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281. South Korea in the Chinese Political Imagination

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
States form images of each other based on assessments of each other’s material capabilities or on interpretations of each other’s intentions. Images matter in the foreign policy making process since they form popular public opinion on official policies and, in more basic ways, construct people’s identity toward other countries. Some images are more transient and therefore manageable. Remarks by foreign leaders, official documents, or media coverage tend to belong to this category. States try to make their images favorable in the minds of a foreign audience through their public diplomacy efforts. On the other hand, some images are more fundamental and hard to change, so that foreign policies are pressed to operate within their perimeter. Political ideology, religious orientation, and accumulated bilateral historical experiences tend to form these more durable images. Today’s globalized world has witnessed the rise of the Internet as an important medium constructing popular images of a foreign country. As mass communication across countries becomes more open and instant, foreign policy makers face the increasing challenge of controlling information flows and separating foreign policy agendas from domestic interests. Citizens with less direct contact are more prone to embracing popular images mediated by mass media. Elites, in contrast, who have more direct contact and knowledge, tend to have more rationally interpreted images of foreign countries. Formerly, elites used to monopolize foreign policy inputs. In the porous world of today, however, it is difficult for elites to resist and persuade popular opinion, which is more emotionally driven. This challenge is felt in China, where the leadership is sometimes at odds with irrational populism. In this respect, it is important to understand Chinese images of South Korea. How do elites and ordinary citizens of China hold South Korea in their political imagination? What are the implications of Chinese images of Korea for Seoul’s China policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, and Populism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

282. North Korea’s Hedging Strategy and South Korea’s Proactive Strategy

Author:
Kyung-Young Chung
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The year 2010 saw heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula triggered by North Korea, as shown by the sinking of the Cheonan warship and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. Some experts, even some within the intelligence community, estimated that through these efforts Kim Jong-eun was attempting to strengthen his power in the succession struggle. North Korea’s provocative actions, however, while internally motivated, repeatedly force South Korea to pay a ransom to support three generations of succession within the royal Kim family, and create an almost insurmountable problem for the South. Defining the Yeonpyeong Island incident is critical to the national security posture of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Conducting an exercise of artillery fire against a specific target is one thing, but attacking South Korean territory is a different thing altogether. The latter implies an invasive action, a deliberate attack to secure a series of strategic objectives waged by limited warfare. In the context of North Korea’s provocation, the conflicting, competitive, yet also cooperative relationship between the United States and China had both a direct and an indirect impact on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK's weak, vacillating reaction against the North Korean provocation clearly revealed the ROK military's limitations in countering the North Korean threat. Since dealing with a provocative scenario has a tremendous impact on how the ROK responds, a comprehensive reassessment of the North Korean threat is imperative. Taking account of the complexity of power politics as well as North Korea's provocations, this briefing will explore a potential provocative scenario, which will be developed on the basis of Pyongyang’s intent, its capability to inflict threat using asymmetric war-fighting assets, and the North Korean perception of South Korea's political, social, economic, and military vulnerability. Finally, the briefing will make policy recommendations in terms of security and defense posture, international cooperation to deter North Korean provocation, and examine how to promptly and effectively deal with future crises in the event of any further military action from the North against the ROK.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

283. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

284. Blame Game under Fire: Parsing South Korean Debate on North Korea Policy

Author:
Dong Sun Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In late 2009, a North Korean warship attacked South Korean naval vessels near Daecheong Island. The following year witnessed a further elevation of North Korean aggression expressed in attacks on the South Korean corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. These shocking developments have sparked a heated debate in the South, inter alia, on whether and how Seoul’s North Korea policy has increased Pyongyang’s belligerence. This paper aims to critically evaluate key arguments pervading the debate and offer an alternative perspective. (I limit my scope to examining how Seoul’s policy has affected Pyongyang’s recent aggressiveness, instead of offering a more comprehensive account of the provocations or a theory of North Korean behavior.) I argue that all conventional wisdom (which either denies the significance of North Korea policy or views the level of engagement as mainly shaping Pyongyang’s behavior) has only weak empirical support, but remains salient because it serves parochial political interests in the partisan blame game. In reality, Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang has significantly amplified North Korean belligerence primarily because it has been partisan in nature—not because inter-Korean engagement has been excessive or insufficient. Resolving this problem requires promoting post-partisanship, to which independent scholars and institutions can contribute significantly.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

285. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

286. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of Public Opinion Surveys on Ratification

Author:
Wonchil Chung
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
There was a lot at stake for the Korean Congress in August 2011, and one of them was the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Regarding this bill, the two main parties have been pitted against one another. The Grand National Party (GNP) asserts that the FTA bill has at least to be submitted to the Standing Committee; while the Democratic Party (DP) suggests the 10+2 renegotiation proposal (see Appendix 1) for the KORUS FTA that impose restrictions on the arrangement. If the DP's proposal is agreed upon by the National Congress, ratification becomes impossible, since the proposal will allow the negotiation of the FTA, in progress for more than four years (2006 to February 2011), to be taken back to square one. It is true that the KORUS FTA has a lot to offer when it comes to economic aspects, as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) pointed out in its analysis (see Appendix 2). With that in mind, the GNP risks its political position, as public opinion displays distrust and dissatisfaction over the imbalance between Korea and the United States shown during the progress of the negotiation (see Appendix 3).
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

287. From Preponderance of Power to Balance of Power? South Korea in Search of a New North Korea Policy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The global and East Asian orders of power are now represented by China's economic, military, and diplomatic rise and America's decline. The result is often called Chimerica or G2, leading to U.S.-China competition in every aspect of the international agenda. After the Bush administration's foreign policy in the first years of the millennium, when many scholars and policy makers focused on U.S. unipolarity or at least its preponderance of power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the current state of affairs is a great change. While U.S.-China relations represent a set of the most important variables in world politics, the meaning of China’s rise is much greater in the East Asian regional order. The Korean Peninsula, of course, cannot escape from the influence of its neighbors. Although the world order of the 1990s saw the unprecedented economic prosperity and overwhelming military power of the United States, the recent order has been characterized by the relative decline of the United States and the fast and strong rise of China. The Chinese economy has grown more than 10 percent per year for the last thirty years and is now the world's second-largest economy. Although the Chinese GDP is still only one-third that of the United States, as TABLE 1 shows, it is not at all unheard of to say that China may economically catch up with the superpower by 2030. Moreover, China's trade with Northeast Asian countries is much larger than that of the United States. As TABLE 2 shows, China's exports and imports with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are almost twice as large when compared with those of the United States. Given America's economic recession and China's incessant growth, the gap between the two is likely to get much larger. China's increasing economic interdependence with regional powers will have a great effect on the changing balance of power in the region, and will have a much greater effect on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, China has also made every effort to build up its military capability. Supported by its strong economic growth, Chinese military spending has been hugely increased, more than 10 percent per year on average. China spent 40 billion U.S. dollars in 2001, but it spent 119 billion in 2010, an increase of almost three times in ten years. TABLE 3 indicates that Chinese military spending is still less than one sixth compared to the American figure, but one must recognize that while the United States plans to cut its military spending in the next decade due to its budget deficit, China is certain to keep increasing its, unless its economy falls into deep trouble in the near future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Military Strategy, and GDP
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

288. Russia’s “Return” to Asia: How Should South Korea Respond?

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 24, 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a joint summit in Eastern Siberia, the first such meeting between the two countries since 2002. After the summit, many speculated upon the impact this meeting would have upon the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear program. Although some experts viewed Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia as merely a form of begging bowl diplomacy, such analysis underestimates recent efforts by Russia to engage Northeast Asia. Moreover, the strategic significance of the summit is reflected in the agreement reached between the two leaders which would imply that the summit could be a watershed moment in bringing about new dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and among neighboring countries. Particularly, the proposed Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project would have a strong impact on the political geography of Northeast Asia. In November 2011, South Korea and Russia held their own summit in St Petersburg where the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline project was reconfirmed. Moscow even expressed its willingness to build the pipeline, passing through North Korea, at its own expense. Such a very active participation from Russia though could provoke certain competition with China in the region. The future course of this project is expected to be decided during the negotiation process between Russia’s Gazprom and South Korea’s KOGAS. Yet in South Korea, domestically, this issue of building a gas pipeline could be controversial in many ways. There are concerns regarding security matters related to North Korea as well as a lack of trust in Russia. At the same time, the responses from the United States and China must be taken into account. As 2012 is the year of leadership change for many countries in the region, it is also possible that the project will become unnecessarily politicized and eventually jeopardized. Therefore, South Korea should carefully prepare an action plan for realizing this project in order to take advantage of this opportunity amid changing dynamics in the region. In recent years there has been much talk of the United States “returning” to Asia, but Russia is also making its own return. This gas pipeline project shows how Russia intends to use its vast energy resources to facilitate its ambition to play a new role in Northeast Asia. This Issue Briefing addresses the impact of Russia’s reengagement and how South Korea should respond by considering both the positive and negative effects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and South Korea

289. The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953

Author:
Chang-Il Ohn
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula and incorporate it in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe—as a springboard to attack Russia—and asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Because of this policy and strategic posture, the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-48) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union. Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung asked for Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim and secured newly-born Communist China's support for the cause. Judging that it needed a buffer zone against the West and Soviet aid for nation building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of full American intervention in the projected war. With full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from China, Kim Il-sung attacked South Korea with forces that were better armed, equipped, and prepared than their counterparts in South Korea.
Political Geography:
China, America, South Korea, North Korea, Poland, and Soviet Union

290. The Korean Position on Alliance Formation and the Change of Public Trust between Korea and the United States: The Cheonan Incident and the OPCON Issue

Author:
Taewoo Kim
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
In macroscopic perspective, the ROK-U.S. alliance has evolved toward a desirable future-oriented one and public trust has been generally robust. Most South Koreans remember it as an unmatched blessing for their security and prosperity. In microscopic perspective, however, the alliance was not without ordeals and tribulations, and the public trust not without dangerous vicissitudes. Today, many South Koreans regard the 2007 OPCON (Operational Control) agreement as a strange decision made in a strange time, thus representing the era of ordeals. The sinking of the Cheonan on March 26, 2010, sheds new light on the OPCON issue. For those South Koreans who think that 2012 is the worst time for the OPCON transfer and dismantlement of the CFC, the bloody North Korean provocation reminds us of the Korean War sixty years ago, distinguishes once again friends from foes, and opportunely rekindles the OPCON issue. They believe that an indefinite postponement of the OPCON transfer is what the two nations should do to sustain a more future-oriented alliance and public trust toward it.
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea