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31. The New-Old Elites and their Relations with the EU: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia

Author:
Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Tunisia and Egypt are two countries that have experienced the fall of longstanding authoritarian leaders. Transitions in both countries then took entirely different directions. This paper deals with the question of whether and how political change in the two countries has affected their foreign policy-making towards the European Union (EU). Building on a liberal international relations (IR) perspective and elite theory, the paper focuses on the politically relevant elites (PRE). PRE shape discourses and influence decision-making processes. Building on the assumption that the composition and discourses of the PRE influence policies and positions towards the EU, the paper analyses the structure of the elites and their disputes over power resources.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, European Union, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and Mediterranean

32. Who Owns What? – Free Trade Policies, Migration Management and the Ambiguity of “Joint Ownership”

Author:
Sherin Gharib
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The concept of joint ownership has become a buzzword since the 1990s not only in strategies of international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the WorldBank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also in European Union (EU)foreign policy (Ejdus, 2017). Since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) in 2004 joint ownership has been defined as one of its main principles.Accordingly, the EU states that “joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners” (European Commission, 2004, p.8). It continues by holding that there “can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country. The endorsement of these plans by the highest instance of the agreements in place will give added weight to the agreed priorities for action” (European Commission, 2004, p. 8). Thus, EU policies should be set within a partnership relation between the EU, and its counterparts and priorities should be defined by common consent. The EU aims to engage “governments and all leading local stakeholders, including national parliaments” (European Commission, 2010c cited in Jonasson, 2013, p. 47). The importance of joint ownership was reconfirmed within the revised ENP in 2015,where the EU has declared that “differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus ofits partnership with the EU” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The goal, as the EUhas claimed, is to increase cooperation with neighbouring countries to an eye-to-eye level and to follow an approach based on “both partners’ needs and EU interests”(European Commission, 2017). The revised ENP again acknowledges the importance of involving relevant members of civil society as well as social partners in consultations(European Commission, 2015a, p. 3). Despite the appearance of joint ownership in several EU documents and its use as an example of an inclusive approach, the definition offered remains quite vague. Thus, it is unclear to what extent governments, local stakeholders, civil society and social partners should co-own certain policies. Whose considerations should count and should joint ownership be operationalised within the decision-making or implementation process?How can the operationalisation of the concept be evaluated? This policy paper critically investigates the EU’s concept of joint ownership. Drawing on two case studies, namely free trade policies and migration management, the paper 7PAPERSIEMed. Who Owns What? – Free Trade Policies, Migration Management and the Ambiguity of “Joint Ownership” analyses the implications and limitations of the EU’s partnership relation with its southern neighbourhood. The paper focuses mainly on the Egyptian, Tunisian and Moroccan cases. Due to the vague definition of “joint ownership” and in order to be able to analyse the two case studies, the paper suggests, based on EU documents, two types of ownership: 1) governmental ownership and 2) societal ownership. Using this conceptualisation, the paper analyses the involvement of different stakeholders and the main beneficiaries of EU free trade policies and migration management. It argues that there is a lack of governmental as well as societal ownership within the two EU tools, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and Mobility Partnerships (MP) as it is mainly the EU that sets priorities, norms and standards to be adopted by partner countries. Government representatives and civil society actors from Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) perceive their relationship with the EUas asymmetric rather than based on an eye-to-eye level (personal communication with Tunisian and Egyptian officials and civil society actors, 2016-2017). The perceived reluctance to fully engage MPCs – government officials and social actors – in the implementation of EU policies has led to their growing mistrust of the EU. If ownership is applied at all, then it is often reduced to a state-centric approach even though the EU is rhetorically attached to the inclusion of actors going beyond the government. The lack of “societal” ownership becomes evident as consultative mechanisms suggested and applied by the EU to include grassroots organisations have in most cases no implications for policy-drafting processes. Thus, there seems to be a gap between what the EU refers to in official documents and the implementation on the ground. In this case, both MPs and free trade policies might exclusively serve the interests of the government and linked elites in the region – this depends on their ability to “own” certain policies rather than addressing the needs at the grassroots, such as poverty reduction or the creation of job opportunities. In this respect, the legitimacy and sustainability of EU policies is at risk (Ejdus, 2017;Dworkin & Wesslau, 2015). The paper proceeds as follows: the first part investigates the concept of ownership,illustrates several dimensions of its ambiguity, and analyses the EU’s operationalisation of the concept. Subsequently, the paper sheds light on the limits of ownership in the realm of free trade policies in general and DCFTAs in particular.The following section investigates the concept of migration management and MPs. The analysis is based on primary and secondary literature review as well as interviews conducted by the author with Egyptian and Tunisian officials and civil society actors, as well as with EU representatives in 2016 and 2017.
Topic:
Migration, Regional Cooperation, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Tunisia, and Mediterranean

33. Tunisia 2019: The Success and Failures of the Arab Spring

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Paul Rivlin analyzes the economic challenges facing Tunisia, a country which many have claimed represents perhaps the sole success story of the 'Arab Spring.'
Topic:
Poverty, Economy, Arab Spring, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Tunisia

34. Cooperation with Religious Institutions as a European Policy Tool

Author:
Yasemin El-Menouar, Sergio Altuna, Patrycja Sasnai, and Georges Fahmi
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
For at least three decades now religion has been re-entering the public sphere and politics in Europe and globally. Its re-emergence, however, bears little resemblance to the past when the religion-state coupling was unequivocal. Today, in Europe, the values of freedom of religion and belief, free expression and non-discrimination take precedence over any single religion’s domination – at least that is the prevalent aspiration. In the European neighbourhood, major social and political phenomena have acquired an increasingly religious angle: radicalisation – in the words of Olivier Roy – is becoming Islamised, intra and interstate conflicts have a sectarian character, and governments either want to increase their control over religion or the breakdown of local governance is making religious actors more legitimate representatives than the central government. Within EU member states, religion is resurfacing alongside two simultaneous trends: on the one hand, individualised, atomised urban life that requires more spirituality and a reference point to the realities of modernity and diversity; and, on the other, social polarisation around perceptions of secularisation and religions, particularly Islam. This Joint Policy Study takes an institutionalist view of state-religion relations, although religious institutions are defined in a broad sense and encompass both official and unofficial religion. This leaves the field outside of the institutionalised religion-state relations either relatively small or down to individual expressions of religiosity. Institutionalism, so understood, is a view that policy is carried out through and with institutions. This can vary in different aspects: dependence (state-dependent, statecontrolled, independent of states), size, homogeneity, thematic focus, accountability, credibility, and so on. The chapters in the study aim to provide both more generalised overviews and case studies to cover all levels of state-religion relations in Europe and MENA: relations between state and religious institutions in Europe (chapter 1); relations between state and religious institutions in the Maghreb (Tunisia and Morocco in chapter 3); relations between institutions of different religions (the Vatican and al-Azhar in chapter 4); and the role of Muslim religious institutions in advancing a state policy in an EU member state (Germany in chapter 2).
Topic:
Religion, Institutionalism, Secularism, and Theocracy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Germany, Morocco, Tunisia, and Vatican city

35. Assessing Tunisia’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regime

Author:
Thomas Lassourd and Carole Nakhle
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The authors of this paper examine Tunisia’s upstream petroleum fiscal regime, in consideration of the government’s stated policy priority of reversing a decade-long decline in reserves and production. Although the country’s “Jasmine Revolution” led to improved civic rights and the country is a strong regional performer on the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s (NRGI) Resource Governance Index, foreign investment has dropped since 2011, in part because of regulatory ambiguity and political instability. Tunisia’s proven oil and gas reserves are very small, especially by regional standards. With limited geological prospects, the existing context is not conducive to oil and gas investment, especially for exploration. Tunisia offers different contractual arrangements and fiscal regimes: a concession-based system, which often involves joint ventures between the state-owned company, ETAP, and international oil companies and production sharing contracts. This paper analyses the various arrangements and fiscal instruments, focusing primarily on production sharing contracts, which have become the dominant contractual forms for foreign investors and do not require any public (ETAP) capital investment. The government of Tunisia publicly discloses all contracts and concessions.
Topic:
Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

36. Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

Author:
Thomas Renard
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has mobilised an unprecedented number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). More than 50,000 individuals travelled to the Levant to join jihadi groups. While fighters have flocked from virtually every corner of the world, a significant contingent came from North Africa. This has created an unprecedented challenge for individual countries, as well as for the broader Maghreb and Mediter- ranean regions. The ‘Caliphate’ has now been defeated with the loss of its remaining territories. While many people were killed, thousands of fighters and family members are either in detention in Syria or in Iraq – or still on the run. Authorities worldwide are contem- plating – or should be contemplating – the possible return of these fighters in the short to medium term and how to deal with them. In fact, more than a thousand North African fighters have already returned home since 2012. Following this unprecedented number of jihadi volunteers, countries must now handle an unprecedented number of jihadi veterans who present a multi-faceted security and societal challenge from prosecution to detention and rehabilitation. Arguably, whether they return or not, some of these fighters are likely to have a lasting effect on the global jihadi movement and on local dynamics in their country of origin. As highlighted in this report, history is a reminder that even small numbers of veteran fighters can have a significant impact on local, regional and global security. There has been a growing amount of research into (returning) foreign fighters recently.1 This research was needed to better understand the phenomenon, either in general terms or at a country-specific level. Most of this research focused on departures rather than returns, and it focused often more on the individual dynamics and motivations rather than on governments’ debates and responses. Yet, as most governments still grapple with returnees, it is important to look into governments’ responses, with a view to opening a discussion and possibly making some recom- mendations. In this report, we have therefore decided to focus on governments’ responses to the issue of returning foreign fighters in North Africa, in light of the unprecedented regional mobilisation. Tunisia, notably, has often been described as the largest provider of foreign fighters to the Levant, or certainly one of its top purveyors. Egypt and Morocco have also seen a significant mobilisation for jihad, justifying their inclu- sion in our study. We offer a comparative analysis of the situation in these three North African countries: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Such an approach, using similar guidelines for all contributing authors, allows for interesting comparisons between the circum- stances that led to the departure of fighters and the responses to dealing with their return. Contributors were asked to look into domestic perceptions and debates related to the threat from returnees, and the specific policies developed to handle them. They were also asked to compare current perceptions and responses with previous jihadi mobilisations.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia

37. September 2019 Issue

Author:
Daniel Byman, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, Julie Chernov Hwang, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Katherine Bauer
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This September 11th, a new generation is taking up the mantle in the fight against terrorism. “Later this year, a U.S. service member is likely to be deployed to Afghanistan who was not yet born on September 11, 2001,” Daniel Byman notes in our feature article on the jihadi terror threat facing the United States 18 years later. He assesses “although the operational freedom of jihadi groups is constricted by U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts, the jihadi cause as a whole has far more local and regional influence than it did in the years before 9/11, it is better able to inspire individuals in the West to act on its behalf, and groups have proven resilient despite the fierce U.S.-led onslaught.” Our interview is with Joseph Maguire, the United States’ Acting Director of National Intelligence. He says that “since the catastrophic attacks on 9/11, we have significantly diminished the ability of jihadists to strike the U.S. by removing hundreds of leaders and operatives, disrupting dozens of networks and plots, and degrading safe havens. But some jihadist groups still have that intent, not only to target the homeland but also our interests overseas. They are continually adapting to setbacks by modifying their tactics, seeking out alternative safe havens, and using new and emerging technologies to communicate, recruit, and conduct attacks. This makes for an increasingly diverse and unpredictable threat.” As the terror threat evolves, Acting Director Maguire stresses the importance of addressing the still-significant security challenges posed by the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq, and beyond given the group still poses a “tremendous threat” and has “all the recipes” for a resurgence. Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines examine Islamic State Khorasan’s leadership losses between 2015 and 2018 by leadership tier, year, and geography. Their findings highlight “the group’s tenacious presence in Nangarhar (Afghanistan) and Baluchistan (Pakistan), despite declines in overall number of attacks. An important factor contributing to ISK’s resiliency appears to be rooted in its steady recruitment of experienced Pakistani militants that sustain its leadership ranks.” Two years after the Marawi siege in the Philippines, Julie Chernov Hwang outlines the motivations for joining the Maute Group based on her interviews with 25 former members of the jihadi group and a related faction. Aaron Zelin and Katherine Bauer outline the significant progress Tunisia has made over the past two years in developing domestic counter-terrorism finance capabilities.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Khorasan Group
Political Geography:
Middle East and Tunisia

38. 'You Can Change the Course of a Country:' Report on the International Gender Symposium

Author:
Sibley Hawkins
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
In February 2019, ICTJ hosted an international symposium on gender and transitional justice in Tunisia that brought together representatives from eight countries where ICTJ has been actively engaged in implementing a gender-focused approach to its programming. This briefing paper presents the lessons learned and key strategies that came out of this conference, as well as recommendations to international organizations, donors, and the media.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Women, Media, and Transitional Justice
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Syria, and Tunisia

39. Exporting for Growth: Identifying Leading Sectors for Egypt and Tunisia Using the Product Space Methodology (التصدیر من أجل النمو: تحدید القطاعات الرائدة في مصر وتونس باستخدام منھجیة فضاء المنتجات)

Author:
Amirah El-Haddad
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Development Institute (DIE)
Abstract:
This discussion paper is available below in both Arabic (2019) and English (2018). The structural transformation of countries moves them towards more sophisticated, higher-value products. Network analysis, using the Product Space Methodology (PSM), guides countries towards leading export sectors. The identification process rests on two pillars: (1) available opportunities, that is, products in the product space that the country does not yet export which are more sophisticated than its current exports; and (2) the stock of a country’s accumulated productive knowledge and the technical capabilities that, through spillovers, enable it to produce slightly more sophisticated products. The PSM points to a tradeoff between capabilities and complexity. The methodology identifies very basic future products that match the two countries’ equally basic capabilities. Top products are simple animal products, cream and yogurt, modestly sophisticated plastics, metals and minerals such as salt and sulphur for Egypt; and slightly more sophisticated products such as containers and bobbins (plastics) and broom handles and wooden products for Tunisia, which is the more advanced of the two countries. A more interventionist approach steers the economy towards maximum sophistication, thus identifying highly complex manufactured metals, machinery, equipment, electronics and chemicals. Despite pushing for economic growth and diversification, these sectors push urban job creation and require high-skill workers, with the implication that low-skilled labour may be pushed into unemployment or into low-value informal jobs. A middle ground is a forward-looking strategy that takes sectors’ shares in world trade into account. This approach identifies medicaments in the chemicals sector; seats (e.g. car and aeroplane seats) in the “other highly manufactured” sector; inflated rubber tyres in the chemicals community (plastics and rubber); containers, bobbins and packages of plastics also in the plastics and rubber section; and articles of iron and steel in the metals sector for Egypt. The top product for Tunisia is furniture in the highly manufactured and special purpose goods community, followed by three products in plastics and rubber in the chemicals community, and finally three machinery sectors.
Topic:
Development, Economic growth, Exports, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Tunisia

40. Tunisia: Human Rights Organizations, Political Islam and its Groups

Author:
Mohamed Sahbi Khalfaoui
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
How can we understand the relation of political Islam in Tunisia with the human rights system in its indivisibility and universality? Since the establishment of the Tunisian Islamic Movement in the early seventies, it has worked extensively to articulate public positions addressing issues of human rights and freedoms. This relationship sprang from a dual position which juxtaposed full hostility to personal freedoms such as sexual rights and a relatively positive interaction with public freedoms. Then came the deliberations and process of ratification of the 2014 Constitution which was special in its emphasis on equality between women and men, freedom of belief, and criminalization of accusation of blasphemy. The repression of Islamists in Tunisia in the 1980s and 1990s was the most important factor that defined their position, views, and engagement with human rights principles. After the fall of former Tunisian President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali in 2011, the return of the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) Movement to public activity was one of the most important features of the new political phase in the country. The Tunisian society was split between supporters and opponents of such a development. With the return of Ennahda and the emergence of other Islamist groups, especially the Salafis, the debate resumed over the position of Islamists towards human rights. While they attempted to include Islamic law (Sharia) as the main source of legislation in the constitution, Islamists continued to declare their belief in human rights principles. Some analysts were optimistic concerning a transformation in the Islamist ideology, while others insisted that Islamists were duplicitous, waiting until they are empowered enough to impose their project, which is inherently hostile to human rights. This paper is an attempt to review the Islamists’ positions on human rights and how they changed over time.
Topic:
Human Rights, Islam, Constitution, and Islamism
Political Geography:
Africa, North Africa, Tunisia, Mediterranean, and Tunis