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132. China Maritime Report No. 22: Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing
- Author:
- Kevin McCauley
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves. Despite the recognized importance of logistics support, it is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies. Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Conflict, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
133. China Maritime Report No. 21: Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia: The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion
- Author:
- Lonnie D. Henley
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Most analysts looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is incapable of invading the island because it lacks the landing ships to transport adequate quantities of troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. This report challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that the PLA intends to meet these requirements by requisitioning civilian vessels operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵). Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government and military have taken steps to strengthen the national defense mobilization system to ensure the military has ample quantities of trained militia forces to support a cross-strait invasion. Despite ongoing challenges—including poor data management, inconsistent training quality, and gaps in the regulatory system—and uncertainties associated with foreign-flagged Chinese ships, this concept of operations could prove good enough to enable a large-scale amphibious assault.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Militias, Logistics, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
134. China Maritime Report No. 18: Chinese Special Operations in a Large-Scale Island Landing
- Author:
- John Chen and Joel Wuthnow
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- PLA special operations forces (SOF) would likely play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Their capabilities and training are geared towards several missions undertaken during the preparatory and main assault phases of the landing, including infiltration via special mission craft and helicopter, reconnaissance and targeting, obstacle clearance, strikes and raids, and extraction missions. While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several longstanding challenges could affect their performance in an island landing: integrating advanced special mission equipment for complex and dangerous missions, coordinating their operations with non-SOF supporting and supported forces, and overcoming the Chinese military’s penchant for centralized command. Even if PLA SOF are only partially effective, however, their support to the main assault force could diminish Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a large-scale invasion.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Maritime, Special Operations, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
135. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy
- Author:
- Ethan Kessler
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
136. The 21st Century's Great Military Rivalry
- Author:
- Graham Allison and Jonah Glick-Unterman
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- PRISM
- Institution:
- Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
- Abstract:
- A quarter-century ago, China conducted what it called “missile tests” bracketing the island of Taiwan to deter it from a move toward independence by demonstrating that China could cut Taiwan’s ocean lifelines. In response, in a show of superiority that forced China to back down, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to Taiwan’s adjacent waters. If China were to repeat the same missile tests today, it is highly unlikely that the United States would respond as it did in 1996. If U.S. carriers moved that close to the Chinese mainland now, they could be sunk by the DF-21 and DF-26 missiles that China has since developed and deployed. This article presents three major theses concerning the military rivalry between China and the United States in this century. First, the era of U.S. military primacy is over: dead, buried, and gone—except in the minds of some political leaders and policy analysts who have not examined the hard facts.1 As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it starkly in his 2018 National Defense Strategy, “For decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.”2 But that was then. “Today,” Mattis warned, “every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”3 As a result, in the past two decades, the United States has been forced to retreat from a strategy based on primacy and dominance to one of deterrence. As President Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his National Security Council colleague Kurt Campbell acknowledged in 2019, “The United States must accept that military primacy will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners.”4 One of the architects of the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy put it less diplomatically and more succinctly: “The era of untrammeled U.S. military superiority is over.”5
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Military
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and United States of America
137. Evolutionary Possibilities of Democratization and Atavistic Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Unrecognized States
- Author:
- Hilmi Ulas
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- The question of how rising atavistic nationalism will affect democracies worldwide is an essential one of our time. In this paper, I focus instead on conducting a comparative historical analysis of atavistic nationalism in two unrecognized states: North Cyprus and Taiwan. I argue that the democratic crisis of our times is, in its essence, economic and has been precipitated by the failure of democracies to build domestic capacities to support democratic values. Furthermore, I posit that engaging populaces at the local political level will prove essential to preserving democracies around the world. I conclude by underlining that atavistic nationalism is indeed a significant threat to regional and global peace and requires further co-operation on trade and governance, and should be engaged at the local level. Lastly, I suggest that co-creating local cultures that will act to soften atavistic nationalism, which feeds off the perception of threats and fear.
- Topic:
- Democratization, Nationalism, Financial Crisis, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Taiwan and Cyprus
138. The New Taiwan Clause: Taiwan and the Security of Japan
- Author:
- Tetsuo Kotani
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
- Abstract:
- A summit meeting between Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and President Joe Biden was held on April 16, 2021, followed by a joint statement. In the statement, for the first time in the 52 years since 1969, the importance of the security of the Taiwan Strait was emphasized by the leaders of Japan and the United States, confirming that both countries are increasingly concerned about the current situation regarding Taiwan. According to a poll conducted by Nikkei Inc. after the summit, 50% of the Japanese public considered the U.S.-Japan summit itself as "positive" (32% "negative"), and 74% of the respondents "agreed" that Japan should be involved in stabilizing the Taiwan Strait, while only 13% "disagreed." These figures were received with some surprise by experts. This paper will analyze these changes in Japan's perception of Taiwan, and then examine the issues that Japan should address in the future following the recent Japan-U.S. joint statement.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
139. Countering China’s Adventurism over Taiwan: A Third Way
- Author:
- Patrick Porter and Michael Mazarr
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- There is a growing bipartisan consensus in Washington on a tighter embrace of Taiwan, which may soon become a stronger implied US commitment to go to war in the event of a Chinese invasion. Taiwan matters to US security and the regional order, and the United States should continue to make clear that aggression is unacceptable. But those advocating a stronger US security commitment exaggerate the strategic consequences of a successful Chinese invasion. The stakes are not so high as to warrant an unqualified US pledge to go to war. American decision-makers, like their forebears confronting the seeming threat of communism in Indochina, may be trapping themselves into an unnecessarily stark conception of the consequences of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It would be irresponsible for the United States to leave itself no option in the event of Chinese aggression other than war. But nor should Washington abandon Taiwan. There is a prudent middle way: the United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor. It should help prepare Taiwan to defend itself, to raise costs against aggression, and develop means of punishing China with non-military tools.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
140. ASPI NOTES for the Biden Administration
- Author:
- Wendy Cutler, Anubhav Gupta, Nathan Levine, Richard Maude, Elina Noor, Jing Qian, Alistair Ritchie, Kevin Rudd, Daniel R. Russel, and Thom Woodroofe
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Notes for the Biden Administration is designed to offer creative and practical ideas for how the United States might re-engage in the Asia Pacific, particularly in the critical first six months of the new administration. The administration will immediately face a range of challenges and opportunities in this important region, including on climate change, public health, and the global economy. President-elect Biden and his team have signaled the need for the United States to lean into and deepen its engagement with friends and allies. This will mean leveraging the Asia Pacific’s multilateral architecture as well as using global forums such as the G20 and international organizations. Trade policy will also figure importantly in any effort to renew and expand America’s engagement. Additionally, the U.S.-China relationship will loom large from the outset. Tensions with China will surely linger, whether in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, complicating the task of establishing a new framework of “managed strategic competition” – a combination of each side's "red lines," continued competition, plus agreement on areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. ASPI Notes for the Biden Administration provides a diverse package of 20 actionable proposals to address specific risks or objectives in reconnecting with the Asia Pacific. These notes carefully reflect the views, perspectives, and expectations of the region itself – a hallmark of ASPI’s approach.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Economy, Trade, Public Health, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America