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1. China Maritime Report No. 42: Invasion Plans: Operation Causeway and Taiwan's Defense in World War II

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
During World War II, the United States and the Empire of Japan each developed plans and marshaled forces for a climactic battle over Taiwan. Both sides regarded the island as an area of strategic consequence. Code-named Operation CAUSEWAY, the American invasion of Taiwan would have been the largest amphibious campaign in the Pacific Theater and the largest sea-air-land engagement in world history. Strategists in Japan believed the attack was coming and designed a blueprint for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands called SHO-GO(捷 2 号作戦, or “Operation Victory No. 2”), which envisioned a bloody campaign of annihilation. Japanese camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in Taiwan were effective at hiding many capabilities from American intelligence. In recent years, Taiwanese military officers have drawn lessons from Taiwan’s wartime history to improve their defense plans. They highlight the need to stockpile, update beach defenses, mobilize whole-of-society support, expand underground bunker complexes, and prepare for a long fight and layered defense campaign. One important lesson of this history for the U.S. Navy and Joint Force is that deterrence worked before. It can work again. Under certain circumstances, the United States and Taiwan may be capable of preventing a PRC invasion of the island. But a tremendous amount of hard work will be needed to realize that goal. By revisiting the history of Taiwan-focused war plans, we may better assess current challenges and develop insights that could inform future strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.
Topic:
History, Military Affairs, Maritime, World War II, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Invasion, and Operation Causeway
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2. PLA Airborne Capabilities and Paratrooper Doctrine for Taiwan

Author:
Daniel Fu
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, PLA airborne troops are likely to assume a substantial role. Decapitation strike scenarios and the prospects of an airborne invasion are widely discussed by analysts, scholars, and policy practitioners in both the US and Taiwan. Despite PLA ambitions to rapidly expand their airborne capabilities, there are a growing number voices that downplay the threat or likelihood of an airborne assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese security analysts such as Liu Tai-ying (劉泰英), founder of the Taiwan Research Institute, have stated that “if paratroopers were used, the losses for China would be very high” and minimized their threat by stating that there are few landing spots available to PLA airborne forces (Taipei Times, September 26, 2022). Notably, many of these conclusions revolve around the viewpoint held by a growing number of military experts, who contend that “mass airborne operations are a thing of the past” (Modern War Institute, December 10, 2016). These views, however, fail to consider the robust drive on part of the PLA to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of its airborne troops. They also ignore substantial progress the PLA has already made towards that goal, both in terms of the training and preparation of its paratroopers and in decisive factors such as heavy airlift. In short, documenting the progress of PLA airborne troops’ capabilities may play a crucial role in assessing Chinese deployment strategies during a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Deterring a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the Status Quo

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China. The imperative to avoid a conflict with China should take priority for U.S. leaders. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. China has advantages in terms of geographical proximity to Taiwan and superior commitment to resolving the issue on favorable terms. The United States should not commit to fighting a great-power war at a time of China’s choosing. The Taiwanese obviously have the strongest interest in deterring a Chinese invasion of their island. Regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have the next-strongest interests in preserving stability in East Asia. These actors should do the heavy lifting in deterring China. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. Working with others, Taiwan has the capacity to inflict severe costs upon Beijing in the event of an armed attack. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others might convince Beijing that the various costs of invasion—economic sanctions, opprobrium, military balancing—outweigh the benefits and thus deter China from invading. America’s role should be to support Taiwanese-led efforts to deter China while working to convince all sides that the status quo is sustainable and the U.S. remains committed to its longstanding One China policy. This is the best chance of preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, Status Quo, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. China Maritime Report No. 21: Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia: The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion

Author:
Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Most analysts looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is incapable of invading the island because it lacks the landing ships to transport adequate quantities of troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. This report challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that the PLA intends to meet these requirements by requisitioning civilian vessels operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵). Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government and military have taken steps to strengthen the national defense mobilization system to ensure the military has ample quantities of trained militia forces to support a cross-strait invasion. Despite ongoing challenges—including poor data management, inconsistent training quality, and gaps in the regulatory system—and uncertainties associated with foreign-flagged Chinese ships, this concept of operations could prove good enough to enable a large-scale amphibious assault.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Militias, Logistics, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. China Maritime Report No. 18: Chinese Special Operations in a Large-Scale Island Landing

Author:
John Chen and Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
PLA special operations forces (SOF) would likely play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Their capabilities and training are geared towards several missions undertaken during the preparatory and main assault phases of the landing, including infiltration via special mission craft and helicopter, reconnaissance and targeting, obstacle clearance, strikes and raids, and extraction missions. While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several longstanding challenges could affect their performance in an island landing: integrating advanced special mission equipment for complex and dangerous missions, coordinating their operations with non-SOF supporting and supported forces, and overcoming the Chinese military’s penchant for centralized command. Even if PLA SOF are only partially effective, however, their support to the main assault force could diminish Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a large-scale invasion.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Maritime, Special Operations, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

6. China Maritime Report No. 17: The PLA Army's New Helicopters: An "Easy Button" for Crossing the Taiwan Strait?

Author:
Tom Fox
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
This report examines the potential roles and missions of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) new rotary wing capabilities in a cross-strait invasion. Looking specifically at the helicopter units of the PLA Army (PLAA), it discusses two possible scenarios in which these forces could serve as the main thrust in a campaign to seize control of Taiwan. In the first scenario, the PLAA would use nearly all of its rotary wing inventory simultaneously to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses and quickly convince the country’s political leadership to surrender. In a second “unconventional” scenario, the PLAA would risk the destruction of older helicopters in order to launch a sudden attack against the island, thereby achieving the element of surprise while saving its most capable platforms for lengthy follow-on operations to fully subdue the island. Based on analysis of the scale, complexity, and frequency of recent PLAA exercises, this report argues that China is at best a decade away from having the ability to seize Taiwan by either approach.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Air Force, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

7. China Maritime Report No. 15: The New Chinese Marine Corps: A "Strategic Dagger" in a Cross-Strait Invasion

Author:
Conor Kennedy
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has undergone significant expansion, growing from two brigades to eight. The major impetus behind these efforts is a desire to build the service arm into an expeditionary force capable of operating in most environments at short notice. However, PLANMC reform has also bolstered its ability to contribute to major campaigns along China’s periphery, including a Taiwan invasion scenario. This report examines the PLANMC’s role in a cross-strait amphibious campaign and analyzes how new additions to the force could be used against Taiwan.
Topic:
Navy, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia