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81. Enhancing Australia’s Taiwan ties

Author:
Benjamin Herscovitch and Mark Harrison
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia should articulate and pursue a disciplined Taiwan strategy that uses the flexibility of its one-China policy to increase engagement with Taipei in service of Australian economic and security interests. Canberra should support Taipei’s bid for entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and start negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. It should also establish regular ministerial exchanges with Taiwan. The Taiwan strategy advocated in this paper is likely to be a net negative for Australia’s relations with China. But it strikes a reasonable balance between Australia’s interests and the stabilisation of the Australia–China relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Regional Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

82. Stark Choices Confront Taiwan Voters

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan’s presidential election campaign has begun. Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Hou Yu-ih from the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) Party, Ko Wen-je of Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and independent Terry Gou offer Taiwan voters four different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with China. As senior US and Chinese officials resumed long-stalled face-to-face meetings, China warned once again that it has no room for compromise or concession on Taiwan. Yet, when Lai completed almost invisible transits through the US en route to Paraguay and back, China’s military response seemed almost pro-forma. When US, Japanese, and South Korean leaders reiterated at the trilateral Camp David summit their staunch opposition to China’s intimidation, China chose to interpret their words as one more promise to support Taiwan. The US accelerated weapons deliveries to Taiwan and expanded training for Taiwan’s military, and Taiwan announced that its defense budget will increase by 7.5% in 2024. Taiwan’s TSMC moved forward on constructing its Arizona factory despite some hiccups, and the US and Taiwan signed a long-awaited trade deal—the first part of their 21st Century Trade Initiative. As Taiwan’s presidential and legislative election campaigns enter the home stretch, the DPP’s Lai continues to lead the race. How will Beijing respond? Will Taiwan voters choose caution and vote for the KMT, or will they again interpret Chinese intimidation as one more reason to give four more years to the DPP with its insistence on de-facto independence?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Domestic Politics, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

83. Taiwan's Security Future: How Domestic Politics Impact Taipei’s Defense

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
With a presidential election fast approaching, Taipei’s defense policy could go in multiple directions. As China has grown more militarily capable and assertive under President Xi Jinping, Beijing’s promise to forcibly unify with Taiwan has increasingly worried both Taiwan and the United States. Beijing’s large-scale military exercise near Taiwan this fall underscores the role Taiwan’s own military capabilities play in deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To that end, US policymakers have increased defense cooperation with Taiwan and urged Taipei to do more for its defense in recent years. However, whether Taipei will stick to the defense policies implemented under current president Tsai Ing-wen is uncertain. This coming January, Taiwan’s voters will select a new president. Currently leading the polls is Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is committed to Taiwan’s sovereignty and views Taiwan as effectively already independent. Beijing has angrily decried this position and boycotted talks with Taipei as long as the DPP remains in power. Meanwhile, the path ahead for the Kuomintang (KMT), the primary opposition party, is riven with internal fissures. The party has traditionally sought closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing to defuse tensions—something it seems uniquely qualified for, since the PRC will not talk to the current DPP government. Yet emphasizing dialogue with an increasingly aggressive PRC, especially after Xi’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s limited self-government in 2020, has soured many voters on the KMT’s message. In response, reformers in the party have suggested a new direction more closely aligned with the DPP on national security to win back moderate voters, while traditionalists have doubled down on the old promise of peace through dialogue. This latter path would be worrying for the Biden administration, which has increased arms sales to Taipei and presided over a period of worsening US-China mistrust. US concerns are a helpful reminder that, whether discussing Taiwan’s future or the risk of a catastrophic cross-Strait war, Taiwan’s own politics cannot be ignored. The rigor of Taipei’s defense—and, with it, the health of cross-Strait deterrence—will depend largely on the course Taiwan’s politics take.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Elections, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and United States of America

84. China Maritime Report No. 32: The PCH191 Modular Long-Range Rocket Launcher: Reshaping the PLA Army's Role in a Cross-Strait Campaign

Author:
Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
With its fielding of the PCH191 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) and its variety of long-range precision munitions, the PLA Army (PLAA) has become arguably the most important contributor of campaign and tactical firepower during a joint island landing campaign against Taiwan. No longer simply the primary source of amphibious and air assault forces, the PLAA is now capable of using its multiple battalions of PCH191 MRLs to support maritime dominance, the joint firepower strike, and ground forces landing on Taiwan’s shores and in depth. The Chinese ordnance industry has developed multiple low-cost rockets, an anti-ship cruise missile, and a tactical missile to be used with the PCH191, as well as its export variant, the AR3, including munitions that can quickly and precisely strike targets in the Taiwan Strait, across the island, and beyond. Recent demonstrations of the PCH191 during PLA training events and Eastern Theater Command response actions to politically charged visits, in addition to the fielding of new reconnaissance assets capable of providing targeting and battle damage assessments to the MRL, make it clear the Army intends to use the system to achieve effects in a future Taiwan crisis that formerly would have been the responsibility of other PLA services.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Weapons, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

85. The EU and Taiwan: Normalizing the Status Quo

Author:
Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
When I read Egmont colleague Sven Biscop’s My Summer in Beijing, I was just about to depart to a little-recognized political entity off the Chinese coast that – constitutionally, at least – still claims Beijing as part of its territory: The Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan). Unlike my colleague, I was not questioned on the academic desirability of my stay – Taiwan has over the last few decades consistently ranked in the higher echelons of academic freedom. I was, however, counselled on multiple occasions to reconsider by concerned family and friends who had seen sensational media reports claiming that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could attack at any moment. Staying in a serene yet vibrant Taipei, visiting multiple places of interest and meeting with local scholars, I have noticed that confusion reigns not only in Europe toward Taiwan, but also in Taiwan toward Europe. Especially the cross-Strait position of the EU, which does not recognize Taiwan due to ‘its “one China” policy’ but has over the last two decades increased the scope of engagement with Taiwan, is little understood. As exchanges between Brussels and Taipei intensify, there is an increasing urgency to consolidate the EU’s position on Taiwan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

86. US-Japan-Taiwan Dialogue: Deterrence Signaling, Domestic Politics, Defense Cooperation, and War Termination

Author:
Michael Beckley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The risk of a war over Taiwan is higher today than at any time in the past half-century. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has declared that Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is an “inevitable requirement” for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Yet peaceful means of reunification have all but disappeared because most Taiwanese are more determined than ever to maintain their de facto independence. This stance threatens China’s territorial integrity, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Xi’s legitimacy as top leader. In response, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three years, it has conducted the largest and most provocative show of force in the Taiwan Strait in a generation. Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than fifty combat aircraft, menace Taiwan almost daily and often simulate attacks on Taiwanese, Japanese, or US targets. Meanwhile, China has been amassing ships, aircraft, and missiles as part of the largest military buildup by any country in decades. Its military budget increased tenfold from 1990 to 2020. From 2020 to 2023, it doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal. China now militarily outspends every other country in Asia combined. It wields the world’s largest ballistic missile inventory and navy by number of ships. Moreover, Beijing has become increasingly belligerent in its relations with neighbors from Japan to India. The United States has tried to deter Chinese aggression by declaring its support for Taiwan. But it is no longer clear that the US military could immediately respond to a Chinese assault on the island. Historically, the United States has relied on its manufacturing prowess to outproduce adversaries after a war starts. But now that China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation by output, it is possible that both sides could sustain a protracted conventional war—and might be tempted to break the stalemate by using nuclear weapons against military targets. These dangerous trends make deterrence and defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan extremely important. Toward that end, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) convened a US-Japan-Taiwan Track 2 dialogue in November 2023 to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

87. EU-Pacific Talks: Taiwan and security dimension – lessons learned, Indo-Pacific containment

Author:
Adam Horry
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During the first debate of the third edition of the EU-Pacific Talks, organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants engaged in a lively debate covering various aspects of Taiwan's status. They discussed the economic, military and value drivers behind Taiwan's importance, addressing concerns about China's approach and lessons from other global conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. Read what our guests debated in this report by Adam Horry.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Deterrence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

88. Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The danger of armed confrontation over Taiwan is growing, raising the spectre of a direct conflict between China and the U.S. that would have severe global repercussions. Managing this risk will require the parties to rebuild trust by shoring up decades-old understandings.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Risk, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Taiwan Strait

89. Analyzing China’s Escalation after Taiwan President Tsai’s Transit through the United States

Author:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, and Matthew Slade
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
As Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States in March and April 2023, China embraced significant military and diplomatic measures to coerce and punish Taiwan and, to some extent, the United States. This is reminiscent of Chinese actions after then-speaker of the house Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, though there were differences between China’s behavior. While some elements of China’s actions in April 2023 appear less escalatory than those in August 2022, there was considerable continuity and even progression with respect to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operations, tactics, and reach vis-à-vis Taiwan. This brief analyzes Chinese activities in August 2022 and April 2023 and explores the factors impacting Beijing’s decisionmaking.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

90. How Militarily Useful Would Taiwan Be to China?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The military value of Taiwan to China should be viewed in the aggregate. There are detriments that could come with seizing the island in addition to advantages for China’s military position. Taiwan is likely to be of greater utility to China in consolidating its hold over the East and South China Seas, as opposed to projecting power deep into the Pacific Ocean. Basing sensors on Taiwan would enhance the effective range of China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against mobile targets, like U.S. aircraft carriers. The technical deficiencies of Chinese nuclear submarines will limit the advantages of occupying Taiwan in terms of undersea warfare, but there could be gains with respect to operation of China’s conventionally powered submarines. Depending on the depth of resistance China encounters, force requirements for permanently garrisoning Taiwan could place major stress on Chinese military and security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia