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31. Dimensión digital de la guerra de Rusia contra Ucrania: perspectivas endógenas en situaciones de emergencia

Author:
Jacinto Gómez-López, Jesús Miguel Flores-Vivar, and Ángel Gómez de Agreda
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Los conflictos armados provocan disrupciones en las redes de comunicaciones y su empleo malicioso por parte del enemigo. Si bien las causas que lo originan son distintas, las consecuencias son, a menudo, similares a las que se producen en emergencias de la sociedad civil. El establecimiento de protocolos y mecanismos que fomenten la resiliencia de las redes y aplicaciones tecnológicas existentes y que prevean el uso de otras alternativas es una parte fundamental en el correcto funcionamiento de los servicios de emergencia. El artículo presenta algunas reflexiones y resultados preliminares para la mejora de estos servicios, basadas en las enseñanzas extraídas del conflicto en Ucrania-Rusia. Se recogen acciones para la mejora de las actuaciones en las redes sociales y en aquellos servicios que estas habilitan.
Topic:
Communications, Propaganda, Disinformation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Emergency Services
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

32. One year of war in Ukraine

Author:
Christian Leffler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
It has been just over one year since Russia began its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. In that year, the EU has stepped up and provided copious amounts of support to Ukraine – economic and military, as well as providing a safe haven for millions of Ukrainians who have fled the fighting. As the conflict has now entered its second year, this CEPS Explainer dives deep to analyse what has defined the first year and then expands on what the EU needs to concretely do in the second if Ukraine is to have any hope of triumphing over the invaders. This will require vision, courage and boldness from European leaders. The alternative if they fail? A rules-based international order replaced by a ruthless multipolar world defined by competing spheres of influence.
Topic:
European Union, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

33. Hard choices: if not now, when?

Author:
Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Yet, even before the NATO Summit, the long-expected Ukrainian spring counteroffensive was falling short of the significant gains anticipated after the massive Western aid provided during the war’s first 15 months – $37.6 billion in U.S. security assistance alone, according to the Pentagon (May 31, 2023). With Kyiv nonetheless insisting in late summer, that “we don’t care how long it takes,” questions are now raised, morally awkward but strategically valid and likely to spread over the coming months: How much longer before it proves too long, and how much more will be needed before it is too much?
Topic:
NATO, Armed Conflict, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

34. VIEWPOINT: IS MILITARY AID REALLY THE BEST WAY TO HELP UKRAINE?

Author:
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Molly Wallace, and Ned Dobos
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Ukraine has received tens of billions of dollars worth of military aid since the Russian invasion began one year ago. The international consensus seems to be that supporting Ukraine means financing its war effort. But a few dissenting voices have emerged of late, more ambivalent about the prudence—and ethics—of the current policy. Colonel Douglas MacGregor, a former advisor to the US Secretary of Defence, has warned that the choice of cure could turn out to be worse than the disease. At least 7,000 Ukrainian civilians have already perished in the war. Thousands more have been injured, and millions have been displaced. MacGregor’s primary concern is that the bleeding will continue for as long as the fighting does. Russian forces advance, Ukrainian forces resist with violence, Russia responds with counter-violence, and the bodies continue to pile up. The Ukrainian state retains its sovereignty, but eventually we get to a point where, to quote MacGregor, “There are no longer any Ukrainians left!” This is hyperbole, of course, but that should not distract from the valid point MacGregor is making. States exist for the sake of their citizens, not the other way around. Therefore, if a given method of defending the state is causing its citizens to be killed or to flee en masse, that is a compelling reason to explore alternatives.
Topic:
Resistance, Armed Conflict, Nonviolence, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

35. THE LIMITS OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND

Author:
Costantino Pischedda and Andrew Cheon
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Drone strikes targeted Moscow last week. Though much remains unknown about it, the episode appears to be part of a series of unclaimed coercive attacks that US officials attributed to Ukrainian government personnel, including the killing of the daughter of a Russian nationalist, the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines, and drone attacks on the Kremlin. With unclaimed coercion, perpetrators impose costs on adversaries to signal their resolve to prevail in disputes while denying involvement or simply not making any claim about responsibility. Unclaimed coercion is not unique to the war in Ukraine. Russia launched cyber attacks in 2007 to extract concessions from Estonia, though Moscow denied responsibility, and in 2010 Seoul claimed North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship, Pyongyang’s denial notwithstanding. Unclaimed coercion may have strategic benefits. Without unmistakable evidence about the identity of the perpetrator, the absence of a claim of responsibility creates plausible deniability, which, some argue, allows coercers to send intelligible, credible messages to targets while containing escalation risks. It may also reduce the costs of being seen as a norm violator. For instance, Austin Carson observed that, though both Saudi Arabia and the United States viewed the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities as part of an Iranian coercive campaign, the absence both of conclusive evidence and a claim of responsibility prevented Riyadh and Washington from carrying out a tough military response, which would have looked “illegitimate while jeopardizing allies’ support.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Armed Conflict, Coercion, Russia-Ukraine War, and Plausible Deniability
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, South Korea, North Korea, and Cuba

36. Importing Instability How the War Against Ukraine Makes Russia Less Secure

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
ACLED data indicate that cross-border violence between Ukraine and Russia escalated in May-October 2023 in the wake of the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. Conflict incidents inside Russia have become increasingly deadly for both civilians and the Russian military. Although the Russian government has attempted to hush up the impact of the war’s spillover, local authorities — especially those in the border regions — are struggling to fend off cross-border attacks. Ukrainian drone attacks have surged since May 2023, reaching deeper into Russian territory and inflicting significant damage to Russia’s reputation, military, and infrastructure. While the Wagner Group mutiny revealed the Russian state’s inability to control the internal situation, it may also have rallied the establishment around President Vladimir Putin. Still, resistance to the invasion from individuals and armed groups within Russia shows no signs of abating, as attacks on military enlistment offices and rail infrastructure continue despite the government crackdown on opposition and protest.
Topic:
Security, Drones, Wagner Group, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. Starr Forum: Rebuilding Ukraine While Under Fire

Author:
Oleg Ustenko and Simon Johnson
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
A discussion with experts--including Oleg Ustenko, the economic advisor to President Zelensky--on rebuilding Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing war. Joining Ustenko is Simon Johnson, professor at MIT Sloan and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.
Topic:
Economics, Reconstruction, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Sporadic Crises in Europe in the Support for Ukraine: Why the West Should Keep to its Primary Path

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been ongoing discussion about whether or not the collective West is getting tired of supporting Ukraine. Despite the fact that, overall, the West continues to express support by providing assistance, and Washington and Brussels1 repeatedly state that continued assistance is crucial to keep Ukraine fighting for its independence, there are still periodic attempts by some actors within the European Union to suggest peace treaties that might lead to a ceasefire as soon as possible. For example, in spring 2022, Italy presented a 4-point peace plan that concentrated on demilitarizing the front lines; declaring Ukraine a neutral country, with some unidentified states guaranteeing its security; having an agreement between Russia and Ukraine about the status of Crimea and Donbas that would give those parts of Ukraine full autonomy in every sphere but officially would leave them parts of Ukraine; and having a multilateral agreement signed between Russia, Ukraine and the EU about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and the removal of the sanctions.2 However, the plan never saw success because it left space for legitimate concerns associated with Russia not fulfilling its responsibilities and continuing its aggressive policy both against Ukraine and against other neighbors. Italy has had opposition from various political groups to the sending of arms to Ukraine, and Prime Minister Meloni, who has generally been supportive towards Ukraine, has been voicing concerns about “fatigue… from all sides”.3
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Crisis Management, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

39. Preparing for a Longer War: Is a Ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia possible by 2024?

Author:
Stefan Meister, András Rácz, and Judith Heckenthaler
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine has failed and is now a protracted war of attrition. Russia has adapted to this situation and prepared for a longer war. The legitimization of the Putin system is increasingly built around the war. As long as Ukraine has no security guarantees, a ceasefire is not realistic from either side. Therefore, the focus should be on protecting the territory Ukraine controls and defining together with the Western partners how security can be provided and what victory means.
Topic:
Security, Vladimir Putin, Ceasefire, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

40. Synchronized: The Impact of the War on Ukraine's Energy Landscape

Author:
Thomas Laffitte and Ihor Moshenets
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine was able to generate substantial revenues from the transit costs of Russian hydrocarbons destined for the European market. Despite the war, Russian oil (and some gas) continues to flow to Europe via Ukraine, and the latter continues to receive transit fees. In the field of hydrocarbons, although Ukraine is far from having hydrocarbon reserves equivalent to those of Russia, it has several assets to offer Europeans, including particularly large storage capacities. Fortunately, these storage facilities are located in the western part of the country, away from much of the fighting. Thanks to the successful synchronization of the Ukrainian and the EU power grids, the electricity trade continues. It has become a field of increased cooperation between Kyiv and Brussels, offering a potential blueprint for other sectors with a view to future integration. Despite the immense destruction caused by the Russian army, which specifically targeted the country’s energy infrastructure, Ukraine has shown extraordinary resilience. Ukraine can export electricity to its European partners, creating a profitable situation for both parties and good promises for the future. While the debate continues in Europe regarding the role of nuclear energy in the energy transition, it is already clear that in this domain, North American actors have the upper hand in Ukraine. Decisions made in Brussels on the exact contours of the energy transition will have a major influence on energy policy decisions made in Ukraine. The country has significant potential to produce decarbonized and renewable electricity.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Nuclear Energy, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine