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11. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:
Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

12. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:
Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

13. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. Ukraine's European Aspirations

Author:
Myroslav Marynovych
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Ukrainians have always been aware of the fact that they belong to the European cultural sphere. As Serhiy Plokhyi, professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, points out, "...times change, ideologies change - liberalism is replaced by national-communism... or the idea of human rights emerges. But Europe remains a constant as an example of that something else that is par excellence necessary for the survival of the Ukrainian national project." Before Ukraine was absorbed by Muscovy in the 17th century, the fact that Ukrainian lands were then part of the Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) opened up a natural cultural window onto Europe. It was thanks to this lively cultural exchange (albeit not without its problems) that “Ukrainian Baroque” yes amongst other trends, came to be. However, once Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire, new ideas from Western civilisation only reached Ukraine by way of the Russian language, thereby condemning Ukrainian culture to secondary status. Politically, as an independent subject, Ukraine simply disappeared from European consciousness. The emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 offered Ukrainians new opportunities to re-establish direct cultural and political contacts with Europe. Immediately, the need to "return to Europe" emerged in Ukrainian public debate. Politically, this had an initial consequence: Ukraine found itself at the end of a fairly long queue of states waiting to join the European Union "club". It was assumed that these states would join as they went along (legislative reforms, economic modernisation, the fight against corruption, etc.). It was not all plain sailing, nor was it without its pitfalls, but the vector of the European vocation (and accession to the European Union) in Ukraine's development was undoubtedly the most powerful, even if it was rivalled by the attachment of eastern Ukrainians to Russia's cultural and political landscape. The impact of Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, primarily affected the pro-Russian part of the country. It is members of this population who now constitute the majority of refugees and displaced persons. It is their vision of the world that has been turned upside down against a backdrop of atrocities and genocidal crimes committed by the Russians. Accession to the European Union and NATO has therefore become the sine qua non of Ukraine's aspirations, as confirmed by several documents of national importance. In addition to historical memory and purely cultural preferences, security priorities are now clearly visible. Ukraine has begun to implement the European Union’s recommendations and to adapt its legal framework to that of Europe. Any campaign against European integration, or simply questioning the need for it, would be perceived by Ukrainian society as a betrayal of national interests. Recently, however, opinions within the European Union have diverged somewhat. Alongside those States that were shocked by the brutality of the Russian aggression and have declared their solidarity with the Ukrainian people and their willingness to accept our country into the Union, there are also States such as Hungary and Slovakia that consider Ukraine's accession to the European Union to be premature, or even wrong. We can be both optimistic and pessimistic. Optimistic, because European leaders and the majority of Member States are increasingly in favour of Ukraine's accession. Pessimistic, because the chances of Ukraine's accession remain slim as long as the European Union retains its current decision-making rules. As war continues, the reactions of Ukrainian society to the reticence of Hungary and Slovakia and to the blocking of the borders by Polish, Slovakian and Romanian farmers have remained discreet. Ukrainians are aware that their country's accession to the European Union would be a long-term solution, and that a certain amount of restraint is therefore advisable. However, since nobody knows the future, in unfavourable circumstances, resentment and therefore rancour might erupt in Ukrainian society. This is why it would be useful to examine this situation not only from the point of view of the formal concordance of conflicting economic and political interests, but also from a broader perspective.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

16. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:
Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

17. Russia’s Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, which translates into a relatively coherent political project for Russia and a desire to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official doxa. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology. After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.
Topic:
Ideology, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Deep fires and the British strategic posture: does the war in Ukraine validate it?

Author:
Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, Augusto W.M. Teixeira Junior, and Tamiris Pereira dos santos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war presented an unintended chance to assess the British strategic posture regarding deep fires. The deployment of guided rocket artillery systems by Ukrainian forces in 2022 altered the land battle dynamics significantly, especially with the modern Western deep fires by the US, UK, and France. This study analyses the evolution of the UK defence policy and land force structure and the impact of deep fires in the first phase of the war, and discusses challenges ahead of Britain due to the ongoing conflict. This perspective might apply to other cases, including Brazil, as we drew upon critiques mainly directed to the over-reliance on technology over combat mass due to the re-emergence of conventional warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, and Ukraine

19. The Realist debate in the context of the War in Ukraine: balancing dynamics, international change and strategic calculus

Author:
Layla Ibrahim Abdallah Dawood and Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The article discusses Mearsheimer’s interpretation of Russia’s use of force against Ukraine based on concepts and categories of Offensive Realism. It is argued that external balancing lost its place during unipolarity. However, Russian internal balancing is one of the factors that enabled the current conflict, and Russia’s rapprochement with China diminishes the prospects for conflict in Asia, allowing Russian military efforts to be concentrated in the European theater. Additionally, the decision to use force will be analyzed in its strategic dimension. It is concluded that Russia’s activities against Ukraine are entirely consistent with Offensive Realism, despite of Mearsheimer’s allegations contrarywise.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Russia-Ukraine War, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Marek Dabrowski, Heather Grabbe, Luca Léry, André Sapir, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Whether and when Ukraine accedes to the European Union will depend greatly on how and when its war with Russia ends and post-war reconstruction starts, and how the EU handles issues of governance, security, migration, trade, investment, the energy transition, decarbonisation and the EU budget. The enlargement process is likely to overlap with post-war reconstruction, increasing the EU's influence in fostering Ukraine’s institutional development. Ukrainian leaders will have strong incentives to comply with the accession criteria, which the EU should use astutely to create a better-functioning economy and public institutions, especially by reducing opportunities for corruption. This will require clearer standards for rule-of-law and fundamental values, including effective tools to ensure continued compliance after accession. That is also the most effective way to ensure a positive impact of future enlargements on EU governance. The EU will also need to develop assistance programmes to help the Ukrainian government manage post-war external and internal security challenges, including the large number of weapons in circulation, and to encourage Ukrainian refugees to return to the country when possible, as they will be needed for the reconstruction effort. If the current EU budget rules were applied and there were no transitional arrangements – which is unlikely – we calculate the total annual cost of Ukraine's integration into the EU budget at 0.13 per cent of EU GDP, which would hardly change net recipient/payer positions of current EU members. Some of this funding would come back to the EU via EU companies participating in EU-funded projects in Ukraine. Ukraine’s entry into the EU would benefit EU GDP via trade, migration and foreign direct investment, boosting employment, production and tax revenues in the EU. The history of EU enlargement shows that the strongest motivation for difficult reforms is a credible and predictable accession process based on rewarding reforms. Both Ukraine and the EU would benefit from progressive integration of the country into EU policies, alongside the formal accession negotiations. That would show the Ukrainian public the tangible benefits of moving towards EU standards, while also bringing Ukraine into areas such as energy cooperation and decarbonisation.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine