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151. Money and War: Corruption as the Hidden Enemy of Mission Success

Author:
Emily Knowles and Karolina MacLachlan
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Corruption, instability, and conflict tend to go hand in hand. Twelve of the fifteen lowest-ranking countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are currently experiencing violent insurgencies, extremist activity, or other signs of deep-seated instability. [1] Systemic, embedded corruption is a thread that runs through such seemingly disparate events as the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the conflict in Ukraine, the failure of the Malian army in 2012, the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the retreat of the Iraqi security forces in the face of ISIS. However, the effects of corruption are not limited to exacerbating the risk of conflict; corruption also makes it more difficult for states to respond to threats and for international institutions and other actors to offer effective assistance.[2] Assistance to fragile and failing states tends to include two types of engagement: international peacekeeping and/or stabilization operations and defense capacity building (i.e. assistance to the recipient states’ security forces). But without anticipating and mitigating the risks that corruption poses, the international community risks the intent of security assistance being subverted, the assistance wasted, and the success rate of stabilization operations being severely impaired. In particular, misappropriation of funds, vanishing resources, and a reliance on malign power-brokers can irreparably damage the operational success of a mission. This article is based on the research investigating the international community’s approach (or lack thereof) to tackling corruption in Afghanistan carried out by Transparency International UK’s global Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) and based on over 75 interviews with civilian and military officials. This work is supported by insights from TI-DSP’s long-term engagement in the Building Integrity training for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.[3] In the resulting report, we argue that corruption has had a significant impact on ISAF mission success and that the international community’s reaction to corrupt practices was too little, too late. We point to three main ways in which corruption and uncontrolled money flows can diminish the effectiveness of the mission and offer a planning and risk assessment framework as the first step toward addressing corruption risks on operations...
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Peacekeeping, Arab Spring, Conflict, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Middle East, Nigeria, and Mali

152. OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001

Author:
Marianna M. Yamamoto
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This monograph tests the OSCE approach to security. The OSCE approach to security encompasses all areas that can cause tensions and conflict between States, and is the result of a sustained effort by almost all of the world’s democracies on how to achieve both security and individual freedom. An important basis of the OSCE security concept is that international security cannot be achieved without the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms. The study first extracts from official OSCE documents a set of principles designed to achieve international security, and then uses the work of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, to test the effectiveness of the principles in practice. From 1993 to 2001, HCNM Max van der Stoel applied OSCE principles in cases involving minority tensions with a high potential for international conflict, and this experience provided the means to assess the practical effects on security when OSCE principles are implemented. The study examined three cases that involved potential conflict: Ukraine and separatism in Crimea; Estonia and tensions regarding the Russian minority; and Macedonia and tensions regarding the Albanian minority. The study found that in each of the three cases, the implementation of OSCE principles reduced national and international tensions involving minority issues, and increased security. The increase in security was seen within each State, between States, and in the region, and reduced the potential for conflict within and between OSCE States. The results were particularly significant in view of the instability, conflicts, and tensions of the post–Cold War period; the OSCE’s ongoing institutionalization during the period; and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the HCNM. The study identified and articulated twenty OSCE security principles that addressed national and international security. The principles addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty; a comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; the prevention of security threats and the peaceful resolution of issues; the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities; the development and advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. The monograph extended the research on the OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. The OSCE security concept is a security framework based on the idea that security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and advance values, principles, and commitments. The study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia significantly increased security in those three countries and the OSCE region. The study found that the OSCE principles and the OSCE security concept constitute a significant body of thought and practice regarding security, and respect for the individual. The OSCE principles, the OSCE security concept, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further examination, development, and application to national security policy and practice. The application to national security policy and practice is relevant to all security threats and problems.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Estonia, Macedonia, and Crimea

153. Prospects of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Author:
Hanna Pashkova
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The “hybrid” war of Russia against Ukraine has continued since February 2014. To date, the multiple efforts of international diplomacy, unfortunately, have not resulted either in settlement or even in a “freeze” of the situation in eastern Ukraine. The previous Minsk Agreements adopted in September 2014 (Minsk Protocol and Minsk Memorandum) were disrupted and Russian aggression in Donbas continued. On 12 February 2015, the presidents of Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia agreed on a new document, “Package of Measures for Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”, which envisaged conflict settlement by the end of 2015. However, implementation of these measures was postponed to 2016 and, given the course of events, has actually become a process which is difficult to forecast and which is indefinite in time.1 It should be noted that on the one hand, the situation in eastern Ukraine has not undergone significant changes for the better – hostilities are ongoing. There are persistent fundamental differences in the positions of the two sides, Ukraine and Russia, on conflict resolution. (In particular, implementation of the Minsk Agreements in line with the Russian scenario threatens to destabilise the internal situation in Ukraine and destroy its statehood.) On the other hand, the international situation is rapidly changing; we see further escalation of international terrorism (the terrorist attacks in Paris), the “migration crisis” in the EU, Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and the gaining momentum of the acute conflict of Moscow and Ankara. This dulls the perception of events in Donbas on the part of the international community, renders these events a somewhat “background” nature in the West, and urges attempts to “freeze” the situation there at any cost, including at the expense of Ukraine’s own interests. Meanwhile, Russia proceeds with military expansion in Donbas, aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, and now there is no reason to expect a change for the better in the Kremlin’s policy. Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (which has a regional and global dimension) acquires a long-term nature with recurrent escalation and unpredictable consequences. Russian aggression – the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine – has entailed profound changes in bilateral relations: (а) the legal framework of Kyiv and Moscow relations has been destroyed; (b) institutional mechanisms of state-to-state relations have been destroyed; (c) contacts at the highest level have become impossible, political and diplomatic relations have become confrontational; (d) Ukraine has suffered huge human, economic, and territorial losses; (e) an unprecedented curtailment of economic cooperation has taken place; (f) deep alienation between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia has emerged. The previous official ideology of “strategic partnership”, “fraternal peoples”, and “neighbourliness”, embedded in many joint agreements, has lost its sense.2 A new political-ideological reality has emerged in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, a new assessment and review of the nature, ideology, and general institutional system of relations with Russia in key areas (politics, security, economy, energy, humanitarian sphere, etc.) is required, given that the main threat to Ukrainian statehood is the current government in place in the Russian Federation. There is a need to design a new conceptual model of coexistence with Putin’s Russia, which would reflect current realities and prospects of bilateral relations and would take into account the position of Western partner countries and international organisations. However, it is important to keep in mind at least two things. First, one should clearly distinguish the current Putin’s regime and the country of Russia as it is and its society. Second, in rebuffing Russian aggression, a strategic goal should be seen – to restore confidence and interest of the societies of both countries in peaceful coexistence and respect the right of each state to determine the state system in the country and its civilisation development vector.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

154. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Current Situation, Consequences, Prospects

Author:
Valeriya Klymenko and Hanna Pashkova
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
On 27 January 2015 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution “On the Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the United Nations, European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, GUAM Parliamentary Assembly and national parliaments of the countries of the world on the recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state”. It is stated in the document that “Ukraine remains the target of military aggression by the Russian Federation, which the latter carries out, among other things, by supporting, and providing supplies for large-scale terrorist attacks. … taking into account the provisions of the UN Charter and UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 ‘Definition of Aggression’ dated 14 December 1974, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognises the Russian Federation as an Aggressor State…”.1 This Appeal defines the current situation and character of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the reason and source for which is Russia’s expansionist policy in the post-Soviet area, which the Russian Federation, represented by its current leadership, considers its “zone of privileged interests”. This forms the basis for Russia’s hard pressure on Ukraine to integrate into Eurasian alliances under the auspices of the Russian Federation (RF), and blocking Kyiv’s course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Such policy, as implemented by Russia since the beginning of 2000, did not involve establishing real partner relations between Moscow and Kyiv on the basis of parity and equality, – its goal was to turn Ukraine into a controlled state, which would operate in the framework of Russia’s policy. Russia’s geopolitical plans regarding Ukraine were ruined in February 2014. In return, Putin’s regime resorted to outright aggression against Ukraine – in March 2014 Crimea was annexed, later began the military expansion in Eastern Ukraine. This “undeclared” or “hybrid” war of Russia against Ukraine has now lasted for almost a year; during this war Ukraine has suffered large-scale human, territorial and economic losses. A critical outcome of this war is mutual estrangement of both countries’ societies. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is not a “local”, “peripheral” event, – it has regional and global dimension, and contains challenges and threats to the global security system. Annexation of Crimea, the situation in Eastern Ukraine are turning into a large-scale “frozen conflict”, which is a threat to security and stability not only on the European continent, but in the world at large. Leading Western countries and international organisations have not recognised the annexation of Crimea, thus, demonstrating political and diplomatic solidarity with Ukraine; have supported Ukraine in its battle against Russian aggression in Donbas. Ukraine has received considerable external financial and material-technical support. “Restraining” sanctions against Russia have been implemented. Currently, Ukraine is in the epicentre of critical West-Russia confrontation, which is characterised by an unprecedented loss of mutual trust. Ukraine-Russia relations are in a critical and unpredictable state. The political and diplomatic confrontation is ongoing; fundamental agreements and arrangements have been violated; the system of institutional interstate relations has been practically shattered; confrontation in the sphere of economy and energy sector is exacerbating, informational aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine continues. In general, current events give no reason to expect changes for the better in Russia’s policy towards Ukraine in the foreseeable future. Thus, the current state of Kyiv-Moscow relations demands creating fundamentally different conceptual and strategic approaches to co-existence with Putin’s Russia, a review of international contacts system, introduction of specific measures towards Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

155. What do the Crimean Tatars face in Crimea?

Author:
Alexander Osipov
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Abstract:
The Issue Brief concerns further developments which the Crimean Tatars may experience after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars are the second largest minority in the Crimean peninsula, and they are represented by politically active movements with far-reaching claims concerning the status of Crimean Tatars and territorial self-determination. Within less than one month these people as well as their homeland have been transferred to another country with different political and legal systems and potentially a less friendly social environment. Since the contours of the future legal and institutional framework for the accommodation of Crimean Tatars are not fully clear, one can project the major organizational setups and patterns of Russian ethno-politics onto Crimea and tentatively assess their applicability. We can conclude that in a formal sense the Russian rule does not promise the Crimean Tatars much more than they already had in Ukraine, but puts them at risk of a strict police control and pressure. Such arrangements as territorial and non-territorial autonomy, power-sharing, 'rehabilitation' of the Crimean Tatars as victims of the past repressions may take place but they would have limited practical sense. Cultural programmes and recruitment of Crimean Tatars to the regional administration are unlikely to be legally guaranteed and will be fully dependent on the discretion of Russian and Crimean authorities.
Topic:
Culture, Minorities, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

156. What next for Moldova's Minorities after Crimea?

Author:
Federica Prina
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Abstract:
This Issue Brief examines the possible consequences of Russia's annexation of Crimea on Moldova and its national minorities. It further reflects on the factors that hinder greater integration of persons belonging to minorities, and the expression of minority identity in Moldova/Transnistria. The Issue Brief argues there are two indirect consequences of the annexation of Crimea by Russia. First, the annexation deepens the polarization between the pro-Russia and pro-EU camps in Moldova, which manifests itself in multiple ruptures within Moldovan society. Second, such a polarization furthers a tendency to marginalize (non-Russian) minorities, which implies a reduction of the spaces for the articulation of minority concerns and the expression of minority identity.
Topic:
Minorities, Ethnicity, Discrimination, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Crimea

157. Ukraine - Europe's New Proxy War?

Author:
Geraint Hughes
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Ukraine - Europe's New Proxy War? Dr. Geraint Hughes | 22 May 2014 DOWNLOAD PDF On February 27 and 28, 2014, shortly after the revolution in Kiev that toppled Viktor Yanukovych’s government, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was taken over by thousands of masked and armed Russian troops, backed by armor and attack helicopters. In an unconvincing attempt to hide their origin, the soldiers wore no insignia and passed themselves off as a ‘self-defense’ militia drawn from the ethnic Russian majority of the peninsula, which until 1954 had belonged to Russia itself. In fact, this occupation force consisted either of personnel from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) based in Crimea or troops sent from the Russian Federation. Russia’s parliament subsequently voted to grant President Vladimir Putin powers to order further interventions in Ukraine to ‘protect ethnic Russians’, whilst a ‘referendum’ held in Crimea on March 16 produced an overwhelming vote in favor of union with the Russian Federation. Three days later, Russian troops and ‘self-defense’ militias forcibly evicted Ukrainian naval personnel from their own bases, formalizing the annexation of Crimea. This landgrab by Russia, and the separatist turmoil it is currently inciting in Eastern Ukraine, constitutes the most serious crisis in Europe since the Georgian war of August 2008. Although the post-Yanukovych government in Ukraine has acted cautiously and focused on mustering diplomatic support, the country has become the location of a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and the West (the United States, its NATO allies, and member states of the European Union) that could potentially deteriorate into a military clash between Kiev and Moscow. There are repeated instances in history where states have resorted to proxy warfare rather than the overt use of force, using non-state para-military actors to subvert and undermine an adversary. In the process, sponsor states have armed, equipped, trained, and sheltered proxies, and have at times even reinforced them with advisors and special forces personnel, as is the case with Russian military intelligence (GRU) and special forces (spetsnaz) troops reportedly reinforcing local ‘separatists’ in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Proxy warfare has also sometimes preceded an overt military intervention. Given both Putin’s threats to ‘defend’ ethnic Russians and the mobilization of Russian army and air force units over the past two months, this remains a very real possibility in Ukraine. The overall objectives of a sponsor state usually involve the coercion of an adversary, its disruption, or the attainment of a transformative objective, which in turn can involve the successful encouragement of separatism, the annexation of territory, or regime change. Allowing for the absence of solid information on Russian aims it is likely that Moscow’s present reasons for destabilizing Ukraine involve an opportunistic combination of these three outcomes. Putin may well hope that the turmoil he is inciting in the East of the country will forestall the forthcoming elections on May 25 and will force Kiev to subordinate its foreign policy to Russian interests. It is likely that he may consider the takeover of more Ukrainian territory if its government persists in its efforts to forge closer ties with the United States and EU.
Topic:
Security, History, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

158. Corruption, Impunity, and Current Reforms in Ukraine

Author:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This briefing paper assesses the situation in Ukraine with respect to democratic reforms being undertaken in the country following the mass uprising that ousted former President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. It examines issues of corruption and impunity, as well as the historical divide between eastern and western Ukraine at the root of ongoing conflict in the country. It is based largely on extended interviews conducted with representatives of government, civil society and international organizations in Kyiv.
Topic:
Corruption, Reform, Democracy, Conflict, Impunity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

159. America's New Deal with Europe: NATO Primacy and Double Expansion

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
10-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Including analysis relevant to the 2022 Ukraine crisis, this article addresses NATO expansion, burdensharing, the Balkans crisis, and relations with Russia and Germany. The American debate and public opinion regarding NATO enlargement is reviewed as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, Balkans, North America, and United States of America