Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
As the Asad regime's most loyal Palestinian proxy, the PFLP-GC's role in the conflict in Syria is of great importance. Currently, the group's interests center on countering Syrian rebel forces in Syria and their allies in Lebanon. In this role, the PFLP-GC has suffered a number of significant losses, and for the first time in its existence is being pressed in all areas it operates. This article will focus on the Syrian Civil War's effects on the PFLP-GC and what the future may hold for the group.
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
Russian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean have been highlighted both by the country's diplomatic and naval activity related to the Syrian crisis as well as by its stance on economic and energy issues in Cyprus. During the 2000s, Moscow's influence on the island has steadily increased, making Cyprus a new Russian foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Moscow's ties with Nicosia have served Russia's Mediterranean energy interests, they have also revived tensions with Turkey. In the context of the ongoing Syrian crisis, the Kremlin's growing involvement in Cyprus sheds new light on the Russia-Cyprus partnership.
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
Energy issues figure prominently in the Russo-Turkish relationship. Their impact is not nearly as clear-cut as are the Iranian and Syrian issues. Turkey and Russia have a complex, evolving relationship characterized by mutual dependencies in the oil and gas spheres. As Richard Weitz stated, “Energy relations between Russia and Turkey have long been characterized by overt friendship and subtle competition.”
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
The Asad regime has always suffered from a legitimacy deficit. When an uprising against it began in March 2011, the regime possessed few options other than brute force. Following a few desultory attempts at offering cosmetic reforms, the regime declared war against the insurgency in June 2011, seeking to crush it by force. Given the narrow base of his regime, Bashar Asad has pursued probably the only policy that was available to him. Asad's policy of repression has passed through a number of distinct phases. The regime has been forced to retreat from large parts of the country, due to its narrow sectarian base and a lack of sufficient manpower to hold these areas. The direction of events is clearly against the regime. However, at the time of writing, it shows no signs of imminent collapse.
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
This article addresses the approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq in dealing with the Kurdish issue, with a special focus on historical background. In addition, the article discusses how this issue affects relations among the aforementioned countries and whether cooperation on this issue is possible. The article also examines how the Arab Spring has impacted the Kurds and the attitudes of these countries toward the Kurdish issue.
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
This article will observe the process whereby Hamas has consolidated and maintained its rule in Gaza. It will argue that the gradual strengthening of the Gaza leadership within Hamas preceded the upheavals of 2011. The fallout from the events in Egypt and Syria, however, served to accelerate and accentuate the process whereby the Gaza leadership made gains at the expense of the external leadership.
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, Hizballah has defined itself along a number of parallel lines, each of which prior to 2011 appeared to support the other. The movement was simultaneously a sectarian representative of the Lebanese Shi'a, a regional ally of Iran and Syria, a defender of the Lebanese against the supposed aggressive intentions of Israel, and a leader of a more generically defined Arab and Muslim “resistance” against Israel and the West. As a result of the events of 2011, most important the revolt against the Asad regime in Syria, these various lines, which seemed mutually supportive, began to contradict one another. This has diminished Hizballah's position, though it remains physically unassailable for as long as the Asad regime in Syria survives.
Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center
Abstract:
As the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Asad's rule enters its first year, Asad appears to have a good command over Syria's large and fractious minority community. Three of the most prominent minority groups include the Christians, Druze, and Kurds. Asad's control of these groups was not happenstance but the result of a number of hard-and soft-power moves executed by the regime. These calculations did not simply involve direct internal dealings with said minorities, but also outreach to their populations living in neighboring states and abroad. Due to the regime's many policies, minority support may continue for some time.
In the media, news commentators continue to refer to Srebrenica as a lesson that should never be repeated again. Indeed, such “never again” statements have re-emerged in light of current events unfolding in Syria, as the international community debates what type of intervention should be used to stop further violence. The media have gone so far as to call the Syrian regime's possible use of chemical weapons against its population a “Srebrenica moment” — that is, a moment when moral outrage of civilian deaths leads to a push for military intervention (Lerman and Lakshmanan 2013). While little action has materialized in the case of Syria, the Srebrenican “never again” lesson is also far from being either agreed upon or learned from in Bosnia itself.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Crime, Genocide, International Law, Regional Cooperation, War, and Sectarian violence
The Syrian conflict's internal dynamics have reshuffled regional alignments alongside unprecedentedly clear-cut sectarian dividing lines; this has often occurred against the preferences of regional state actors−including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Foreign states have generally adopted expedient policies that followed sectarian patterns for lack of alternatives. Iran bears significant responsibility for exacerbating the conflict's sectarian character at the regional level. There is no such “diplomatic shortcut” to regional appeasement; it is the domestic Syrian deadlock that must be broken in order to alleviate sectarian tensions across the Middle East, not the opposite.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Foreign Policy