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1161. Obstacles to a Resolution of the Syrian Conflict

Author:
David W. Lesch
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the final report of the Harvard-NUPI-Trinity Syria Research Project (HNT). The project is sponsored by Harvard Negotiation Project at Harvard University (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (or NUPI, Oslo, Norway), and Trinity University (San Antonio, Texas, USA).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
America, Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

1162. Next Steps in Syria

Author:
Judith S. Yaphe
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Nearly 3 years since the start of the Syrian civil war, no clear winner is in sight. Assassinations and defections of civilian and military loyalists close to President Bashar al-Asad, rebel success in parts of Aleppo and other key towns, and the spread of violence to Damascus itself suggest that the regime is losing ground to its opposition. The tenacity of government forces in retaking territory lost to rebel factions, such as the key town of Qusayr, and attacks on Turkish and Lebanese military targets indicate, however, that the regime can win because of superior military equipment, especially airpower and missiles, and help from Iran and Hizballah. No one is prepared to confidently predict when the regime will collapse or if its opponents can win.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Security
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria

1163. The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency To Civil War

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The conflict in Syria transitioned from an insurgency to a civil war during the summer of 2012. For the first year of the conflict, Bashar al-Assad relied on his father's counterinsurgency approach; however, Bashar al-Assad's campaign failed to put down the 2011 revolution and accelerated the descent into civil war. This report seeks to explain how the Assad regime lost its counterinsurgency campaign, but remains well situated to fight a protracted civil war against Syria's opposition.
Topic:
Political Violence and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

1164. The Free Syrian Army

Author:
Elizabeth O'Bagy
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Fragmentation and disorganization have plagued Syria's armed opposition since peaceful protestors took up arms in December 2011 and began forming rebel groups under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. A lack of unity has made cooperation and coordination difficult on the battlefield and has limited the effectiveness of rebel operations. Since the summer of 2012, rebel commanders on the ground in Syria have begun to coordinate tactically in order to plan operations and combine resources. This cooperation has facilitated many important offensives and rebels have taken control of the majority of the eastern portion of the country, overrunning their first provincial capital in March 2013 with the capture of al-Raqqa city. However, rebels have been unable to capitalize on these successes, and fighting has largely stalemated along current battle fronts particularly in the key areas of Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. In order to overcome the current military stalemate, the opposition needs to develop an operational level headquarters that can designate campaign priorities, task units to support priority missions, and resource these units with the proper equipment to execute their missions. Recently, the opposition has established a new national military structure that may grow to serve this purpose. On December 7, 2012, rebel leaders from across Syria announced the election of a new 30-member unified command structure called the Supreme Joint Military Command Council, known as the Supreme Military Command (SMC). The Supreme Military Command improves upon previous attempts at armed opposition unification through higher integration of disparate rebel groups and enhanced communication, which suggest that it could prove to be an enduring security institution. The SMC includes all of Syria's most important opposition field commanders, and its authority is based on the power and influence of these rebel leaders. Its legitimacy is derived from the bottomup, rather than top-down, and it has no institutional legitimacy apart from the legitimacy of the commanders associated with the council. Thus, the SMC is not structurally cohesive, and its ability to enforce command and control is dependent on the cooperation of each of its members. The incorporation of rebel networks has resulted in chains of command that are not uniform across the five fronts, with each sub-unit retaining their own unique authority structures. The SMC's primary function to date has been to serve as a platform for coordination. Regardless of the limits of its current command and control, the SMC has played an important role in syncing rebel operations with several notable successes. It has allowed for greater opportunities for collaboration and coordination among the disparate rebel groups operating in Syria. As the SMC develops its institutional capacity, its ability to assert greater authority will likely depend on its transactional legitimacy and its ability to distribute critical resources to rebel-held communities. To date, disparate sources of funding have significantly handicapped the rebels' ability to unite and consolidate authority on a national level. Although private sources of funding will likely continue outside the parameters of the SMC, uniting the support channels of rebels' main state sponsors will be fundamental to ensuring the legitimacy of the new organization. The ability to provide resources and material support to its sub-units is the determining factor in whether or not the SMC will be able to unite rebel forces under its command and establish a level of command and control. The SMC has the potential to serve as a check on radicalization and help to assert a moderate authority in Syria. If the SMC can create enough incentives for moderation it will likely be able to marginalize the most radical elements within its structure. To this end, the SMC has recognized the importance of the inclusion of some of the more radical forces, while still drawing a red line at the inclusion of forces that seek the destruction of a Syrian state, such as jihadist groups like Jabhat Nusra. Ultimately, even if the SMC only serves as a mechanism for greater cooperation and coordination, it is a significant development in that it has united the efforts of rebel commanders across Syria. It is the first attempt at unity that incorporates important commanders from all Syrian provinces and has enough legitimacy on the ground to even begin the process of building a structure capable of providing a national-level chain of command. Syria's state security apparatus will collapse as the Assad regime finishes its transformation into a militia-like entity. The Supreme Military Command is currently the only organization that could serve to fill the security vacuum left by this transformation. As the Syrian opposition begins to build a transitional government, the SMC could create a framework for rebuilding Syria's security and governing institutions if properly supported. The SMC's ability to act as a basis for a national defense institution will be an important component in filling the power vacuum left by Assad's fall and will aid in a secure and stable Syria. There remain a number of critical obstacles ahead for the SMC. They include the incorporation of existing command networks, which will have an impact on command and control and resource allocation; mitigating the strength of extremist groups; and managing disparate sources of financing. Overcoming these obstacles will be difficult, especially as the nature of the conflict transforms and the sectarian polarization makes it more challenging to create a strong military institution and professional armed force. Although the SMC must do its part internally to overcome these obstacles, its success will largely depend on greater international support and access to more resources. The goal behind U.S. support to the opposition should be to build a force on the ground that is committed to building a nonsectarian, stable Syria, with a government more likely to respect American interests. Working with the SMC could enhance America's position vis-à-vis Syria's armed opposition and provide a mechanism for stability should the Assad regime fall.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

1165. Sectarian and Regional Conflict in the Middle East

Author:
Aaron Reese
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The first half of 2013 has demonstrated clearly that sectarian conflict is spreading in the Middle East. This conflict is a product of developments over the course of 2012, including Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's consolidation of power and the development of an armed opposition movement in Syria. A turning point, however, came this year with the Syrian opposition's loss of the strategic town of al-Qusayr in early June to regime forces backed by Lebanese Hezbollah. The intervention of this prominent Shi'a militant group has heightened the "sectarianization" of the conflict. Sectarian narratives provide an emotional rallying point for popular mobilization, and are easily leveraged by actors involved in the conflict to achieve their goals. The rise in sectarian violence sponsored by external actors poses an existential threat to these already-fragile states.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Armed Struggle, Refugee Issues, and Sectarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

1166. Russia assumes and exploits the chairmanship of the G20

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
Russia's plans for chairing the G20 in 2013 go further than staging a pompous summit in St Petersburg similar to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok in September 2012. Russian leadership feels an acute need to re-establish a solid international profile eroded by the evolving domestic crisis, which undermines the credibility of Putin's regime.
Topic:
Corruption, Democratization, Emerging Markets, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Russia, Norway, Asia, Moscow, and Syria

1167. The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Progress

Author:
Michael M. Gunter
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
During the summer and fall of 2009, the continuing and often violent Kurdish problem in Turkey seemed on the verge of a solution when the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) or AK Party (AKP) government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul announced a Kurdish Opening. Gul declared that "the biggest problem of Turkey is the Kurdish question" and that "there is an opportunity [to solve it] and it should not be missed."Erdogan asked: "If Turkey had not spent its energy, budget, peace and young people on [combating] terrorism, if Turkey had not spent the last twenty-five years in conflict, where would we be today?" Even the insurgent Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) or Kurdistan Workers Party, still led by its imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, briefly took Turkey's Kurdish Opening seriously. For a fleeting moment optimism ran rampant. That optimism, however, would ultimately go unfulfilled. What happened? The Kurdish Opening failed to live up to expectations because of roadblocks it encountered before it had a chance to get off the ground. Decades-old resistance to decentralization and an unwillingness to negotiate seriously with the PKK additionally worked to undermine the stated goals of the Kurdish Opening. This article will provide historical background to the recent efforts as well as a timeline of the government's initiatives and the Kurdish response regarding the Kurdish Opening. The question of why the Opening has failed to date will be examined. Recent developments including the civil war in Syria, which suggest that some possibility for progress on the Kurdish question remains, will also be discussed. Finally, the article puts forth recommendations to facilitate progress on finding a political settlement between the Turkish government and the PKK.
Topic:
Development and Government
Political Geography:
Turkey, Syria, and Kurdistan

1168. The Zionist Disinformation Campaign in Syria and Lebanon during the Palestinian Revolt, 1936-1939

Author:
Mahmoud Muhareb
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Based on declassified reports in the Central Zionist Archives, this article brings to light a virtually unknown disinformation project implemented by the Jewish Agency (the governing body of the Yishuv before 1948) in the Arab world during the 1936-39 Palestinian revolt. Operating via a JA front organization—an Arabic-language news agency set up in Cairo—and out of the Jerusalem-based JA Political Department's intelligence services, the project involved inter alia the planting of fabricated articles in the Lebanese and Syrian press with the aim of influencing public opinion. Whatever the project's impact, the article provides insights into the Zionist leadership's thinking, internal debates, and operating methods, and shows the degree of corruption that existed in certain segments of the Arab elite.
Political Geography:
Palestine, Arabia, Jerusalem, and Syria

1169. Whither the Old Order?: The Regional Implications of the Syria Crisis

Author:
Karim Emile Bitar
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Writing in September 2011, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley pointed out that the Arab awakening was "a tale of three battles rolled into one: people against regimes; people against people and regimes against other regimes." Nowhere is this more evident than in Syria where all three dimensions are forcefully present, simultaneously making Syria arguably the most complex of all Arab revolutions. The Syrian revolution started in March 2011 as an inevitable, spontaneous, legitimate and overwhelmingly non-violent movement, much akin to the Arab Spring revolutions that had taken place in Tunisia and Egypt. While the underlying political, economic and demographic causes of the Syrian uprising were quite similar to those which triggered the earlier revolutions, the regime's brutal reaction, Syria's geostrategic positioning and its sectarian heterogeneity, as well as the political agendas of regional and international powers led the revolution to morph into a bloody civil war.
Topic:
Security, Demographics, Economics, Human Rights, and Politics
Political Geography:
Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia

1170. The Middle East: Change and Upheaval 2013

Author:
Dr. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Christian Koch, and Dr. Klejda Mulaj
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
As the Middle East continues to grapple with challenging questions of continuity and change, a group of distinguished thinkers on the region's politics and society met in Gstaad, Switzerland, to analyze current political dynamics and their implications for the region and beyond. This 11th Annual Conference organized jointly by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Crown Centre for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, and the Gulf Research Center (GRC) aimed to take stock of developments in the Middle East over the previous year and bring about a greater understanding of the complex problems faced by a perplexingly disordered region. Following on the 10th meeting in 2012, the primary focus of the discussion was on the Arab revolutions, their overall significance and outlook as well as their impact in the region with a specific emphasis on Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. In addition, Iran's domestic politics and its international security implications; the GCC states and their place in the broader Middle East; as well as Israeli-Palestinian relations also featured prominently. The meeting opened by looking at the broader geopolitical and regional dynamics and concluded with a session considering policy implications in relation to present regional political dynamics. This report summarizes discussions held in the course of this meeting and in the tradition of previous reports on this Conference series, no direct, personal attributions are made herein. The Conference's program is attached.
Topic:
Political Violence, Governance, and Political Activism
Political Geography:
Geneva, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, Syria, Switzerland, and Egypt