Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Syria

1231. Succession, Syria...and the Search for Putin's Soul

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
By any standard, the first four months were a rough start to the year for both Russia and China. While succession politics gripped first Russia and then China, Moscow and Beijing coordinated closely over the crises beyond their borders (Syria, Iran, and North Korea). Toward the end of April, the Russian and Chinese navies held the largest joint bilateral exercise in seven years, codenamed Maritime Cooperation-2012 (海上联合-2012; Morskoye Vzaimodeystviye-2012), in the Yellow Sea. Meanwhile, China's future premier Li Keqiang traveled to Moscow to meet Russia's future-and-past President Putin in Moscow.
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Moscow, and Syria

1232. Syria: What China Has Learned From its Libya Experience

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
China's joint veto along with Russia of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Syria has provoked fierce international criticism. Labeled as “responsible for Syria's genocide,” Beijing's international image has struck a new low. China's decision to cast the unpopular vote was apparently well thought-out, as evidenced by its consistent diplomatic rhetoric and actions, both before and after the veto. However, in analyzing China's motivation, many analysts seemed to have missed an important point. That is, China's experience concerning Libya in 2011 had a direct impact on its actions regarding Syria this time around.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Insurgency, and Popular Revolt
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Arabia, United Nations, and Syria

1233. Israel and the Palestinians After the Arab Spring: No Time for Peace

Author:
Andrea Dessì
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
While spared from internal turmoil, Israel and the Palestinian Territories have nonetheless been affected by the region's political transformation brought about by the Arab Spring. Reflecting what can be described as Israel's “bunker” mentality, the Israeli government has characterized the Arab revolutionary wave as a security challenge, notably given its concern about the rise of Islamist forces. Prime Minister Netanyahu has capitalized on this sense of insecurity to justify his government's lack of significant action when it comes to the peace process. On the Palestinian side, both Hamas and Fatah have lost long-standing regional backers in Egypt and Syria and have had to contend with their increasingly shaky popular legitimacy. This has spurred renewed efforts for reconciliation, which however have so far produced no significant results. Against this backdrop, the chances for a resumption of serious Israeli-Palestinian peace talks appear increasingly dim. An effort by the international community is needed to break the current deadlock and establish an atmosphere more conducive for talks. In this context, the EU carries special responsibility as the only external actor that still enjoys some credibility as a balanced mediator between the sides.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Treaties and Agreements, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, Syria, and Egypt

1234. Stay on Target: Will the UK fight the battle for tough arms controls?

Author:
Edmund Cairns
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
A robust global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is desperately needed to stop the irresponsible transfer of arms that fuels: Atrocities – like those in Syria, where more than 8,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the crackdown on protests began in early 2011;Armed violence and conflicts – which is estimated to cost Africa alone $18bn a year; Corruption in the. defence industry – which costs $20bn a year, and which undermines the competitiveness of UK exporters.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Trade and Finance, Non-Governmental Organization, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and Syria

1235. Advancing Human Rights in the UN System

Author:
Suzanne Nossel
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The 2011–2012 crisis in Syria offers a painful reminder of the international community's limited ability to prevent and halt large-scale human rights violations. As the number of casualties in the country continued to rise, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the main international body responsible for maintaining peace and security, struggled to appropriately react. For over a year and despite more than nine thousand documented deaths, the UNSC remained deadlocked, and it eventually managed to issue only weak presidential statements and, in April 2012, dispatch a small team of monitors to bolster a faltering ceasefire. During the same period, however, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) showed significant signs of revival and effectiveness. Intended to be the centerpiece of the UN's human rights machinery, the UNHRC had—since its founding in 2006—been dubbed by diplomats a “leper of the UN system.” It was known for passivity in the face of human rights crises and for the polarized dynamic between countries of the global North and South.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Human Welfare, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Syria

1236. Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria

Author:
Ömer Taşpınar
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
For most of the 20th century, Turkey chose not to get involved in Middle Eastern affairs. During the past decade, however, in a remarkable departure from this Kemalist tradition (based on the ideology of the republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatu¨rk), Ankara has become a very active and important player in the region. Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government since 2002, Turkey has established closer ties with Syria, Iran, and Iraq, assumed a leadership position in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), attended Arab League conferences, and contributed to UN forces in Lebanon. It has also mediated in the Syrian—Israeli conflict as well as the nuclear standoff with Iran. Ankara's diplomatic engagements with Iran and Hamas have led to differences with the United States and Israel, leaving many wondering if Turkey has been turning away from itsWestern orientation or if it was just a long overdue shift East to complete Turkey's full circle of relations.
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, United Nations, Lebanon, and Syria

1237. What Lies Beneath the "Arab Spring"

Author:
Reva Bhalla
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
More than a year has passed since the fall of the region's most stalwart Arab leader unleashed a current of dissent throughout the Arab world. That unrest, which spread from the Maghreb to the Arabian Peninsula, was simplistically treated in the media as an organic expression of liberal democracy that seemingly had the power to knock off Arab authoritarians one by one. Today, however, the initial euphoria over the so-called “Arab Spring” has predictably given way to disillusionment. After sacrificing the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia's army and security establishment stand ready to intervene should the country's Islamist-filled legislature overstep its boundaries in challenging the relics of the ancien régime. In Egypt, many forget (or fail to realize altogether) that the military establishment exploited the demonstrations to destroy Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's dynastic succession plan. Even as it seeks more creative maneuvers to rule behind what is expected to be an enfeebled parliament, the Egyptian military elite will remain the ultimate arbiter of the state for the foreseeable future. In Libya, after a rare NATO-led military intervention played the instrumental role of driving Gaddafi and his family from power, the once-celebrated rebel forces are again being viewed as a ragtag assortment of militias vying for the spoils of war in the absence of a legitimate, much less democratic, political authority. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh has given up his presidential title for now under a Saudi-mediated power-sharing agreement with his rivals. Still, there is little to hide the fact that Saleh's regime, now led by his close family members, remains entrenched in the security, political and economic spheres of the state. Meanwhile, embattled Arab leaders are thankful for the distraction Syria has created as the latest flashpoint in the Middle East. Just as the Assad regime has proven unable to stamp out its domestic opposition, so too have Syria's still fractious, outgunned and outnumbered opposition forces been unable to overwhelm a largely united Alawite-dominated security and intelligence apparatus. Barring a foreign military intervention—something that no military power, particularly the United States, seems keen on—the Syrian regime can endure for some time to come, even as it becomes all the more dependent on Iran for its survival. The mainstream narrative regarding the Arab unrest has by and large failed to anticipate these developments. There is little predictive value in starting with an assumption that all demonstrations will lead to revolutions, and all revolutions to liberal democracies. Geopolitical context must also be applied. In particular, there are three underlying trends that began developing well before the start of the Arab unrest—and which can help to explain what has happened over the past year, and what to expect going forward.
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Arabian Peninsula

1238. Assad's Cruel Calculus

Author:
Yehuda Blanga
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
On January 31, 2011, at the height of the protests in Egypt, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal. He spoke of how he was reading his country's political map correctly. He said he would soon announce reforms—because, in this day and age, Arab leaders must match their aspirations to the will of the people. Assad also declared that Syria was different from Egypt, and that, thanks to his anti-American and anti-Israeli stance, his position was better than Mubarak's. His policy, the Syrian president said, brought him the support of the Arab street in general and of the Syrian street in particular. Though the interview was clearly detached from reality, Assad was correct in one respect: Syria is not Egypt. February 2012 marked the first anniversary of the protests and popular uprising in Syria, and yet the conflict between Assad and his own people rages on with no end in sight. So why has the Assad regime managed to weather the sustained domestic uprising of the past year—and so successfully thwarted the discontent that claimed its counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya? The answers lie in the unique dynamics of Syrian society, and the vested political stakeholders now working diligently to preserve the Assad regime's grip on power.
Political Geography:
Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia

1239. Flunking the Syria Test

Author:
Matthew RJ Brodsky
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
With the Syrian uprising now past its one-year anniversary, it's long past time to take stock of the carnage. More than 7,000 people have been killed to date by the Assad regime, as it has unleashed war on its own people. The spark that lit the fire was an errant one. On March 6, 2011, state security forces arrested 15 teenagers for spray painting anti-regime graffiti on a wall in the southern city of Deraa. Their continued detention sparked massive demonstrations in the city, and in turn were met by the regime's brutal crackdown using live fire and tear gas. By the time the teenagers were released, the flashpoints between the Syrian security services and the protesters had already claimed many lives. This began the cycle of funerals which became rallying points for further protests—and further regime violence. The anti-regime opposition began as a peaceful protest against a dictatorship. President Bashar al-Assad's brutal response—including the arrest and torture of regime opponents, the indiscriminate shelling of cities, and the cutoff of escape routes to Turkey and Lebanon for civilian refugees—has pushed the opposition to respond with force. Meanwhile, conventional wisdom in Washington and in European capitals is that the Syrian regime is doomed and that it is only a matter of time before Assad is removed from power. But these optimistic assessments are dangerously flawed. Despite Western sanctions and other punitive measures levied to date, the Assad regime as of this writing continues to maintain its grip on the four pillars of Syrian power: the unity of the Alawites; supremacy of the Ba'ath Party; supremacy of the al-Assad clan; and Alawite dominance over the military and intelligence apparatus.
Political Geography:
Syria

1240. Seeking a New Devil in Damascus

Author:
Oren Kessler
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
TEL AVIV–“Better the devil you know than the one you don't.” It's a 500-year old Irish proverb, but to Mideast policy wonks the phrase is instantly identifiable as Israel's decades-long policy toward its nettlesome neighbor Syria. Nearly four decades have passed since the Yom Kippur War, the last conventional conflict between the two states. During that time, Syrian Presidents Hafez and later Bashar Assad kept their frontier with Israel largely quiet, continuing the fight against it via their proxies Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. In Israel's never-ending search for regional stability—and amid uncertainty over who might replace the Assads—that arrangement seemed good enough. When in 2005 President George W. Bush asked Ariel Sharon his thoughts about toppling Assad, the Israeli premier responded with a question of his own: “Are you crazy?” Likewise, when Syrians first rose up against their regime last spring, Israeli officials remained cagey. Asked last March for comment, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu replied laconically, “Any answer I'll give you wouldn't be a good one.” Shlomo Brom, a former head of IDF strategic planning and an Israeli negotiator with Syria in the 1990s, described Bashar Assad as a “known quantity,” while veteran diplomat Dore Gold urged caution given the volatility caused by anti-government dissent spreading “from the Turkish border down to the Suez Canal.”
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Israel, Lebanon, and Syria