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121. Information Warfare Between Russia and Ukraine: A Cause of War for the West?

Author:
Kazimierz Pierzchala
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Experts on information competition between Russia and Western countries are convinced that president Vladimir Putin plans a war against the West as a long-term opera- tion. It is directed on two fronts: internal and the more effective external one. Both can be developed in every country of the World; the opponent may be a compatriot but the ally may be a foreigner. Fortunately, in the West the effectiveness of these operations is lower. Confrontation with the West the Kremlin has many advantages: parental and controlled informational space, technical implements, huge experience based on expert knowledge, likewise a longstanding practice in conducting informational operations. Those actions are strongly concentrated and there are widely used digital platforms and also, they popularise the contents in harmony with Russian Federation politics. Their aim is not only forming in- ternal and external public opinion properly and in line with the Kremlin’s interests, because as the annexation of Crimea has demonstrated that their aim is construction of a new reality of the world. Paradoxically, in the Russian Federation’s policy, media freedom and political pluralism are considered as a weakness of the West. Many communities which have different benefits are sensitive to the Kremlin’ s propaganda.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Information Age, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

122. Russians Want Crimea; Prefer Luhansk and Donetsk Independent

Author:
Stepan Goncharov and Denis Volkov
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine remains unresolved and—after five years—it does not appear to be reaching a resolution any time soon. The ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine between the Ukrainian government and rebel forces supported by Moscow not only degrades the relationship between Kiev and Moscow but also contributes to the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. [1] This particular regional conflict has become an important destabilizing factor for international security. Findings from a new binational survey, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center, show that a plurality of Russians believe these eastern areas of Ukraine should be independent states.[2] And a majority of Russians continue to say that Russia’s annexation of Crimea has brought the country more good than harm.
Topic:
International Relations, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Crimea

123. Five Years of War in Donbas

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The war in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the Donbas has killed over 13,000 people, displaced millions, and led to the worst rupture in relations between the Russian Federation and the West since the end of the Cold War. The war was caused by inherent cleavages in Ukrainian society, combined with clumsy and self-interested intervention by outside powers. The war’s effects on Ukraine have been profound: the collapse of the post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite; billions of dollars in direct and indirect losses to the Ukrainian economy; a wholesale restructuring of the Ukrainian armed forces; social dislocation and psychological trauma; and unprecedented environmental damage. Despite these sad legacies, there are reasons to be optimistic that a settlement to the conflict is in view. The exhaustion and frustration of people in the separatist-controlled regions, Russia’s changing policy on the war—at least in part a result of rising frustration among the Russian public—and the election of a new Ukrainian government without regional ties or ties to networks of oligarchs all contribute to the possibility of peace. But in order for peace to endure after the war, the Ukrainian state must construct a broad-based, civic national identity, and it must tackle the country’s endemic corruption. The international community must be engaged in both crafting a settlement to the war and helping Ukraine deal with its consequences. External observers may be inclined to point to social division and corruption as the internal causes of the war, and argue that Ukraine has to fix itself before the outside world can intervene to help. And this is true as far as it goes. But it is also true that the outside world contributed to the start of war in Ukraine by making the country the object in a geopolitical tussle between Russia and the West. Any honest accounting of the war’s history must acknowledge this fact. And any fair treatment of Ukraine after the war should seek to compensate it through significant, long-term assistance.
Topic:
War, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Separatism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

124. Russia and the Post-Soviet Space: Partners or Rivals?

Author:
Grigory Karasin
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
This interview discusses Russia's relationships with its neighbours.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldavia

125. U.S. Complicity in the 2014 Coup in Kiev as a Violation of International Law

Author:
A. Vyleghanin and K. Kritsky
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
FIVE YEARS AGO, a coup d’état took place in Kiev. Following demon- strations and arson attacks, a mob seized several government institutions, including the administration building and residence of the constitutional- ly elected president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich. Some members of the Ukrainian president’s security detail who were protecting his residence from illegal seizure were wounded and killed.1 Alexander Turchinov, one of the coup leaders, began serving as the president of Ukraine even though no Ukrainian presidential election had been held. The coup in Kiev led primarily to the U.S. assuming a leading role in Ukraine’s governance – something it had neither during the period of the Russian Empire nor the Soviet era. The February 2014 overthrow of the president in Kiev that took place without elections and in violation of the Ukrainian Constitution de facto divided the country into regions that recognized the new authorities in Kiev and those that opposed the coup (primarily the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine). This occurred not only because the Ukrainian presi- dent was unconstitutionally removed from power but primarily because the “installation” of the putschist government was accompanied by vio- lence, and ethnic and linguistic persecution. In March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea left the new, “post-coup” Ukraine in accordance with the provision of the UN Charter on the right of peoples to self-determination. Subsequently, following a referendum in Crimea, a treaty on Crimea’s reunification with Russia was signed. A confrontation between the new regime in Kiev* and residents of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions turned into a protracted armed conflict. The forcible replacement in Kiev of a constitutionally elected head of state (Yanukovich) with an unconstitutional leader (Turchinov) directly impacted Russia’s national interests. Russians and Ukrainians lived together within a single state, the Russian Empire, from the 17th century until 1917. During the Soviet period, the border between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic did not have international legal significance. It was an administrative bor- der. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent UN member states (Russia and Ukraine) that replaced them continued to maintain close economic and other ties. Their continued integration, including through joint participation in the Customs Union, objectively met the strategic interests of Ukraine and Russia. A friendly Ukraine is also important to Russia from a national securi- ty standpoint, considering NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders that began in the early 1990s – i.e., NATO’s absorption of all former member states of the Warsaw Pact, including Poland and even the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Russia’s leadership has repeatedly stressed the inadmissibility of dragging Ukraine into NATO. Words about “fraternal” relations between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine are no exaggeration: Millions of family members (both Russians and Ukrainians) live on opposite sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border,2 and at least one-third of Ukraine’s population speaks Russian as a native language. In this context, it is not surprising that Moscow considered the U.S.- orchestrated seizure of power from the head of state in Kiev an event affecting its vital interests. Something else is remarkable: The U.S. administration said that the events in Ukraine, far away from the American mainland, “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”4 Westerners promulgated a very different assessment of the forced ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014. The U.S. called it a “people’s rev- olution” and said that the mob action organized in part by the U.S. ambas- sador in Kiev (including the killing of Berkut fighters, the state guard of the Ukrainian president) was a legitimate way of expressing the will of the “Ukrainian people.”
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Law, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, South America, Syria, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

