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11. Dissecting the Political Landscape of War-Torn Ukraine: Between Internal Challenges and External Threats

Author:
Aram Terzyan
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This paper explores the political landscape of war-torn Ukraine, focusing on the country’s core domestic problems. The war in Ukraine has led to a significant deterioration of Ukraine’s political landscape. While victory on the battlefield is Ukraine’s utmost priority, escalating internal problems pose additional challenges. With Ukraine having obtained EU candidate status, these problems have moved to a new level on the EU’s membership agenda. The most urgent of these is endemic corruption, which has gained fresh momentum during the war and has put foreign aid at risk. As the costs of the war grow, international pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to show better results increases. Accountability and transparency should become the guiding principles of the reconstruction and recovery processes to maintain Western support and ensure effective postwar reconstruction.
Topic:
Corruption, Reconstruction, Minorities, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and De-Oligarchization
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

12. EU support for Ukraine: The paradox of insufficient assistance

Author:
Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Since Russia started its aggression against Ukraine in 2014, EU member states have lacked the political will to firmly contest Russia’s imperialism in the shared neighbourhood. This was concretized in the rejection of Ukraine’s EU path and the failure to build Ukraine’s military capabilities before 2022. The EU’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion has been more successful than expected considering its limited capabilities and some past failures of international security assistance. The West is, however, failing to equip Ukraine to win the war. This paradox of insufficient aid leaves Ukraine in limbo, whereby it is enabled to continue the defence effort but without adequate means to succeed. In theory, the EU backs Ukraine’s strategy of non-negotiation with Russia, but the limited military support is pushing Kyiv towards peace talks. EU capitals continue to disagree over the extent to which Russia’s imperialist policies need to be suppressed, and whether small concessions could help to end the war in Europe. Even in the scenario where Ukraine emerges from the war as a truly sovereign state, the risk of future Russian interference, combined with Ukraine’s particular vulnerabilities and the likely challenges of post-war reconstruction, cast a shadow over its immediate future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

13. La ampliación de la Unión Europeatras el conflicto de Ucrania

Author:
Jordi Regi
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El conflicto en Ucrania ha supuesto un nuevo reto para la UE en tanto en cuanto, la solicitud de adhesión a la UE planteada por el presidente ucraniano Zelenski el 28 de febrero de 2022 ha tenido consecuencias directas e indirectas para el futuro de la UE. Tres días después, Georgia y Moldavia presentaron solicitudes similares. En un periodo récord de menos de cuatro meses, en el Consejo Europeo de 23 y 24 de junio de 2022, los líderes de la UE decidieron conceder a Ucrania y Moldavia el estatus de país candidato, y reconocieron la "perspectiva europea" de Georgia, un paso hacia la candidatura formal. Nunca los países de la UE habían reaccionado afirmativamente con tanta rapidez a una solicitud de adhesión a la UE, pero detrás de la rápida respuesta de la UE al adoptar un nuevo proyecto de ampliación había una lógica estrategia geopolítica, y no cabe duda de que se trataba de una decisión histórica que no podía eludir. La problemática derivada del complejo proceso de adhesión y las opciones posibles serán tratadas en este artículo.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

15. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

16. Energising eastern Europe: How the EU can enhance energy sovereignty through cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Sovereignty, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

17. Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects

Author:
EUROPEUM
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On April 18th, EUROPEUM’s Brussels Office in partnership with PISM Brussels Office under the Think Visegrad platform hosted a discussion titled “Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects”. This event was attended by 15 experts from think tanks and representatives of EU institutions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe

18. Refugees and Return: Resolving Ukraine's Human Capital Crisis

Author:
Markus Ziener and Dariia Mykhailyshyna
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Ukraine is facing a human capital crisis of enormous proportions. Here, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presents the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees about their intentions to return to Ukraine or remain in their host countries. The report contains some recommendations for encouraging Ukrainians to return. Millions of its citizens fled the country after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. To share best practices and generate possible solutions, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), along with its partners—the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), hosted a conference titled “Toward a Skilled Workforce: Rebuilding Ukraine’s Human Capital” in Berlin on April 25–26, 2024. To set the stage, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presented the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees. Those findings, as well as some recommendations, are detailed in this report.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Refugees, and Human Capital
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

19. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:
Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

20. The Impact of Ukraine’s Accession on the EU’s Economy

Author:
Tinatin Akhvlediani and Veronika Movchan
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The groundwork for Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s single market was laid by the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). A key component of the AA, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), paved the way for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU’s single market. Building on the DCFTA, Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s economy has significantly advanced since February 2022. In response to the invasion, the EU swiftly and temporarily but completely liberalised its market for Ukrainian goods through Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) and triggered the Temporary Protection Directive that has enabled over 4 million Ukrainian refugees to reside and work in the EU. With a continued swift trajectory, Ukraine’s integration is set to be much more comprehensive by the (yet unknown) time of accession. As this study outlines, the prospect of Ukraine’s accession to the EU brings some challenges but holds immense potential for mutual economic benefit. Free movement of goods. Full access under the ATM has not caused drastic changes in the EU’s imports or in the functioning of the single market in general. Yet, to avoid disruptions in the future, the accession treaty could include transition periods for full market access for Ukrainian goods in those EU Member States that may be vulnerable to a sharp increase in imports. Full trade liberalisation in services is expected to have more trade-easing effects, particularly for the EU, as it holds most of the reservations. Ukraine’s main EU partners in services trade are Germany and Poland, but services trade with Ukraine’s other major partners, including Estonia, has been steadily increasing since the implementation of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. Thus, trade absorption capacity should be sustainable. Free movement of capital. Given the underdevelopment of Ukraine’s financial sector and capital markets, legislative and policy alignment should serve as a solid foundation for financial deepening in the country. Eased movement of capital will make it significantly easier to conduct business and trade and commercial and non-commercial payments between Ukraine and the EU. Free movement of workers. As long as Ukrainian workers fit the labour demands of the receiving EU countries, they could fill the gap in the labour supply and complement rather than replace local workers. An enlarged EU as a global supplier. Ukraine could strengthen the EU’s position in critical materials and key agricultural products, as well as contribute to the EU technologically with its emerging ICT sector and increasing skills and know-how in IT and computer services. Ukraine’s reconstruction and sustainable recovery is a significant challenge that requires substantial financial support. Yet, by addressing these considerations with foresight and diligence, Ukraine’s accession to the EU could not only elevate Ukraine’s standing but could also strengthen the EU’s position on the global stage.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Economy, Regional Integration, Trade, Recovery, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine