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51. The Kurds in the spotlight: local and regional challenges

Author:
Ana Villellas
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iraq face complex challenges. Among the current Kurdish realities, the emergence of Kurdish self-governing areas in northern Syria controlled by what is considered to be the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) generates considerable uncertainty. The complex civil war in Syria and antagonism between the Kurdish Democratic Union Party and a fragmented Kurdish political spectrum generate many questions as to the future of these Kurdish areas in Syria. In the case of Turkey, old and new internal and regional factors have threatened the dialogue under way between Turkey and the PKK. These include the lack of clear state policies to resolve the conflict, Turkey's current internal crisis, the complications of cross-border dynamics, and the mutual impact of the Kurdish questions in Syria and Turkey. In Iraq, tensions continue between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the country's central administration. The consolidation of Kurdish autonomy – with new elements such as the energy agreement between Erbil and Ankara – continues to generate uncertainty in a context where many issues remain unresolved.
Topic:
Civil War, Economics, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

52. Assad Strikes Damascus

Author:
Valerie Szybala
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Damascus is the Syrian regime's center of gravity. The capital of Syria has long been viewed by the rebel forces as the key to winning the war in Syria, and its loss is unthinkable for Bashar al-Assad. Thus the struggle for Damascus is existential for the regime as well as the opposition. An operational understanding of the battle for Damascus is critical to understanding the imminent trajectory of the war. This report details the course of the conflict as it engulfed Damascus in 2013; laying out the regime's strategy and describing the political and military factors that shaped its decisions on the battlefield.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Civil War, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

53. Options for a Political Transition in Syria

Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
This report outlines constitutional and legislative options for a political transition in Syria under the umbrella of the Final Geneva Communiqué, issued by the Action Group on Syria on 30 June 2012, and revived in early May 2013 at a meeting in Moscow between the U.S. and Russia. The Communiqué embodies the greatest degree of consensus that the international community has been able to achieve regarding the Syrian conflict, detailing a potentially viable path to a negotiated end to the civil war. Since May 2013, efforts by UN and Arab League Joint Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and others to host a peace conference on Syria (dubbed "Geneva II"), have reinforced the importance of developing possible constitutional and legislative modalities for a transition.
Topic:
Civil War, Government, International Cooperation, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Middle East, and Syria

54. Drones for Peace

Author:
Michael P. Kreuzer
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs), commonly referred to as “drones,” have been the subject of much discussion surrounding potential operations in Syria, primarily in the context of enforcing a “no-fly” zone or enforcement role similar to their role in Libya and modeled after operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. This LISD White Paper examines the prospects of the use of RPAs in Syria and possible future humanitarian crises. In conflict zones, deploying RPAs as currently operated would likely be counterproductive to political aims in an enforcement capacity. Smaller RPAs, however, operating in a number of tactical and other roles, could play a critical role in ameliorating humanitarian crises—for instance in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. Tasks may include monitoring key sites designated by the international community and allowed by the host country government, to providing humanitarian aid, to the over-watch of convoy movements and possible general surveillance functions. The stigma of RPAs given their use in other conflicts and elsewhere must be overcome to allow RPAs to be evaluated and used as an instrument for monitoring, assisting, and aiding in humanitarian crises among other roles, not just as (offensive) intelligence or weapons platforms. Examples of RPA use in natural disasters and relief operations in Southeast Asia and pending models for search and rescue operations in the United States and beyond provide a blueprint for similar RPA operations, with their scope limited by the mutual consent of parties to the conflict.
Topic:
Civil War, Drones, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

55. Rigged Cars and Barrel Bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian War

Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As Aleppo goes, so goes Syria's rebellion. The city is crucial to the mainstream opposition's military viability as well as its morale, thus to halting the advance of the Islamic State (IS). After an alliance of armed rebel factions seized its eastern half in July 2012, Aleppo for a time symbolised the opposition's optimism and momentum; in the following months, it exposed the rebels' limits, as their progress slowed, and they struggled to win over the local population. Today, locked in a two-front war against the regime and IS, their position is more precarious than at any time since the fighting began. Urgent action is required to prevent the mainstream opposition's defeat: either for Iran and Russia to press the regime for de-escalation, to showcase their willingness to confront IS instead of exploiting its presence to further strengthen Damascus; or, more realistically, for the U.S., Europe and regional allies to qualitatively and quantitatively improve support to local, non-jihadi rebel factions in Aleppo. Any eventual possibility of a negotiated resolution of the war depends on one course or the other being followed.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Arabia and Syria

56. Ambiguous endings: Middle East regional security in the wake of the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian civil war

Author:
Helle Malmvig
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The Middle East regional security order is under rapid transformation. The Arab Uprisings and the Syrian War are changing not only the relationship between state and societies, but also some of the region's core norms and historical divisions. This report analyses key changes in regional security order the Middle East in the period after 2010. It identifies five key issues where regional order is changing: State-society relations Relations with the West and foreign policy posturing The impact of the Iran-Syria –Hezbollah Axis (the Resistance Front) and radical-moderate divide The Sunni-Shia rift and the rise of identity politics The Saudi-Qatar rivaling, and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Civil War, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Syria, and Qatar

57. Cooperation from Crisis? Regional Responses to Humanitarian Emergencies

Author:
Walter Kemp, Jérémie Labbé, and Lilianne Fan
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
As the situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, could the humanitarian crisis afflicting the country and its neighbors provide an entryway for regional cooperation? This policy paper examines how regional responses to humanitarian crises have succeeded or failed to meet humanitarian objectives in order to inform approaches to contemporary crises. It also assesses whether such regional responses contributed to strengthening regional integration and cooperation, paving the way for increased regional stability and an improved capacity to respond to emergencies. The report explores two different humanitarian crises: the war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. Examining the ways in which countries in each region and regional organizations addressed humanitarian needs, it draws a number of lessons that could be applied in contemporary crises: Regional ownership over the response is crucial, but not necessarily spontaneous. External actors can usefully contribute through a balanced mix of pressure and technical support. Preexisting regional organizations can provide a valuable institutional framework on which to build the response. An approach that focuses on the specific needs of the most vulnerable individuals can help to depoliticize discussions while strengthening trust among regional stakeholders. Complementary policy-level and expert-level processes can equip the response with both political commitment and regular working relationships for addressing tangible needs.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Humanitarian Aid, Islam, Regional Cooperation, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Yugoslavia, Syria, and Myanmar

58. The Free Syrian Army

Author:
Elizabeth O'Bagy
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Fragmentation and disorganization have plagued Syria's armed opposition since peaceful protestors took up arms in December 2011 and began forming rebel groups under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. A lack of unity has made cooperation and coordination difficult on the battlefield and has limited the effectiveness of rebel operations. Since the summer of 2012, rebel commanders on the ground in Syria have begun to coordinate tactically in order to plan operations and combine resources. This cooperation has facilitated many important offensives and rebels have taken control of the majority of the eastern portion of the country, overrunning their first provincial capital in March 2013 with the capture of al-Raqqa city. However, rebels have been unable to capitalize on these successes, and fighting has largely stalemated along current battle fronts particularly in the key areas of Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. In order to overcome the current military stalemate, the opposition needs to develop an operational level headquarters that can designate campaign priorities, task units to support priority missions, and resource these units with the proper equipment to execute their missions. Recently, the opposition has established a new national military structure that may grow to serve this purpose. On December 7, 2012, rebel leaders from across Syria announced the election of a new 30-member unified command structure called the Supreme Joint Military Command Council, known as the Supreme Military Command (SMC). The Supreme Military Command improves upon previous attempts at armed opposition unification through higher integration of disparate rebel groups and enhanced communication, which suggest that it could prove to be an enduring security institution. The SMC includes all of Syria's most important opposition field commanders, and its authority is based on the power and influence of these rebel leaders. Its legitimacy is derived from the bottomup, rather than top-down, and it has no institutional legitimacy apart from the legitimacy of the commanders associated with the council. Thus, the SMC is not structurally cohesive, and its ability to enforce command and control is dependent on the cooperation of each of its members. The incorporation of rebel networks has resulted in chains of command that are not uniform across the five fronts, with each sub-unit retaining their own unique authority structures. The SMC's primary function to date has been to serve as a platform for coordination. Regardless of the limits of its current command and control, the SMC has played an important role in syncing rebel operations with several notable successes. It has allowed for greater opportunities for collaboration and coordination among the disparate rebel groups operating in Syria. As the SMC develops its institutional capacity, its ability to assert greater authority will likely depend on its transactional legitimacy and its ability to distribute critical resources to rebel-held communities. To date, disparate sources of funding have significantly handicapped the rebels' ability to unite and consolidate authority on a national level. Although private sources of funding will likely continue outside the parameters of the SMC, uniting the support channels of rebels' main state sponsors will be fundamental to ensuring the legitimacy of the new organization. The ability to provide resources and material support to its sub-units is the determining factor in whether or not the SMC will be able to unite rebel forces under its command and establish a level of command and control. The SMC has the potential to serve as a check on radicalization and help to assert a moderate authority in Syria. If the SMC can create enough incentives for moderation it will likely be able to marginalize the most radical elements within its structure. To this end, the SMC has recognized the importance of the inclusion of some of the more radical forces, while still drawing a red line at the inclusion of forces that seek the destruction of a Syrian state, such as jihadist groups like Jabhat Nusra. Ultimately, even if the SMC only serves as a mechanism for greater cooperation and coordination, it is a significant development in that it has united the efforts of rebel commanders across Syria. It is the first attempt at unity that incorporates important commanders from all Syrian provinces and has enough legitimacy on the ground to even begin the process of building a structure capable of providing a national-level chain of command. Syria's state security apparatus will collapse as the Assad regime finishes its transformation into a militia-like entity. The Supreme Military Command is currently the only organization that could serve to fill the security vacuum left by this transformation. As the Syrian opposition begins to build a transitional government, the SMC could create a framework for rebuilding Syria's security and governing institutions if properly supported. The SMC's ability to act as a basis for a national defense institution will be an important component in filling the power vacuum left by Assad's fall and will aid in a secure and stable Syria. There remain a number of critical obstacles ahead for the SMC. They include the incorporation of existing command networks, which will have an impact on command and control and resource allocation; mitigating the strength of extremist groups; and managing disparate sources of financing. Overcoming these obstacles will be difficult, especially as the nature of the conflict transforms and the sectarian polarization makes it more challenging to create a strong military institution and professional armed force. Although the SMC must do its part internally to overcome these obstacles, its success will largely depend on greater international support and access to more resources. The goal behind U.S. support to the opposition should be to build a force on the ground that is committed to building a nonsectarian, stable Syria, with a government more likely to respect American interests. Working with the SMC could enhance America's position vis-à-vis Syria's armed opposition and provide a mechanism for stability should the Assad regime fall.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

59. A Proxy War in Syria

Author:
Sargon Hadaya
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has been demonstrating a relatively high level of tenacity amid the proxy war raging in the country for over two years now. Indeed, the authoritarian regime in Tunisia folded up in two weeks; the Mubarak regime in Egypt, in slightly over four weeks; the Colonel Qaddafi regime collapsed after six months of NATO strikes. Russian expert Prof. Edouard Ozhiganov has offered a methodologically exact comment: “Any political regime can be described as stable to the extent to which it can neutralize inside and outside pressure using its own resources and instruments.”
Topic:
NATO, Civil War, Politics, War, International Security, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Libya, Syria, and Tunisia

60. Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Columbia University Press
Abstract:
Beginning with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and concluding with the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Frederic M. Wehrey investigates the roots of the Shi'a-Sunni divide now dominating the Persian Gulf's political landscape. Focusing on three Gulf states affected most by sectarian tensions—Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—Wehrey identifies the factors that have exacerbated or tempered sectarianism, including domestic political institutions, the media, clerical establishments, and the contagion effect of external regional events, such as the Iraq war, the 2006 Lebanon conflict, the Arab uprisings, and Syria's civil war.
Topic:
Civil War, Islam, Sectarianism, Gulf Nations, and Arab Spring
Political Geography:
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and Persian Gulf
Publication Identifier:
9780231536103
Publication Identifier Type:
ISBN