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271. Russia's War in Ukraine: Two Decisive Factors

Author:
Gilbert W. Merkx
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The various stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and of Ukrainian responses, are analyzed in terms of two decisive factors: 1) force structures and 2) command and control. Both these factors are in turn conditioned by characteristics of the governing political regime and the evolution of that regime.
Topic:
Command and Control, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

272. The Deficiency of Disparity: The Limits of Systemic Theory and the Need for Strategic Studies in Power Transition Theory

Author:
Athahn Steinback and Steven Childs
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article synthesizes power transition theory (PTT) at the grand strategic scale with military studies methods at lower levels of analysis. We analyze the Russo-Japanese War, the recent Afghan War, and the ongoing war in Ukraine as conflicts where political-military specificities enabled outmatched powers to win or force a stalemate. These cases demonstrate the decisive influence of power projection, doctrine, geopolitical constraints, and readiness on conflict outcomes. Finally, the authors operationalize PTT at the grand strategic scale alongside military studies methods at the operational level to propose U.S. responses to Chinese regional revisionism.
Topic:
Geopolitics, History, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Japan, China, South Asia, Ukraine, and Taiwan

273. The Potential Impact of Ukrainian Accession on the EU’s Budget

Author:
Michael Emerson
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
If hypothetically Ukraine was already today a full EU Member State, it could be benefitting from around EUR 18-19 billion of receipts from the EU budget, net of contributions – i.e. roughly within the range of Poland and Romania scaled to fit Ukraine. At current rates, this would mean an increase in GNI-based contributions by all Member States of around 10 %, with only Spain changing from a (small) net beneficiary to a (small) net payer. However, this is only a simple ‘static’ reference number for a more complex and realistic assessment with many ‘dynamic’ factors that could reduce this amount by the time Ukraine might actually accede over the course of the next decade. These can include catching up to the relative prosperity of Poland and Romania, possibly making budgetary room for poorer new Member States, and control valves with capping mechanisms for budget spending on cohesion and agriculture. Both capping mechanisms would need reform, but there is room for negotiation of mutually acceptable outcomes. It is sometimes rumoured that the Ukraine bill would turn all of today’s net beneficiaries into net payers to the EU budget. Our calculations show that this speculation, or maybe disinformation, is absolutely unfounded. The EU’s proposed new EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024 to 2027, averaging EUR 12.5 billion per year in grants and loans, is already not so far behind the static estimate for full membership. There are further huge uncertainties affecting the outcome – how the war may end, how far donors and investors other than the EU will contribute to reconstruction, and the idea of ‘Making Russia pay,’ given most of its frozen EUR 300 billion assets are held in the EU. Overall, the budgetary aspect of Ukraine’s possible accession looks relatively manageable, compared to other more intractable political, economic, demographic, and security issues. Three recommendations are presented, including on the need for the European Commission to inform public debate along the lines of the present paper to avoid speculation over exaggerated concerns.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

274. One year of war in Ukraine

Author:
Christian Leffler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
It has been just over one year since Russia began its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. In that year, the EU has stepped up and provided copious amounts of support to Ukraine – economic and military, as well as providing a safe haven for millions of Ukrainians who have fled the fighting. As the conflict has now entered its second year, this CEPS Explainer dives deep to analyse what has defined the first year and then expands on what the EU needs to concretely do in the second if Ukraine is to have any hope of triumphing over the invaders. This will require vision, courage and boldness from European leaders. The alternative if they fail? A rules-based international order replaced by a ruthless multipolar world defined by competing spheres of influence.
Topic:
European Union, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

275. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

276. Post-conflict Reconstruction in Ukraine: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
During her first visit to Kyiv on 21 February 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni reassured President Volodymyr Zelensky concerning the Italian commitment to the Ukrainian resistance and defence against the Russian invasion. To most people’s surprise, she stated that “we [Prime Minister Meloni and President Zelensky] have spoken a lot today about reconstruction, not only for when the conflict ends, but also now”.[1] As a concrete follow-up on this commitment, on 26 April a bilateral conference on Ukraine’s reconstruction was held in Rome.[2] Indeed, the word “reconstruction” in reference to Ukraine has been used since the spring of 2022 at the EU level. This is a great achievement for the post-conflict researchers’ community and research centres that have restlessly highlighted the importance of dealing with conflict and post-conflict as a complex spectrum, where recovery considerations need to be taken into account from the early stages. When designing international efforts for physical reconstruction and investment, emerging challenges to good governance and rule of law, such as corruption, must be carefully considered and managed. Furthermore, it is paramount to discuss also non-physical aspects of reconstruction, encompassing all the threats to human security, such as the presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW), that could foster instability in the country after the end of the war.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Post-Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Economic Aid
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

277. The changing face of Russia’s information war against Ukraine and other democratic countries: Lessons and recommendations. Interview with Professor Sinan Aral

Author:
Sinan Aral
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Aral: Pre-2020 strategies of misinformation and disinformation have evolved over the last 5 years but they have not been any less intense. In fact, they have potentially been at least as intense and sometimes more intense. The tactics have changed. Before 2020, the western world was not as cognisant or prepared to deal with Russian dis- and misinformation online. And so, Russian tactics were much more overt. In particular, what they would do was use bots and human trolls and sock pockets to spread mis- and disinformation. And bots were a big part of it.3 I think that now what you see more of is the amplification of real voices because those are harder to take down. So instead of putting a false narrative out there, they would do a search for real people creating the narrative they want to promote and then amplify that narrative through reshares, retweets, likes, and amplifications as best as they can. And when the platforms look at that, they say ‘we can’t take this down because the originator of the post is a real human being that we can verify as real, not a Russian spy etc.’
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

278. Conclusions from the use of aviation in the first half of the first year of the Ukrainian-Russian war

Author:
Sylwester Lubiejewski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of the article is to suggest a desirable direction in which the Polish air force, and indeed the air forces of other NATO countries, should develop so that they are better prepared for the challenges identified in the conflict in Ukraine so far. In order to achieve the aim of the research and answer the formulated research question, the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents, observation and interviewing took place. In order to have the ability to deter and gain air superiority during a defensive operation, the Polish air force, and air forces of other NATO countries, should have a large resource of fighter, multi-role, and fighter-bomber aircraft. An object-oriented multi-layer air defence of every military airfield needs to be organised and certain roads reconstructed as runways in the event of war. In turn, helicopter aviation units should be able to organise forward arming and refuelling points for helicopters to effectively support land forces. Attack helicopters should also have integrated fire systems that allow them to attack from a distance beyond the range of man-portable air-defence systems. All warplanes should be equipped with proven and modern systems of active and passive self-defence to make them less susceptible to enemy influence. To sum up, in light of the war in Ukraine, the article explains what aviation equipment is necessary and what actions should be taken to increase both Polish air force’s ability and other NATO air forces’ ability to perform tasks during wartime.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Air Force, Aviation, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

279. Implications of the war in Ukraine for the strategic communication system of the Polish Ministry of National Defence

Author:
Agnieszka Glapiak
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The paper explores the evolving role of strategic communication at the operations centre of the Minister of National Defence in Poland, particularly in the period leading up to and during the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine. The study investigates both proactive communication initiatives and reactive communication in response to citizens’ needs. Our research methodology primarily involved analysing official Polish national defence documents and comparing findings from studies conducted before and during the war in Ukraine. The results show that the conflict had a profound influence on the MOD’s strategic communication, emphasising the pivotal role of the Operations Centre of the Minister of National Defence. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the need for a comprehensive communication approach that encompasses both domestic and international audiences, spanning traditional and social media.
Topic:
Security, Communications, Disinformation, Military, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

280. Integrating Earth observation IMINT with OSINT data to create added-value multisource intelligence information: A case study of the Ukraine–Russia war

Author:
Ioannis Kotaridis and Georgios Benekos
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 heralded a new “social media war” era. This “hybrid warfare” extends beyond the military landscape and includes attacks in cyberspace and fake news with the aim of destabilising governments. The goal of this paper is to present a high-level of architecture based on imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) using geographic datasets and state-of-the-art methods. Integration with intelligence information (like Open-Source Intelligence [OSINT]) produces multiintelligent knowledge for security and defence decision-making end users. The results depict a harmonious and creative collaboration between IMINT, OSINT, and GEOINT. OSINT data helps to identify and describe the meteorological conditions that are present, contributing to the procedure’s responsiveness. Weather and dense cloud cover above Ukraine poses a challenge for optical imaging satellites, but synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensor satellites can operate at night and overcome the problem. We carried out OSINT and IMINT analysis, monitoring the situation shortly after the invasion. OSINT data helped in the choice of an appropriate area of interest. Using the right Earth observation satellite system and artificial intelligence/machine learning algorithms is the best way to keep an eye on many different sites over long periods, send out alerts about unusual activity, and find new places where incoherent changes might be happening.
Topic:
International Security, Artificial Intelligence, Hybrid Warfare, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine