Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Syria Publication Year within 3 Years

121. Unexploded Ordnance Threatens Food Security in Syria

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination seriously hinders Syria’s recovery from civil war. The problem not only affects immediate physical safety but also undermines the nation's food security. Omnipresent UXO denies access to arable land, water sources, and infrastructure, exacerbating aid dependence. Additionally, UXO intensifies land degradation by contributing to the overcultivation of uncontaminated lands, leading to intensive farming practices that can degrade soil and deplete its nutrients. Overcultivation also depletes water resources and leads to soil erosion. All these factors further stress Syria’s already weakened food production capabilities.
Topic:
Food Security, Syrian War, Farming, and Unexploded Ordnance
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

122. After the Turkish Elections, Now What for Syria?

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
On May 28, 2023, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan solidified his 20‐year rule as Turkey's premier by winning the latest presidential election. Despite facing challenges, including a declining economy and the aftermath of a devastating earthquake, Erdoğan's relationship with the government of Syria (GoS) played a crucial role in the elections and their aftermath.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Syrian War, Erdogan, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

123. Effectiveness of Humanitarian Exceptions to Sanctions:

Author:
Erica Moret
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The adoption of several humanitarian carveouts under several Syria-related autonomous sanctions regimes – in response to February 2023’s devastating earthquake – has been strongly welcomed by the humanitarian community. The exceptions adopted by the United States (US), European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK), and Switzerland are designed to facilitate transactions in relation to relief efforts and the purchase of oil and petroleum-related products in Syria, particularly by humanitarian actors. They differ in terms of scope of activities authorized, breadth of actors covered, and their duration. This article seeks to map the main characteristics of each exception and assesses them in terms of benefits, ongoing challenges, and areas for potential improvement to inform future sanctions policies.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Sanctions, European Union, Earthquake, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, Syria, Switzerland, and United States of America

124. An Enduring Challenge: ISIS-linked Foreigners in Türkiye

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Numerous foreign nationals with ties to ISIS have come to Türkiye since the group’s defeat in Iraq and Syria. This population presents officials with complex questions, one of which is what threat individuals might still pose. The predicament calls for a multi-pronged strategy.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Islamic State, Jihad, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

125. Containing Transnational Jihadists in Syria’s North West

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The rebels who control north-western Syria are dealing harshly with ISIS cells but have not yet crushed them entirely. The best way to stop jihadists from rebounding is to consolidate the area’s ceasefire. Outside powers can also help by sending more humanitarian aid.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Islamic State, Syrian War, Transnational Actors, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

126. Apply the Logic of the Afghanistan Withdrawal to Syria

Author:
Natalia Armbruster
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The logic President Biden used for removing U.S. troops from Afghanistan applies to Syria. Since a U.S. intervention should be defined by clear, achievable goals, and since long-range strikes, instead of occupying forces, can accomplish U.S. counterterrorism goals, there is no good case for keeping U.S. troops in Syria either. Around 900 U.S. forces currently occupy territory in eastern and southern Syria, risking conflict with Syrian forces and local militias, as well as Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces. ISIS’s territorial caliphate in Syria was eliminated in 2019. The few, small, remote areas the remnants of ISIS now hold are largely within territory held by Syrian government forces. Local forces can fight the remnants of ISIS. None of the other standard rationales for keeping U.S. forces in Syria—protecting the Kurds, countering Iran and Russia, unseating the Assad regime—justifies keeping troops in Syria either.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

127. Global threat landscape 2022

Author:
Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Three trends will characterise the evolving global terror threat landscape in 2022. First, the cascading implications of the return of the Taliban-al Qaeda alliance to Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. Second, the diffusion of the Islamic State threat from the Levant, notably from Iraqi-Syrian theatre. Third, the online surge of extremist and violent content especially of Islamist and Far Right entities on servers in North America and Europe mobilising and radicalizing especially youth. With lockdowns, partial lockdowns and other pandemic restrictions, the challenges facing government security forces - military, law enforcement and intelligence surged and both in resource allocation for training and mobility for operations hampered their performance and efficacy. The focus on humanitarian challenges by governments during the pandemic was ably exploited by threat groups to expand their support bases or capture territory. On the other hand, a range of ideological and material threats manifested in 2021. Some will institutionalise both in the physical and digital spaces in 2022. With radicalisation and reciprocal radicalisation of Islamists and Far Right threat groups, their networks, cells and personalities will stage attacks.
Topic:
Taliban, Radicalization, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Islamism, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and Syria

