, Post-Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

283. Hard choices: if not now, when?

Author:
Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Yet, even before the NATO Summit, the long-expected Ukrainian spring counteroffensive was falling short of the significant gains anticipated after the massive Western aid provided during the war’s first 15 months – $37.6 billion in U.S. security assistance alone, according to the Pentagon (May 31, 2023). With Kyiv nonetheless insisting in late summer, that “we don’t care how long it takes,” questions are now raised, morally awkward but strategically valid and likely to spread over the coming months: How much longer before it proves too long, and how much more will be needed before it is too much?
Topic:
NATO, Armed Conflict, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

284. Moldova, land of the European Union's partnership mission

Author:
Florent Parmentier
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Sharing 939 kilometres of borders with Ukraine, Moldova is closest to the epicentre of the war that began on 24 February 2022. From the very first weeks onwards, the Moldovan authorities had to build reception facilities for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the fighting in the south and east of the country. In diplomatic and strategic terms, this war has also played a role in accelerating events, since in June 2022 Moldova was, against all expectations, recognised as candidate country to the European Union. The credit for this European rapprochement goes largely to the leadership team headed by President Maia Sandu. He later, with her party (Party of Action and Solidarity, PAS), has led the nation's dynamic forces along this demanding path of transformation, despite the many difficulties that the country faces. The war has already changed Moldova’s geopolitical situation, which has to contend with a great number of hybrid threats from Russia. In other words, beyond the success of the European Political Community Summit, organised at Castelul Mimi on 1 June last, and the many political signals received on this occasion, Moldova still needs assistance on the road to European transformation. This is why the Europeans decided to launch a partnership mission on 31 May last in Chisinau together with the High Representative Josep Borrell, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Nicu Popescu and the then Home Affairs Minister, Ana Revenco.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, Hybrid Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

285. VIEWPOINT: IS MILITARY AID REALLY THE BEST WAY TO HELP UKRAINE?

Author:
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Molly Wallace, and Ned Dobos
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Ukraine has received tens of billions of dollars worth of military aid since the Russian invasion began one year ago. The international consensus seems to be that supporting Ukraine means financing its war effort. But a few dissenting voices have emerged of late, more ambivalent about the prudence—and ethics—of the current policy. Colonel Douglas MacGregor, a former advisor to the US Secretary of Defence, has warned that the choice of cure could turn out to be worse than the disease. At least 7,000 Ukrainian civilians have already perished in the war. Thousands more have been injured, and millions have been displaced. MacGregor’s primary concern is that the bleeding will continue for as long as the fighting does. Russian forces advance, Ukrainian forces resist with violence, Russia responds with counter-violence, and the bodies continue to pile up. The Ukrainian state retains its sovereignty, but eventually we get to a point where, to quote MacGregor, “There are no longer any Ukrainians left!” This is hyperbole, of course, but that should not distract from the valid point MacGregor is making. States exist for the sake of their citizens, not the other way around. Therefore, if a given method of defending the state is causing its citizens to be killed or to flee en masse, that is a compelling reason to explore alternatives.
Topic:
Resistance, Armed Conflict, Nonviolence, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

286. THE LIMITS OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND

Author:
Costantino Pischedda and Andrew Cheon
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Drone strikes targeted Moscow last week. Though much remains unknown about it, the episode appears to be part of a series of unclaimed coercive attacks that US officials attributed to Ukrainian government personnel, including the killing of the daughter of a Russian nationalist, the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines, and drone attacks on the Kremlin. With unclaimed coercion, perpetrators impose costs on adversaries to signal their resolve to prevail in disputes while denying involvement or simply not making any claim about responsibility. Unclaimed coercion is not unique to the war in Ukraine. Russia launched cyber attacks in 2007 to extract concessions from Estonia, though Moscow denied responsibility, and in 2010 Seoul claimed North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship, Pyongyang’s denial notwithstanding. Unclaimed coercion may have strategic benefits. Without unmistakable evidence about the identity of the perpetrator, the absence of a claim of responsibility creates plausible deniability, which, some argue, allows coercers to send intelligible, credible messages to targets while containing escalation risks. It may also reduce the costs of being seen as a norm violator. For instance, Austin Carson observed that, though both Saudi Arabia and the United States viewed the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities as part of an Iranian coercive campaign, the absence both of conclusive evidence and a claim of responsibility prevented Riyadh and Washington from carrying out a tough military response, which would have looked “illegitimate while jeopardizing allies’ support.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Armed Conflict, Coercion, Russia-Ukraine War, and Plausible Deniability
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, South Korea, North Korea, and Cuba

287. Resolving the Russia-Ukraine Impasse: Lessons from an African Cosmological Viewpoint

Author:
Evans O. Ogada
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This paper makes a case for the utility of Ubuntu philosophy in providing a context within which resolving the conflict and post-conflict stages of the war between Russia and Ukraine may take place. Before speaking to Ubuntu’s conflict resolution utility, it is first necessary to provide an explanation of its basic tenets because it is not likely to be well-known to the readers of Baku Dialogues.
Topic:
Philosophy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Ukraine

288. The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Exhaustion of the 1945 World Order: Tracing the Origins, Examining the Consequences

Author:
Manuel Becerra Ramírez
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I n the early hours of Thursday, 24 February 2022, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin launched what it called a “special military operation” on Ukrainian territory. On 21 February 2022, Russia officially recognized the two selfproclaimed people’s republics that had established themselves in earlier rounds of fighting. This was supposedly based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for legitimate individual or collective defense. Later that year, Russia annexed them outright. Of course, in reality, Russia’s invasion violated the UN Charter and the principles contained therein. This constitutes a disregard for the norms that emerged after World War II as understood by the proponents of the “rules-based international liberal order” and others. The UN Charter privileges the solution of conflicts by peaceful means. Legitimate defense is only permissible in the face of a current attack, not a hypothetical one (this is why, for example, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was termed a “preemptive war” by the George W. Bush Administration). Moreover, the UN Security Council (with what is effectually an endorsement or legitimization function) must always be aware of such actions.
Topic:
History, Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

289. ‘Appeasement’ and the Current Crisis: How ‘Munich’ Impoverishes Western Grand Strategy

Author:
Christopher J. Fettweis
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy loves to remind any Western leader who seems about to go wobbly that appeasing aggressors is not only dishonorable but strategically unwise and dangerous. When Henry Kissinger, for instance, suggested in May 2022 at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos that Ukraine may need to make territorial concessions to end the war, Zelenskyy said this: “It seems that Mr. Kissinger’s calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time.” Indeed, Munich makes an appearance in every speech (and most off-hand remarks) that the Ukrainian president makes, as if the conference happened in 2018 rather than 1938. Zelenskyy knows his audience. The lessons of Munich and appeasement are deeply ingrained in the strategic consciousness of the United States and its allies. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the dangers posed by appeasing dictators is one of the central tenets of the Western foreign policy establishment. Those arguing for staunch opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin employ the analogy as much as possible, accusing anyone who disagrees of being ignorant of the most basic of lessons that history supposedly teaches. The word “supposedly” is doing a lot of work in that sentence. This brief essay begins by providing a historical overview of appeasement and explains how the lessons of Munich have been mislearned by generations of Western policymakers. That infamous conference did not lead to the Second World War, which was coming no matter what British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain did at the negotiating table. The essay then turns to the effect of misremembrance on U.S. foreign policy to this day, including its influence on the debates regarding Russia’s barbarous invasion of Ukraine. It would be best for everyone involved if the true history of the Munich conference was widely known, or barring that (since it is probably too late), that it was forgotten altogether. This essay provides a historical overview of appeasement, explains how the lessons of Munich have been mislearned by generations of Western policymakers, and then turns to the effect of misremembrance on U.S. foreign policy to this day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Grand Strategy, Appeasement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

290. The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Anya Fink
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, and even before February 2022, the Russian government has conducted intense nuclear rhetoric and actions. This behavior is a specific approach to strategic deterrence that seeks to incorporate nonmilitary and military (nuclear and nonnuclear) means into a continuous spectrum of actions for deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. Nuclear weapons are the foundation of credible strategic deterrence and signaling with these and other strategic capabilities could in theory be instrumental for deterring the escalation of a local conflict to a regional war. Russian signaling varies from aggressive declarations from Putin himself but also Russian officials such as Medvedev or journalistic cronies, to medium to large scale strategic exercises like the infamous Grom. Likewise, on the international stage, Russia has shown restraint by reimplementing the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration, but also deliberate disrespect of arms control agreements, notably by suspending its participation to the New START treaty. In practice, however, Russia’s use of strategic deterrence signaling in this conflict has been met with mixed results insofar as it has not compelled the cessation of or constraints on Western lethal aid to Ukraine, even though it may have, at least in the eyes of Russian officials, deterred direct Western intervention. Consequently, there might be more to expect from Russia, depending on the evolution of the daily battlefield in Ukraine. If the use of a nuclear weapon is still very unlikely, some other strategic moves in the hybrid domain (cyberattacks, attacks on undersea cables, information manipulation) could also serve as signaling.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine