An intensive discussion covering the role of the Syria campaign, advances by the new generation of European jihadists, and steps the Dutch government is taking to understand and reduce the problem.
Friday's meeting offers an opportunity to discuss the kingdom's domestic challenges, the proposed no-fly zone in northern Syria, and the potential ramifications of ramped-up training of Syrian opposition forces on Jordanian territory.
A detailed discussion of the various factors fueling or constraining chaos on Syria's borders, including Arab tribal politics, Israeli security calculations, Iranian-Hezbollah military strategy, and a seemingly hesitant U.S.-led air campaign.
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Israel, Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria
The moderate rebel force currently envisioned by Washington would take far too long to arrive on the battlefield and could be easy prey for ISIS and Assad. As the Obama administration's plans for raising a moderate Syrian opposition force become clearer, its approach seems to center on a lengthy recruitment, training, and deployment program initially dedicated to defense against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). If carried out, this plan promises a long delay before significant forces are on the battlefield. It would also limit their potential effectiveness in the near to midterm and perhaps commit them to a protracted enterprise in which defeat is likely.
As the complex global security environment faced by NATO members continues to evolve in the coming years, terrorism – waged by actors both in and outside of their borders – will remain a vexing challenge. For over a decade, NATO's counterterrorism strategy has been built on taking the fight abroad. Member nations have been intimately involved in this effort as contributors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, to the Multi-National Force in Iraq and in a variety of smaller missions around the globe. In recent times, however, there has been growing attention to the threat posed by “homegrown” terrorism and foreign fighters returning from Syria and elsewhere to their home countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.
The counterterrorism effort launched by the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition has sidetracked international attention away from a political resolution to the Syrian civil war. Officials, analysts and peace practitioners alike are latching on to quick fixes aimed at mitigating violence at the local level. Although stakeholders are mindful of the need to match bottom-up de-escalation efforts with top-down interventions, a comprehensive approach is as elusive as ever. The United Nations (UN) secretary-general's appointment of a new special envoy for Syria presents an opportunity for building an inclusive peacemaking strategy for the country. This policy brief provides a series of recommendations for the development of a strategy led by the UN with support from key countries.
Under the Assad regime, Syria acquired a well-deserved reputation as a repressive mukhabarat state dominated by vast, overlapping internal security agencies that operated with near impunity, reporting directly to the president. Having presided over so much destruction and division, however, it is likely that the Assad regime will eventually be replaced by a government with a better claim to legitimacy. Security sector reform will be a key challenge for establishing the legitimacy of any post-Assad political order, but what would such a system look like and how could it be constructed?
Over 12,000 fighters from at least 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria, and the numbers continue to grow. Around 2,500 are from Western countries, including most members of the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. There are also several hundred from Russia. But the great majority are from the Arab World. Most are fighting with rebel groups, and increasingly with the most extreme among them; but many are also fighting with the Government, or with ethnic or faith communities that are trying to protect themselves from both sides. A lot are young, often teenagers, and a fair percentage of those arriving from non-Muslim majority countries are converts to Islam. These and others who share their faith commonly express their motivation as a religious obligation to protect fellow Muslims from attack. This sense of duty is captured by their loose use of the word ‘jihad’.
Geneva II did not bring about any significant humanitarian or political advancement. The Assad regime attended the talks under pressure from Russia and in order to avoid being labelled as the party refusing a peaceful solution. The regime’s unwillingness to negotiate during the talks was unprecedented because it perceived that both regional and military contexts were more favourable to it than they had been prior to the Geneva invitation. However, the perception that things are in the regime’s favour is a mirage. The catastrophic humanitarian situation is threatening the international mood, especially given that Geneva II has thus far been an exercise in absurdity. Another American announcement to supply light-calibre weapons to the Syrian opposition highlights the possibility of escalation of fighting, forcing the negotiation process forward as the more desirable option.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, United Nations, Conflict, Syrian War, Negotiation, and Dialogue
With interest in the Geneva conference’s lacklustre progress fading, and the Syrian regime’s presidential election showcase, any prospects for a political solution based on the 30 June 2012 Geneva declaration have been completely erased. The declaration, which was the basis for Geneva II in January 2014, had called for the formation of a transitional government drawn from both the regime and the opposition. Given this reality, and with the international community’s attention turned to other issues, the possibility of a political solution will be set even further back after the recent 3 June 2014 elections. It is likely that both parties to the conflict – the regime and its allies as well as the opposition and its supporters – will continue to strengthen their military and negotiating positions before any potential political process is launched. In addition, unpublicised contact between Iran and western countries will continue as a “second track” of the Syrian crisis.
Topic:
Syrian War, Revolution, Presidential Elections, and Dialogue