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51. History 1, Soccer 0

Author:
Allan Song
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As the World Cup soccer tournament, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan, was beginning, Mr. Aidan Foster-Carter raised the issue of whether the two countries could take advantage of the unprecedented occasion to finally overcome their decades of hostility and forge a truly lasting friendship (“South Korea and Japan: High Time These Neighbors Put Future Before Past,” PacNet No. 22A, June 3, 2002). Although it was an interesting essay, I found the ending odd. He concluded by asking whether South Korea and Japan could finally move forward, but he coyly avoided an answer although it seemed that the answer was obvious to him.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Israel, Asia, and South Korea

52. When Realism and Liberalism Coincide: Russian Views of U.S. Alliances in Asia

Author:
Andrew C. Kuchins and Alexei V. Zagorsky
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Contemporary discussions of virtually any aspect of Russian foreign and security policy must take as their point of departure the extraordinarily weakened condition of the Russian Federation. There is no comparable case of such a rapid and dramatic decline in the status of a great power during peacetime in modern history. The Russian economy has been in a virtual free fall for most of the 1990s. The World Bank estimated the Russian GNP in 1997, using fixed exchange rates not adjusted for purchasing power parity, at $403.5 billion, making Russia the twelfth-largest economy in the world, just ahead of the Netherlands and just behind South Korea. Russian per capita GNP of $2,740 ranked fifty-first in the world and was in the category of “low middle” income countries. In 1997 the Russian GNP was about 5 percent of that of the United States, 8 percent adjusted for purchasing power parity. The figures for 1998 will be even starker given the devaluation of the ruble to approximately 30 percent of its 1997 value and continuing overall economic decline. A back-of-the-envelope calculation would have Russian GNP at the end of 1998 at no more than $120 billion and per capita GNP at less than $1,000.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Asia, South Korea, and Netherlands

53. U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: A Second Look

Author:
Michael J. Green, James T. Laney, and Morton I. Abramowitz
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In May, former Secretary of Defense William Perry traveled to North Korea with a comprehensive proposal to increase outside assistance for its isolated and declining Stalinist regime in exchange for steps by the North to reduce its threatening military posture. The Perry proposal was designed to test North Korea's intentions not only to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework, which aimed to cap Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, but also to stop further missile tests and military provocations. It is unlikely that North Korea will respond positively. The regime has survived for five decades only by maintaining a belligerent stance. Pyongyang has rebuffed South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's unprecedented efforts to improve North-South relations and has continued to produce military tensions, even in the wake of the Perry visit. But it is too soon to give up on a comprehensive package to reduce tensions with North Korea. Despite the illusion of self-sufficiency, or juche, the North is increasingly dependent on outside help to sustain itself. It is possible that over time Pyongyang will find no alternative to greater interaction with the outside world. Barring an increase in threatening North Korean actions, the United States should keep the Perry proposal on the table and continue to support Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement. A second Taepodong missile test by North Korea would not violate any existing North Korean commitments, but it would significantly change the situation in Northeast Asia. We should make every effort to deter a launch, but if one takes place, the United States, Japan, and South Korea will have to examine ways to enhance defense against a different North Korean threat. South Korea should suspend new investment in North Korea and Japan should impose new sanctions and consider restrictions on financial transfers to the North. The United States should lower its diplomatic activity toward Pyongyang, keeping channels open, but forcing North Korea to provide incentives for greater dialogue. A missile launch should not end our attempts at diplomacy or cause us to forget that North Korea's relative military capabilities are in decline, but if a test is conducted business cannot continue as usual. Although a North Korean missile launch would do great damage to political support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the United States, Japan, and South Korea, it should not be a reason for us to abandon our commitments under the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework stands as the major bulwark against a return to the kind of calamitous military steps the United States was forced to consider in 1994 to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Inspections of suspicious underground facilities at Kumchangri in May revealed no North Korean violation of the Agreed Framework. Although we cannot assume from this that Pyongyang has forsaken its nuclear ambitions, we do know that implementation of the Agreed Framework remains the best approach to preventing nuclear weapons development in the North. In the end, there is no easy solution to the intractable North Korean problem. Efforts to reduce tensions and build North-South reconciliation have yielded little. We are strong enough to test inducements for change in the North, but our policy must be based on robust deterrence and close defense cooperation with our allies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

54. Is Readiness Overrated? Implications for a Tiered Readiness Force Structure

Author:
James L. George
Publication Date:
04-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Readiness, the capability to respond quickly to a conflict with the appropriate force, is considered one of the most important elements in defense planning. From one-third to well over one-half of the defense budget goes toward maintaining readiness. Few people questioned the need for readiness, especially after the attack by North Korea against South Korea in 1950 and during the Cold War, when the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was poised to quickly thrust into Western Europe without much warning.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Cold War
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, North Korea, and Western Europe