126. The Risks of Foreign Fighters in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Author:
Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In none of the conflicts in the post-Soviet area have so many foreign fighters participated than in the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014. It is estimated that more than 17,000 fighters from 55 countries have fought there on either side. Those fighting on the Russian side pose a special challenge to Ukraine’s security and to neighbouring countries because these fighters can engage in terrorism or other radical actions and are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare.
Topic:
War, Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

127. Rebels without a Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Russia and the separatists it backs in Ukraine’s east are no longer quite on the same page, especially since the Kremlin abandoned ideas of annexing the breakaway republics or recognising their independence. The rift gives the new Ukrainian president an opportunity for outreach to the east’s embattled population, including by relaxing the trade embargo. What’s new? Russia’s gradual retreat from any plans to annex parts of eastern Ukraine has opened schisms between Moscow and its separatist proxies in the region. Why does it matter? For Kyiv, these divides could create opportunities to restart dialogue with the people of the east. Such contacts, in turn, could help lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s unification. What should be done? The rift between Moscow and its proxies should inform new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s policies. Kyiv should look to rebuild relations with the inhabitants of separatist-held areas, by easing the economic blockade on the east and increasing outreach to the population there.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

128. DONBAS PEACE TALKS 2.0: Russia’s Objectives and Ukraine’s Limits

Author:
Cristina Gherasimov and András Rácz
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
On October 1, 2019, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy agreed to meet Russia’s conditions for holding peace talks already this autumn. Moscow’s readiness to play, however, should not be mistaken for willingness to solve the conflict. So far, the Kremlin has not made any concessions in Eastern Ukraine that would be irreversible; consequently, it seems to only be testing Zelenskiy’s limits. Both Zelenskiy and the EU need to be cautious not to reward easy-to-reverse steps with major, strategic benefits.
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

129. Regards sur l’Eurasie - L'année politique 2018

Author:
Anne De Tinguy, Annie Daubenton, Olivier Ferrando, Sophie Hohmann, Jacques Lévesque, Nicolas Mazzuchi, Gaïdz Minassian, Thierry Pasquet, Tania Sollogoub, and Julien Thorez
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Regards sur l’Eurasie. L’année politique est une publication annuelle du Centre de recherches internationales de Sciences Po (CERI) dirigée par Anne de Tinguy. Elle propose des clefs de compréhension des événements et des phénomènes qui marquent de leur empreinte les évolutions d’une région, l’espace postsoviétique, en profonde mutation depuis l’effondrement de l’Union soviétique en 1991. Forte d’une approche transversale qui ne prétend nullement à l’exhaustivité, elle vise à identifier les grands facteurs explicatifs, les dynamiques régionales et les enjeux sous-jacents.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Corruption, Democratization, Economics, Health, International Security, Natural Resources, Conflict, Multilateralism, Europeanization, Political Science, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan

130. Dying Light: War and Trade of the Separatist-Controlled Areas of Ukraine

Author:
Artem Kochnev
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
The paper investigates how war and the war-related government policies affected economic activity of the separatist-controlled areas of Ukraine. The paper applies a quasi-experimental study design to estimate the impact of two events on the separatist-controlled areas: the introduction of the separatist control and the introduction of the second round of the trade ban, which was imposed by the government of Ukraine on the separatist-controlled territories in 2017. Using a difference-in-difference estimation procedure that controls for the yearly and monthly effects, individual fixed effects, and the region-specific time shocks, the study finds that the separatist rule decreased the economic activity by 38% in the Donetsk region and 51% in the Luhansk region according to the preferred specifications. At the same time, the trade ban of the year 2017 against the major industrial enterprises of the separatist-controlled areas decreased luminosity by 20%. The paper argues that the trade disruptions due to the war actions were nested within the negative effect of the separatist rule and accounted for half of it.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, War, Conflict, Macroeconomics, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine