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111. Nuclear power plants in war zones: Lessons learned from the war in Ukraine

Author:
Joanna Przybylak
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to examine the lessons learned till mid-2023 from the war in Ukraine to find out how attacking or seizing nuclear power plants (NPPs) can be utilised to advance military and political objectives during an armed conflict. The qualitative research approach has been applied to the study, focusing on an analysis of academic research and relevant acts of international law. In order to examine Russia’s approach to the attacks against the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, numerous reports, official statements by the authorities, press releases, and Internet sources have been analysed. For evaluation of nuclear security and safety standards in Ukraine, the “seven pillars” model proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been adopted. The study indicates that strategically located NPPs can be used as “nuclear shields” for the occupying forces deployed at the plant or nearby. They may also become useful tools of “lawfare” waged with the use of flawed interpretations of international humanitarian law. Finally, nuclear security-related narrations analysed in the paper clearly prove that seized NPPs can be effectively used in information warfare. The research leads to the conclusion that civil NPPs in war zones can be weaponised and exploited by the hostile forces not only for impeding energy supplies (and thus shattering the public morale of the adversary) but also for blackmailing and coercing the decisionmakers of the attacked state and their international allies with a vision of man-made nuclear disaster.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

112. The Three Seas Initiative, its fund, and its support for Ukraine in terms of the theory of liberalism

Author:
Marta Gębska
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This article aims to analyse how the theory of economic and institutional liberalism applies to the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and its Investment Fund (3SIIF), particularly in the context of Ukraine, which was attacked by Russia in February 2022. The study integrates theoretical perspectives from security studies, political science, and international relations with the practical implementation of the 3SI and 3SIIF. It uses scholarly literature on liberalism along with official 3SI and 3SIIF documentation. By comparing the theoretical principles of liberalism with the operational practices of the 3SI, the article draws conclusions about the alignment of these practices with liberal theory. The findings indicate that the theory of liberalism can be used to explain and describe forms of regional cooperation such as the 3SI, which reflects its relevance across various operational and conceptual dimensions. The acceptance of Ukraine as a participating 3SI partner was one of the signals to Russia that Ukraine is a part of the Western world, where goals are achieved through voluntary integration, trade and investment cooperation, free market, and democratic principles, and not through dependency, violence, and military action. Finally, the paper illustrates the application of liberalism theory to the geopolitical realities of the 3SI and draws attention to its effectiveness in achieving economic and regional security goals. The research may influence future regional policies and strategies, especially in the context of Ukraine’s integration into Western structures.
Topic:
Security, International Security, Liberalism, Russia-Ukraine War, and Three Seas Initiative
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

113. Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:
Marlena Zadorożna and Marin Butuc
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Russian disinformation carried out as part of the ongoing war in Ukraine is becoming a challenge for neighbouring countries that border the conflict region. The aim of the analysis was to identify common features between Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland, which, as two of the countries that border Ukraine, were on a list of Russia’s main targets for disinformation in 2022. The geopolitical and historical importance of both countries increases their social polarisation. The study was therefore guided by the following research question: What common features can be distinguished between Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland? The research took the form of an open comparison. According to the approach used, the empirical cases used for comparison were not explicitly limited a priori. In order to carry out the research, however, preliminary assumptions were adopted that ensured temporal, conceptual, and interpretative comparability of the data. Research results proved that Russian disinformation in both countries is based on the following common features: creating internal divisions, propagation of distrust towards the West, stimulating social emotions, use of social media, and popularising pro-Russian narratives. Analysing these areas may be helpful in increasing the ability of states to detect and disclose disinformation. Scientific publications describing Russian disinformation focus on the national perspective, which does not always correspond to the transnational nature of disinformation campaigns. Meanwhile, this article synthesises knowledge about disinformation mechanisms occurring in two countries bordering the conflict region and draws attention to the need for research in this area.
Topic:
Communications, Disinformation, Fake News, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland

114. Surviving the War: Russia-Western Balkan Ties After the War in Ukraine

Author:
Maksim Samorukov
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pushed Europe into a new era of instability. The fundamentals of the continent’s political and economic order are shifting as Russia’s brutal methods of war undermine the prospects of the slightest cooperation between Moscow and European states. Decades-old trade links have been severed, transport corridors rerouted, and people-to-people contacts have become more scarce than ever. Europe is reshaping its security architecture around Russia as the main threat, while Moscow frames its aggression against Ukraine as an existential defensive war with a duplicitous West. The only European region that stands out in this process of growing mutual alienation is the Western Balkans. More than a year into the war, Russia’s relations with several Balkan states appear to have undergone little change. Serbia is eagerly continuing with energy deals with Gazprom, Bosnian Serb leaders frequent Moscow on official visits, and some leading Montenegrin parties are sticking to pro-Russian slogans. It would appear that time stands still in the Western Balkans, with petty local grievances overriding major global developments This publication was produced with the support of the Open Society Foundations (OSF). Responsibility for the content of this publication belongs solely to Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trade, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

115. A Contact Group for Ukraine?

Author:
Walter Kemp
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The high-level Ukraine peace summit hosted by Switzerland on 15 and 16 June underlined the need for finding a path to peace. But thus far, proposals made by several countries, including Ukraine, have not stopped the fighting. Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has implications for international peace and security, perhaps it is time to consider the formation of an international contact group to formulate a more coherent approach to de-escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and nudge the parties towards peace. Since the late 1990s it has been common to form international contact groups in times of crisis. Such groups can bolster coordination among different international actors, forge common positions and exert leverage on the parties to reduce tensions. Indeed, in the past 20 or so years (since the beginning of the 21st century) there have been more than 20 such groups. Some of the more high-profile examples include contact groups on the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and for dealing with piracy off the coast of Somalia. These ad hoc coalitions with nonbinding rules are designed to enhance cohesion, cooperation and coordination to improve conflict or crisis management. Considering the seriousness of the war in Ukraine and the fact that many countries have a stake in reducing tensions, it would seem necessary and urgent to form an international contact group on Ukraine.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

116. Perspectives for the War in Ukraine

Author:
Thomas Greminger
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
There is no doubt that the military aggression against Ukraine unleashed by President Putin on 24 February 2022 represents the most significant disruption of security and peace in Europe since the end of World War II. The war has far-reaching repercussions affecting practically every aspect of our lives and impacting far beyond the European continent. In this article, I will first briefly assess the situation on the battlefield. I will then offer a few scenarios for how the conflict could evolve in the coming months. Afterward I will mainly focus on what has been called “Plan B”-thinking in the expert community: What if the official narrative of both sides – a military victory – does not materialize? What if the parties, exhausted by a war of attrition, decide to return to the negotiation table – or the high-intensity warfare transitions to low-intensity conflict leading to a de facto cessation of hostilities? What could a negotiated or a de facto ceasefire look like? And what issues would have to be negotiated if – in the most optimistic scenario – the parties decide to proceed from a ceasefire to a conflict settlement process?
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

117. The War in Ukraine: Reality Check for Emerging Technologies and the Future of Warfare

Author:
Jean-Marc Rickli and Federico Mantellassi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the beginning of one of the most intense and brutal state-on-state conflicts opposing two modern militaries in recent memory. Despite Russia’s qualitative and quantitative advantages, Ukraine’s armed forces have so far put up strong resistance, foiling Russian plans of a quick victory and turning the conflict into a bloody war of attrition. Due to its scale and the nature of its belligerents, the conflict can provide us with a glimpse into what the future of warfare might look like and help us recentre the burgeoning conversation about the future of warfare in the current reality, especially as it relates to the presence and impact of emerging technologies. The war therefore offers us a way to understand how digital and off-the-shelf technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) impact conflicts of this scale and how relevant they are to current modern warfare. The war can also help us see how new actors become involved in warfare, what new means of influencing nation states are becoming available, and which new tools armed forces can use to affect battlefield outcomes. Importantly, it can help us gauge their importance relative to more traditional aspects of warfare. The analysis is structured in four main parts. This introduction is followed by a short contextualisation to situate the analysis in the wider conversation about emerging technologies and the future of warfare (Part 2). Part 3 provides a short overview of the conflict so far, dividing it into six phases. Part 4 surveys the main elements of the conflict in Ukraine, outlining what emerging technologies have been present and critically assessing their role in the war. Part 5 delves into some implications for the future of warfare that can be understood from the dynamics analysed thus far, especially as they relate to the place of emerging technologies in future conflicts and their role in determining battlefield outcomes. We argue that while some new technologies have come to characterise modern warfare, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict shows that many features of warfighting remain unchanged. Emerging technologies, such as AI and cheaper technological alternatives to traditional armaments, such as drones, are undoubtedly starting to change the battlefield and will play an increasingly larger role in future conflicts. Cyberspace and the globalised digital information space are bringing new actors and new means to exert influence, provide nations’ armed forces with new tools, and make battlefields increasingly globalised and complex. However, the conflict also shows that traditional aspects of warfare will not decrease in importance or be sidelined. Conflicts remain a contest of wills and adaptation, where ammunition supplies, the quantity of traditional armaments such as tanks, and both the number and quality of personnel and the logistical and organisational ability to bring all these elements to bear all remain the most important determinants of success. While technology is playing an increasing role in this equation, it remains unable to determine the outcome of a conflict on its own.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

118. Russia Changes Its Nuclear Doctrine

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The publication of Russia’s new nuclear doctrine is another in its attempts to intimidate NATO states, especially in order to discourage them from supporting Ukraine. Russia is lowering the declared threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and specifying additional situations in which it is to be possible. This does not mean, however, an increased danger of nuclear weapons use in the ongoing conflict. Russia is nonetheless likely to take further steps to heighten the fears of such a scenario among NATO governments and societies. At the same time, the document reflects the weakening of Russia’s conventional forces.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

119. Ukraine's accession negotiations with the European Union: reforms undertaken in ten years and the challenges ahead

Author:
Snizhana Diachenko, Viktoria Melnyk, and Dmytro Naumenko
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
10 years ago, European Union representatives were still far from enthusiastic about Ukraine. Indeed, the Association Agreement signed by President Poroshenko in 2014 which came into force three years later[1], although far-reaching, lacked a clear political objective[2]. Russia's massive invasion of Ukraine has considerably accelerated the relaunch of the enlargement policy. Indeed, after Ukraine applied for membership on the fourth day after the Russian invasion, the Union took a positive decision with extraordinary speed and granted Ukraine candidate status in June 2022. On 14 February 2023, the European Council gave the green light to the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine which started on 25 June 2024. The situation was unprecedented, and the EU seems to have accepted the geopolitical challenges and responded quickly. For Ukraine, approaching the gates of the European Union is a concrete expression of the will of the people who defended the European path during the Revolution of Dignity – otherwise known as EuroMaïdan, in 2014, and which is defending European values on the front line. European integration is proving to be a matter of national security for Ukraine, since from 2019, "the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic path" are enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine, following amendments made on the basis of the "strategic path of the State to acquire full membership of the European Union and NATO". Prior to this, Ukraine's National Security Law of June 2018 had already defined ‘Ukraine's integration into the European political, economic, security and legal space and membership of the European Union’ as one of the State's fundamental national interests. And so, Ukraine has already started working towards its rapprochement with the EU with the implementation of this text. Given its scale and ambition, the lessons learned from Ukraine's implementation of the association agreement can help to effectively organise the accession negotiation process.
Topic:
NATO, Reform, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

120. European agriculture and Ukrainian agriculture complement each other

Author:
Alan Hervé
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Agriculture has long been the richest, most diversified and most innovative of Ukraine's economic and social activities. Since Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, it has also become the most essential for the country and the one that raises the most questions in its relations with the European Union, which it intends to join as soon as possible. Many accuse Ukraine of unfair competition: on wheat, which is seriously disrupting Poland's agrarian economy; on poultry meat, which is said to be a threat to French production; on sugar and, increasingly, on organic products. Beyond the particular circumstances we are currently experiencing, Ukraine could occupy a place of choice within an enlarged Union. Thanks to its high-performance agriculture, it could help to strengthen the Union's role in meeting the food needs of deficit countries, at a time when, without Ukraine, the European Union is losing market share all over the world, particularly to the growing competition from Russia. Ukraine's competitiveness should not be an obstacle to fruitful cooperation, if the accession negotiations agree to include all the key issues of climate change, ecological diversity and the aspiration of a majority of rural people to contribute to solving these problems. This paper outlines the issues at stake and the solutions we need to analyse together in order to take action, and thus to set a new and determined course for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that has lost its way.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, European Union, Innovation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine