Search

Begin New Search Topic Russia-Ukraine War Political Geography Ukraine

161. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

162. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

163. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:
Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

164. The Future of European Security

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:
European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

165. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

166. Judging Putin

Author:
Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:
International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

167. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

168. WHY DEMOCRACIES AREN’T MORE RELIABLE ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Author:
Mark Nieman and Doug Gibler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine set off a security spiral in Europe. Despite US President Biden’s pledge to “defend every inch of NATO territory,” Poland increased its military budget by a whopping 60 percent and asked to have US nuclear weapons based on its territory. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also announced sizable defense increases, with Latvia re-instating compulsory military training. Why didn’t Biden’s pledge reassure these NATO members? Is the alliance’s famed Article 5 promise—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a less than ironclad guarantee?
Topic:
NATO, Democracy, Alliance, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

169. Russia’s Ukraine Revanchism: Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, and the Emerging World Order

Author:
Mohammad Ali Zafar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
The Ukrainian conflict has paved the way to re-examine the geopolitical implications of Russian Neo-Eurasianism, which has challenged the Liberal International Order. The implications of such a development will have global implications for Russia. Indications of Putin's renewed mission, infused by restrategising the Russian position in Eurasia coupled with cultural exceptionalism based on messianic identity, are observable in recognition of Donbas and Luhansk as separate territories and the invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has allowed the US to lead as an Atlanticist player and regain its slipping position in the international system. Therefore, following exploratory research methodology, the paper examines Dugin’s geopolitical model based on neo-Eurasianism. The paper concludes that the model will observe major setbacks in the post-Ukrainian conflict order as the proposed alliances by Dugin’s model with Moscow, Tokyo, and Tehran face several challenges. Consequently, the invasion has pushed Atlanticist pre-eminence back on track across Eurasia.
Topic:
Conflict, Regionalism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

170. Mongolia Between Two Giants: Cold War Lessons and Today’s Realities

Author:
Batbayar Tsedendamba, Segey Radchenko, Morris Rossabi, and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Ambassador Batbayar will discuss Mongolia’s effort to achieve a delicate balance between its two big neighbors, namely Russia and China, and between the Russian Federation and its so-called “third neighbor” [democratic partner] countries. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mongolia has endeavored to stay as neutral as possible both between Russia and China, and between Russia and the West. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Mongolia was faced with intense confrontation between its two giant neighbors: Russia and China. At that time, Mongolia had no other choice but to enter into an alliance with Moscow. Today Mongolia is again facing the old dilemma about maintaining equidistance from its two giant neighbors: Russia and China. But unlike Cold War era, Mongolia has developed extensive relations with “third neighbor countries”; namely the USA, the EU, Japan and South Korea all have an enormous stake in Mongolia’s future as a democratic and prosperous country. Therefore, Ulaanbaatar has a great dilemma between short-term economic gains from ties with Moscow and Beijing or a long-term commitment to Western democracy and freedom.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, History, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Mongolia, and Asia