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91. A "System of Systems" Approach to Countering Drones: Examining Recent Operations from the Middle East to Ukraine

Author:
Eric Feely
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Drones have proliferated over the past decade, offering a cheap, effective precision-strike capability and leading to an inflection point wherein the United States can no longer count on complete air superiority. As former U.S. Central Command head Kenneth McKenzie put it, “Until we are able to develop and field a networked capability to detect and defeat [drones], the advantage will remain with the attacker.” The United States and other countries have therefore begun investing in counter-drone systems to complement and augment legacy air defense systems that have already proven effective in the role. Conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine, and elsewhere suggest that progress in drone technology will require corresponding adjustments in counter-drone capabilities to fill gaps and lower the costs of interception. In this lavishly illustrated Policy Note, Eric Feely details counter-drone approaches used in recent conflicts and what they could mean for the future of warfare. Military officials, he writes, are not seeking a silver bullet on this front, but rather advances based on existing layered, interoperable systems capable of providing kinetic and nonkinetic solutions.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Gulf Nations

92. Turkish Backlash: How Street Interviews Spread Anti–Syrian Refugee Sentiment

Author:
Sude Akgundogdu
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In early February, two major earthquakes shook Turkey’s southeast, as well as parts of Syria, claiming at least 45,000 Turkish lives in what has become the biggest natural disaster in modern Turkish history. The country’s most pressing challenge is to provide relief for the more than 13 million citizens who live in areas directly affected by the tremors. In the meantime, however, in addition to exposing egregious zoning and building code violations, the powerful quakes have revealed new dimensions of anti-Syrian feeling in Turkey. In the days that followed, gruesome videos circulated on social media showing vigilantes battering individuals they accused of looting in the affected provinces. Syrian refugees have seen their noncitizen status exacerbated by local resentment, resulting in limited access to earthquake relief resources; they have likewise been especially vulnerable to the vigilantism. “Looting” and “Syrian” have become synonymous in some corners of social media, fueling public resentment centered on the refugee population. But hate directed at Syrians on the Turkish web is nothing new. Turkey has seen an overall uptick in anti-refugee violence since 2021, often targeting Syrians. In a particularly violent episode in August 2021, residents of the Altindag district in Ankara vandalized and looted Syrian-run businesses and homes. Across 2022 and into 2023, even before the earthquakes, hate crimes against Syrians have continued to increase. Turkey hosts at least 4 million refugees—3.7 million of them Syrian nationals or stateless people who have migrated from Syria. This is an almost 5 percent addition to Turkey’s existing population, which stood at about 74 million before their arrival, making it the largest influx to Turkey since the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, amid the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. Since the Syrian war began in 2011, the Turkish government has welcomed large numbers of Syrian refugees and given them “temporary protected status.” While the public in general welcomed them, since Turkey fell into recession in 2018, tolerance has worn thin. This public unease has found expression in a media trend known as “street interviews,” which simultaneously spread intolerance and misinformation regarding Turkey’s Syrian refugee population. By way of context, the Turkish government has cracked down on conventional media over the past decade and a half, giving loyal media a monopoly on information and pushing Turkish citizens to seek alternative sources of news. Creative new initiatives have emerged as a result, some anchored in social media, and while these can fill gaps and contribute in meaningful ways, some, such as street interviews, are quasi-journalistic and can disseminate dangerous messages. If the Turkish government does not ease its hold over the media, other such trends will likely persist and continue shaping public opinion, hurting chiefly Turkey’s vulnerable Syrian population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Refugees, Discrimination, Syrian War, and Hate Speech
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

93. Disaster Dynamics: Assessing Middle East Responses to the Turkey-Syria Earthquake and Other Destructive Events

Author:
Sarah Cahn and Erik Yavorsky
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The massive earthquake that killed more than 50,000 people in Turkey and Syria as of February 28—one of the worst Middle East natural disasters in recent memory—has touched the hearts of leaders and peoples across the world, triggering a flow of urgently needed humanitarian support. Regional states, too, have provided rescue and relief assistance. From the outset, however, politics has played an important role in shaping the scope and direction of such aid. In fact, the politics of humanitarian aid follows a pattern discernible based on previous regional responses to crises, including the 2020 Beirut port explosion and—before it—the 2014 Gaza war.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Foreign Aid, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

94. Nonviolent Protest Movement in Suweida Continues to Resurrect Calls from the Syrian Revolution

Author:
Ishtar Al Shami
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On December 8, residents of Suweida city and the surrounding areas came out to protest the Assad regime yet again. Days later, as the movement entered its sixteenth week, a long line of protesters appeared in the town of Salkhad in the south of Suweida province. On these streets, waves of protesters chant “the people want the downfall of the regime,” echoing cries of the Arab Spring that has in the past sparked swift military backlash from the Syrian Regime. Syrian opposition flags are common, along with the Druze flag—the community to which the large majority of Suweida’s inhabitants belong. Meanwhile, several residents of Salkhad and nearby Shahbaa city broke into their local Baath party offices to either close down or take documents from an already closed building. These offices joined the fate of other Baath party offices throughout the province that have been shut down in towns including Melh, Arman, al-Qurayya, and Sama al-Bardan. In videos posted to social media, these protesters tore up pictures of Bashar al-Assad in a clear challenge and explicit rejection of the regime’s legitimacy, demanding its departure. In the events of this one week, Syrians following the protests could see a microcosm of the larger Suweida protest movement, now over a hundred days in and with no signs of stopping. Although the peaceful demonstrations in Suweida are no longer in the international spotlight since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the movement is remarkable for its longevity and continued open articulation of so many of the ideas that initially motivated Syrians to take to the streets in 2011, and that the Syrian regime has tried so desperately to repress in the intervening years. These protests are the means through which the demonstrators communicate with the world, and have become a symbol for many Syrians both within the country and outside of it. When they began in mid-August 2023, their unprecedented scope meant that they were almost immediately hailed as a second wave of the Syrian revolution. At the time, many wondered: Will Suweida be the turning point? Will this movement be able to oust the Assad regime and usher in a democratic political process that could make reconstruction possible, allowing the return of refugees and the displaced? While protesters in Suweida have not yet accomplished these admittedly audacious goals, neither have they been silenced or forced into submission in the intervening months. This in itself should be seen as a victory; the Suweida movement has become the longest, most organized, widespread, and participatory movement since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, a mixed-gender civilian movement with broad and influential participation from all segments of Suweida’s society.
Topic:
Reform, Democracy, Protests, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Suwayda

95. Earthquake in Syria and Turkey: U.S. Policy Implications

Author:
Can Selcuki, Amany Qaddour, Soner Cagaptay, and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A panel of experts offers on-the-ground insights from the disaster zone and discusses the political and policy consequences of the still-unfolding humanitarian crisis.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Natural Disasters, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

96. Drug Addiction in Syria: A Decades-Long Disease

Author:
Emad Bouzo
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Numerous articles have recently appeared in international media about confiscated shipments of Captagon coming from Syria into various countries in the Middle East. Recent research has examined how Syria turned into a regional center for drug trafficking. Yet media interest appears comparatively silent about the spread of drug abuse inside Syria itself. According to available reports, domestic drug abuse has reached dangerous levels. While such a crisis has no doubt increased, the roots of this issue are decades old. Through my work as a doctor in Damascus from 1980 until September 2011, I witnessed how drug abuse spread during this period. My private clinic was located in one of the most significantly affected neighborhoods, and some of my personal observations from my time as a clinician may help shed light on the deeper origins of Syria’s current drug crisis and perhaps shed light on potential avenues to address it. Initially, the Lebanese civil war served as the main factor in the spread of drugs. Several militias exploited the collapse of state institutions in Lebanon to carry out drug cultivation, manufacturing, and drug trafficking within its borders. The Syrian military intervention in Lebanon in the mid-seventies and the establishment of partnerships between the leaders of these militias and Syrian officers that secured the drug trade with more protection allowed its revitalization and prosperity, as documented in a Washington Post article from that period. Tons of heroin were produced annually in Lebanon, and Syrian officers subsequently trafficked large quantities into Syria. This new ease of access captured the attention of numerous Syrian youth, who began using these highly addictive drugs. Their interest in drugs was often initially driven by being forced to leave education to enter the labor market at an early age and experiencing a sense of a bleak future. And whereas Syrian teenagers used to rebel by smoking or consuming alcohol, peer use of opioids—such as the proximal “dextropopoxyphene” that became popular globally in the sixties—opened the door to growing usage due to the drug’s quick tolerance. Some patients moved rapidly from two capsules to the entire envelope of ten capsules in order to obtain the same sense of euphoria, ultimately leading the user to try other drugs to experience the same high. Young Syrians also took to abusing codeine-containing cough syrup.
Topic:
Public Health, Drug Trafficking, Addiction, and Captagon
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

97. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

98. The Future of Repatriation from Northeast Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) recently announced that due to the international community’s slow response to the repatriation of thousands of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), it will begin to hold “fair and transparent trials in accordance with international and local laws related to terrorism.” The announcement comes after representatives from more than eighty countries gathered in Saudi Arabia on June 8 for a ministerial meeting convened by the Global Coalition Against Daesh, where U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reminded attendees, “We know that repatriation is the only durable solution.” His statement stood out in this context because citizens from many coalition states are still being detained indefinitely in northeast Syria. While the United States has proactively advocated for repatriation across two administrations, most other countries around the world have been reluctant or slow to take such action. To date, approximately 5,500 Iraqis and 2,700 third-country nationals (i.e., not Syrian or Iraqi) have been repatriated from detention camps, and the international community is on track to repatriate more such individuals in 2023 than in years past. Although this is a step in the right direction, it means that more than 10,000 third-country nationals from almost 60 countries remain in detention in northeast Syria, including approximately 2,000 men and boys and 8,000 women and minors. These numbers do not include the more than 18,000 Syrians and 25,000 Iraqis who are also being held indefinitely. With numerous international conflicts dominating daily headlines, much of the international community is no doubt fatigued by the challenges emanating from the fight against IS and the repatriation of IS-affiliated individuals. Yet the AANES announcement and other developments show that these challenges will only proliferate without concerted attention from Washington and its coalition partners.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

99. Syrians' Reactions to the First Weeks of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Ammar Musarea
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When the al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization—launched their al-Aqsa Flood operation, Syrians were already on edge. They had been following news of peaceful protests that have been taking place for almost two months in the Suwayda Governorate, which is majority Druze, as well as in other Syrian governorates. Protestors have called for the end of the Assad regime, the release of tens of thousands of prisoners, and the implementation of UN resolutions on Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and Russian aircraft have carried out daily bombings on civilians in Idlib and the surrounding countryside, which have displaced more than 100,000 Syrians. The Syrian Network for Human Rights stated that the Assad regime and Russia’s attacks on northwestern Syria have resulted in around 45 civilian deaths including 13 children, 9 women, and 3 humanitarian aid workers. They said that 51 critical facilities had also been targeted during October 2023. Al-Aqsa Flood also comes at a time when Syrians in regime-controlled areas face increasingly difficult living conditions. Concurrently, the International Court of Justice is beginning initial proceedings for Canada and the Netherlands’ case against the Assad regime for crimes of torture. The response to events in Israel and Gaza have not been monolithic; reactions have varied significantly depending on factions’ alliances and proximity to the conflict. On the one hand, there is widespread disillusionment with actors claiming to liberate Palestine, a reflection of how groups like Hamas failed to support the Syrian people’s revolution against the Assad regime. However, Syrians as a whole empathize with Palestinians and reject the killing and forced displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their homes. Simultaneously, Syrians have not forgotten the crimes that the terrorist organization Hezbollah has carried out against them in support of the regime, as well as Hamas’ backstabbing in trying to reestablish ties with the Assad regime. Hamas' close ties with Iran, the main backer of the Damascus government, are another source of anger in anti-regime circles.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Syrian War, Hamas, and October 7
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Syria

100. Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Siyasetçilerin Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Bakışlarının Nefret Söylemi Bağlamında İncelenmesi

Author:
Muhammet Sait Pınarbaşi
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Bilgi
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
Türkiye ve dünyada nefret söylemi çalışmaları incelendiğinde, çoğunlukla sosyal medya üzerinden yapılan çalışmalarla toplumdaki nefret söyleminin ölçüldüğü, siyasi parti liderleri özelinde, siyasal iletişimde nefret söylemi çalışmalarının sayıca çok az olduğu söylenebilir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de resmi rakamlara göre sayıları 3,5 milyon civarında olan geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyelilere ilişkin Türkiye’deki milliyetçi siyasal parti liderlerinin nefret söylemini kullanıp kullanmadığını ortaya çıkarma amacındadır. 2011 yılından itibaren Suriyelilerin Türkiye’ye göçü ile birçok şehirde demografik yapının bozulduğu ve çok çeşitli toplumsal sorunların ortaya çıktığı söylenebilir. Ancak nefret söyleminin, toplumda daha derin yaralara yol açılmasına sebep olabilecek olan “nefret suçlarını” ortaya çıkarma potansiyeli bulunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda önem arz eden çalışmada, Devlet Bahçeli, Meral Akşener ve Ümit Özdağ’ın açıklamaları söylem analizi yöntemi ile incelenmiştir. Bu incelemelerin sonucunda, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi lideri Bahçeli’nin, geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyeliler ile ilgili söylemlerinde önyargılı aktarımlar ve ayrımcılık yaratıcı unsurlara rastlanmamakla beraber geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyelilere dostane şekilde yaklaştığı; İyi Parti lideri Akşener’in de ayrımcılık, ötekileştirme veya önyargılı söylemlerden uzak durduğu gözükmektedir. Buna karşın, Zafer Partisi lideri Özdağ’ın, toplumda meydana gelen neredeyse bütün olumsuzlukları geçici koruma kapsamında bulunan Suriyeliler ile ilişkilendirdiği ve yine neredeyse her zaman ayrıştırıcı ve ötekileştirici söylemler kullandığı görülmektedir. Zafer Partisi’nin kuruluşundan sonra söylemleri keskinleşmiş olup, önyargılı aktarımlara da çokça başvurmaktadır. Bu durum da, Özdağ’ın söylemlerinin nefret içerikli oluşu sonucunu beraberinde getirmektedir.
Topic:
Nationalism, Elections, Refugees, Domestic Politics, Syrian War, and Hate Speech
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria