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1. Should Denmark and Sweden join the banking Union?

Author:
Dirk Schoenmaker and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Though outside the euro area, Denmark and Sweden could benefit from joining the European Union’s banking union. It would provide protection in case of any need to resolve at national level a large bank with a Scandinavian footprint, and would mark a choice in favour of more cross-border banking. But joining the banking union would also involve some loss of decision-making power.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Banks
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Sweden

2. The Swiss Model vs. Swedish Model in Dealing with China

Author:
Joseph de Weck
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Do you want to know how Beijing would like Europe to act? Take a look at Switzerland. Switzerland and China have been close for decades. It was the first Western nation to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in January 1950. Bern wanted to protect investments in the new People’s Republic from nationalization and hoped Swiss industry could lend a hand in rebuilding China’s infrastructure after the civil war. Being friendly to China paid off, but only 30 years later, once reformer Deng Xiaoping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1980, Swiss elevator producer Schindler was the first foreign company to do a joint venture in China. Today, Switzerland is the only continental European country to have a free trade agreement (FTA) with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Switzerland, and Sweden

3. Rebuilding Sweden’s crisis preparedness: Lack of clarity impedes implementation

Author:
Mariette Hagglund
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Changes in the security environment and Sweden’s related policy changes adopted in the early 2000s made large national-level planning and organization unnecessary. This led to a decentralization of Sweden’s crisis preparedness system. Covid-19 is the latest reminder of some of the shortcomings in Sweden’s crisis preparedness. Previous warning signs were the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, and the forest fires in 2014 and 2018. A major effort is currently underway in Sweden to build a streamlined system to respond to the broad scope of vulnerabilities and threats. A functioning crisis preparedness system is not only important in itself, but also as a contribution to Sweden’s total defence efforts. Rebuilding the system, however, will be slow and costly. Sweden’s crisis preparedness system is characterized by a complex authority landscape and discrepancies between sectors and regions. While the Swedish constitution does not allow for exceptions in crises, and ministerial governance is forbidden, the Covid-19 situation may spark a discussion about the need for changes in the legal framework.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Crisis Management, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Sweden

4. Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation: What history suggests about future scenarios

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden has a history that far predates the most recent ‘reignition’ of 2014, and is now deeper than at any time in the past. In 2020, Sweden and Finland can contribute to each other’s defence in an integrated and planned fashion; but any plans are best viewed as being supplementary to national preparations. While the security interests of Finland and Sweden have overlapped historically, cooperation has often been limited due to a combination of domestic drivers and foreign pressures, as well as the nature of the international security system. Yet these same variables are currently permitting even deeper cooperation. Four future paths of cooperation are identifiable, with the most likely being a continuation of bilateral deepening, with added trilateral cooperation with Norway and the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia

5. The deepening Finnish-Swedish security and defence relationship: From operative cooperation to ‘strategic interoperability’?

Author:
Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation has taken significant steps. Currently, the two countries engage in operative planning, which constitutes a significant part of their new cooperation agenda. Although interoperability between the Finnish and Swedish armed forces is crucial for the bilateral defence relationship, the countries should be ‘interoperable’ at the strategic level as well. Neither Finland’s and Sweden’s strategic cultures nor their decision-making systems or legislation are entirely similar. However, military non-alignment, similar threat perceptions and a shared assessment of their security environment facilitate their cooperation. In view of the future, questions remain about the two countries’ readiness to enter mutual defence commitments. There is also a need to ensure that their basic messages concerning the bilateral defence relationship are aligned. Over the longer term, the idea that one’s neighbour is worth defending should be entrenched in the strategic cultures of both states. This requires active nurturing of the already close relations between their national security communities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia

6. Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk

Author:
Dr Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Peter Topychkanov, Fei Su, and Peldán Carlsson
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This report aims to offer the reader a concrete understanding of how the adop­tion of artificial intelligence (AI) by nuclear-armed states could have an impact on strategic stability and nuclear risk and how related challenges could be addressed at the policy level. The analysis builds on extensive data collection on the AI-related technical and strategic developments of nuclear-armed states. It also builds on the authors’ conclusions from a series of regional workshops that SIPRI organized in Sweden (on Euro-Atlantic dynamics), China (on East Asian dynamics) and Sri Lanka (on South Asian dynamics), as well as a transregional workshop in New York. At these workshops, AI experts, scholars and practitioners who work on arms control, nuclear strategy and regional security had the opportunity to discuss why and how the adoption of AI capabilities by nuclear-armed states could have an impact on strategic stability and nuclear risk within or among regions.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, East Asia, Sri Lanka, and Sweden

7. Cyber-incident Management: Identifying and Dealing with the Risk of Escalation

Author:
Fei Su, Dr Vincent Boulanin, and Johan Turell
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The ever-increasing dependence on information and communication technologies (ICTs) in all aspects of society raises many challenges for national crisis management agencies. These agencies need to prepare not only for new cyberthreats and cyber vulnerabilities, but also for the fact that the aftermath of a cyber incident affecting critical infrastructure has its own challenges. On the one hand, the practical disruptions caused by an isolated incident can be hard to predict and control and, on the other hand, the consequences and perceptions of an incident whose cause is not yet determined can be equally hard to manage. Uncertainty around the cause of the incident and remedial actions being taken often lead to public speculation and political pressure to respond in ways that could create political tensions, and possibly conflict, between countries. This policy paper is the result of a nine-month research project that was jointly conducted by SIPRI and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) on cyber-incident management. It explores what national crisis management authorities can do to improve their cyber-incident prevention, detection and response strategies and also how they can do better to deal with the larger societal and potentially political aftermath. It investigates why and how cyber incidents may lead to escalatory scenarios and how these scenarios can be avoided and contained using various de-escalatory approaches. It comprises an introduction providing background and the inspiration of this report (section I); four sections that explore the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation from conceptual (section II), analytical (sections III–IV) and empirical (section V) standpoints; and two sections that present the main findings and recommendations (sections VI–VII).
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Sweden and Global Focus

8. Brexit and the consequences for fisheries management in the North Sea

Author:
Gordon Munro
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The North Sea is a very productive fishing area of great importance to surrounding coastal states Norway, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Denmark and Belgium, with an average total harvest in recent years of slightly more than 1.8 million tonnes. This report explains why the cooperative management of the six shared North Sea fish stocks has been so stable to date and considers what lessons this success holds for the world at large. The report also speculates on the post Brexit management of these resources. The lessons learned from cooperative management over 40 years may well have an impact also on future cooperation between Norway, the UK and the EU27.
Topic:
International Cooperation, European Union, Economy, Brexit, Oceans and Seas, and Fishing
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and Netherlands

9. Is the Future of Foreign Policy Feminist?

Author:
Lyric Thompson and Rachel Clement
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
In 2014, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Margot Wallström took the worldby storm when she launched the world’s first explicitly feminist foreign policy. The new policy would be a way of doing things differently in Sweden’s international affairs, organizing its approach to diplomacy, development, and defense under a 3 Rs framework of women’s rights, resources, and representation, the latter of which this journal issue seeks to explore.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Women, Inequality, and Feminism
Political Geography:
Europe, United Nations, Sweden, and Global Focus

10. The Geostrategic Arctic: Hard security in the High North

Author:
Harri Mikkola
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The end of the Cold War meant that the Arctic region lost most of its geostrategic relevance. However, due to growing great power competition, the Arctic is back on the geopolitical map. Hard security dynamics in the region are defined by two key elements: the importance of conventional long-range missiles and nuclear weapons for Russia, and the importance of the North Atlantic sea line of communication for European defence. Russia has revitalized its Cold War-era bastion strategy, which aims to ensure the survival of its strategic ballistic missile submarines. In a crisis scenario, this strategy could pose serious challenges to the Nordic countries as well. Five Arctic states are members of NATO and the Alliance’s collective defence is operational in the Arctic. Even if the Arctic is still not a focus area for NATO, the North Atlantic maritime domain is increasingly back on the agenda. Given the divergent strategic interests and lack of common ground between Russia and other Arctic states on grand strategic issues, the Arctic will not be losing its geostrategic importance anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Canada, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Arctic