128. March 2022 Issue

Author:
Bennett Clifford, Daniel H. Heinke, Audrey Alexander, Teddy Macdonald, and Richard M. Yon
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“The January 15, 2022, hostage crisis at a Jewish synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, resurfaced a longstanding jihadi cause when the armed hostage-taker demanded the release of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani neuroscientist-turned-al-Qa`ida-operative currently serving an 86-year-sentence in an American prison for attempting to murder U.S. troops in Afghanistan,” writes Bennett Clifford in this month’s feature article, which looks at how her case continues to motivate jihadi terror plots in the United States. Clifford argues that “the factors that initially skyrocketed her case as a cause célèbre for jihadis have grown in importance. The jihadi movement, particularly in the West, has had a particularly intense focus on the plight of Western women jihadis behind bars during the past several years … [and] Siddiqui is the prototype for the ‘aseerat,’ the female prisoners of the jihadi movement who are constantly the subject of propaganda pushes, crowdfunding campaigns, and jihadi operational activities.” Our interview is with David Caulfield, who served as Chief of the Defense Combating Terrorism Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency before his retirement earlier this year. Daniel Heinke assesses that the Querdenken protest movement in Germany, which emerged in 2020 in opposition to government COVID-19 measures, is “apparently open to conspiracy theories and right-wing extremism” and has become “a serious threat to public security.” He notes that not only did Querdenken protestors attempt to storm Germany’s parliament building in August 2020, prefiguring the January 6 U.S. Capitol riot, but an alleged 2021 plot to assassinate Saxony’s premier was “reportedly fueled by corona-skeptic grievances and apparently had linkages to the broader Querdenken movement.” He writes: “The threat posed by the movement is that it can fuel anti-government sentiments and thus may form a gateway for the acceptance of more extremist views and ultimately for the belief that resorting to violence may be acceptable or even necessary to defend rights.” Audrey Alexander and Teddy MacDonald examine how jihadi terrorists in Syria move, hide, and access funds using digital currencies. They assess that “All in all, digital currencies are not replacing other methods of terror finance. Instead, terrorists in Syria often use digital currencies in conjunction with other money service businesses and transfer methods.”
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Jihad, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

129. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

130. Gearing Up the Fight Against Impunity: Dedicated Investigative and Prosecutorial Capacities

Author:
Howard Varney and Katarzyna Zdunczky
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
Holding perpetrators to account for the worst crimes known to humanity is one of the most important responsibilities of the community of nations in the 21st century. Notwithstanding the appalling nature of atrocity crimes, most perpetrators do not face justice. Specialized investigative and prosecutorial units, however, offer a ray of hope in this otherwise bleak justice landscape. Such units now operate in several countries around the world, including Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, and Germany. This report, which was prepared jointly by ICTJ and the Foundation for Human Rights emerges from efforts to persuade the South African government to create a dedicated capacity to investigate and prosecute apartheid-era crimes, which have been long neglected. The report considers ways of gearing up the fight against impunity for serious international crimes and crimes of the past. It compares countries that leave atrocity crimes to the general administration of justice and those that adopt a specialized or dedicated approach. Specialized prosecutorial and investigative capacities are entities that focus exclusively on a particular category of crimes. While specialized units vary in size, structure, staffing, and operations, innovations such as prosecution-led investigations and bringing multi-disciplinary skills under one roof, make them considerably more effective than a generalized approach. The report provides a high-level audit of specialized units in 23 countries. It considers different models of domestic dedicated investigative and prosecutorial approaches and analyses their track records. Eleven case studies contrast countries with specialized units and those without. The report examines certain features that characterize specialized units, including their structure, composition, operations, and relationships with civil society and other entities. It analyzes the main challenges faced by the units including political dynamics, accessing evidence, and victim support. The report includes an overview of recent efforts by various specialized units to deliver criminal accountability for serious crimes committed in Syria. It concludes with recommendations on how to make specialized units more effective.
Topic:
International Law, Reform, Criminal Justice, Accountability, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Europe, Middle East, Argentina, South America, Balkans, North Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Peru, and South Sudan