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31. Policy Concerns of Low Fertility for Military Planning in South Korea

Author:
Elizabeth Hervey Stephen
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The South Korean military currently is the sixth-largest in the world. But years of low birth rates have resulted in declining numbers of young men available for military service, and the country now faces the pressing question of how to ensure national security in the face of inevitable troop reductions. Some options for offsetting this shrinking recruit pool (such as increasing fertility, increasing immigration, and increasing the number of women in the military) might seem obvious, but the complex economic, social, and cultural reality of South Korea make them unlikely to be embraced. The best focus for immediate action is to stabilize or increase service terms and to encourage development and implementation of high-tech security systems. While the recruit pool appears nearly adequate at present, South Korea must act quickly to develop the leaner, more diverse, and more technologically based military necessary for the country to maintain a viable military force.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Israel, Asia, and South Korea

32. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

33. The Israeli Exception

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
North Korea and Israel have a lot in common. Neither is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and both employ their nuclear weapons in elaborate games of peek-a-boo with the international community. Israel and North Korea are equally paranoid about outsiders conspiring to destroy their states, and this paranoia isn't without some justification. Partly as a result of these suspicions, both countries engage in reckless and destabilizing foreign policies. In recent years, Israel has launched preemptive strikes and invaded other countries, while North Korea has abducted foreign citizens and blown up South Korean targets (including, possibly, a South Korean ship in late March in the Yellow Sea).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, South Korea, and North Korea

34. Defense Innovation and Industrialization in South Korea

Author:
Chung-in Moon and Jae-Ok Paek
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
South Korea's defense industrial transformation has been impressive by any standard. It was able to satisfy most of its basic weapons needs within a decade after launching its defense industry. Since the late 1990s, South Korea has been elevated from a third-tier arms producer to the second tier by moving from the stage of imitation and assembly to that of creative imitation and indigenization. It now competes with major arms-supplying countries. In addition, the South Korean defense industry has made remarkable progress in RMA-related areas mostly involving command, control, communication, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance. In this policy brief, we first assess South Korea's defense industrial performance by examining the patterns of defense acquisition, rate of localization of defense materiel, and defense exports. We then briefly analyze the evolutionary dynamics of defense industrial upgrades in selected sectors by tracing the stages of innovation. We also delineate a set of institutional and policy arrangements that have contributed to this impressive transformation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Economics
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

35. Chronology of North Korea-South Korea Relations

Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Security, Development, and War
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and North Korea

36. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:
David C. Kang
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The two highlights in Japan-Korea relations during this quarter are Prime Minister Kan Naoto‟s apology to South Korea for Japan‟s colonial rule, and the appointment of Kim Jong-un, as vice chairman of the Workers‟ Party Central Military Commission and military general in the Korean People‟s Army. While these developments hold the promise to potentially change the security landscape of Northeast Asia, Prime Minister Kan‟s first full quarter in office reveals that Japan‟s North Korea policy is likely to continue along the lines of previous Japanese administrations, at least for now: an unfavorable attitude coupled with hostility and inaction. Pyongyang‟s attitude toward Tokyo, too, changed little and remained more or less predictable – it denounced Prime Minister Kan for apologizing only to South Korea, criticized Japan for “shamelessly” wanting a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and demanded compensation for all of Japan‟s past wrongdoings. Japan-South Korea relations appear to be moving closer, although whether Kan‟s apology will truly change anything remains to be seen. Japan keeping a watchful eye on North Korea‟s succession At the quarter‟s end, the Japanese government remained noncommittal but is apparently paying close attention to the North Korea‟s power transition dynamics for signs of whether there is any possible impact on the North‟s stance on either the abduction issue or its nuclear and missile programs. The Japanese media closely followed news about Kim Jong-un‟s appointment as a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission in the Workers‟ Party, which took place a day before the party‟s conference selecting “supreme leadership body.” With no prior military title, little is known about Kim Jong-un, but his new position means that he is responsible for directing North Korea‟s army and for formulating the party‟s military policies. Along with Kim Jong-il‟s sister Kim Kyong-hui‟s promotion to a Central Committee‟s Political Bureau member and her husband Jang Song-taek‟s nomination to the number two position on the National Defense Commission, it appears that a hereditary power transfer may be underway in Pyongyang. The Japanese government made no immediate official comment, but Prime Minister Kan said on Sept. 28 that Japan will “carefully monitor the situation inside North Korea.”
Topic:
Security and Government
Political Geography:
Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Tokyo, Korea, and Pyongyang

37. Lessons from the Cheonan Incident and South Korea’s Response

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the tragic sinking of the ROK Navy corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 2010, there has been an unprecedented level of unconfirmed suspicion, speculation, and criticism over the incident. Not only has this focused on the cause of the sinking but also on the Lee Myung-bak administration’s handling of the incident and its response in the immediate aftermath. The major challenge ahead is to build a domestic consensus on how to perceive and characterize the Cheonan incident and muster global support to punish North Korea. Pyongyang’s sinking of the South Korean warship has raised fundamental questions in the five most critical areas of the state; the military, diplomacy, economy, politics, and intelligence. Rather than narrowly focusing on one single area within which to muster a response, the Lee administration needs to take a comprehensive approach across all five areas and prevent further provocations from threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

38. From “Primordial” to “Pragmatic” Identity: A Search for Regional Identity in East Asia

Author:
Jun-Seok Kim
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2009, two interesting proposals for community building in East Asia were put forward: Kevin Rudd, then serving as Australia’s prime minister, proposed the creation of an Asia Pacific Community (APC) and then-Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed an East Asian Community (EAC). Claiming that Australia should get more deeply involved in Asia, Rudd described his vision of what an APC should look like. Of the most importance, it should be all-embracing. All the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region should take part, including the United States, Australia, Japan, China, South Korea, India, and Indonesia. The APC should also focus on both security and economic issues. In the meantime, Hatoyama, in a New York Times op-ed, came up with the idea of an East Asian Community as the cornerstone of his administration’s Asia policy. While the idea of the EAC was not totally fleshed out, he indicated that the group would include China, Japan, and South Korea as its core members. Hatoyama did not make it clear whether the United States would be invited, although he made no secret of his perception that the era of U.S.-led unilateralism and globalism was coming to an end. In this new period of growing multipolarity, he seemed to believe, it was imperative for Japan to reconceptualize East Asia, the world’s fastest-growing region which now accounts for one quarter of the total GDP of the world, as its own “basic sphere of being.” Prime Minister Hatoyama tried his best not to give the impression that he favored East Asia over the United States (or over the West as a whole). But, it seemed quite obvious that he wanted to see Japan more consciously autonomous from the United States than had been the case under the prolonged rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments. What prompted Rudd of Australia and Hatoyama of Japan to propose the creation of Asia Pacific and East Asian communities upon taking office? A probable cause can be found in the shift in relative power, especially between China, Japan, and the United States, that has long been in progress over the last decade. Both Rudd and Hatoyama were aware of this change. Rudd, for instance, explained that global economic and strategic weight was now shifting to Asia. Hatoyama has also conceded that China would surpass Japan in economic size “in the not-too-distant-future.” One might suspect, therefore, that their initiatives were nothing more than temporary expedients designed to cope with the recently changed international environment. That might be the case—or not. But whatever the two leaders’ underlying intent, their initiatives no doubt constituted significant contributions to a series of efforts to bring about community-type regional organizations in East Asia. From 1989 on, when APEC was first created, and especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, a succession of regional organizations came into being in East Asia, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, ASEAN+3 in 1997, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005 being the most representative. Since the first meeting of the EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2005, in particular, interest in the possibility of building an East Asian Community has become widespread. Although controversies over the proper geographical scope of such a community remain far from settled, with some countries favoring extensive, elastic membership and others favoring a limited, restrictive one, community-building in East Asia is now looked upon as a goal that is worthy of being pursued for its own sake. Australia’s and Japan’s initiatives, probably spurred by geostrategic considerations and not immediately realizable, will surely strengthen the case for an East Asian Community. At the very least, two initiatives have demonstrated the continued interest in an East Asian Community among politicians and decision-makers of East Asian countries.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Community, and Identity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, East Asia, Asia, and South Korea

39. ROK Military Transformation and ROK-US Security and Maritime Cooperation: MD, PSI and Dokdo Island

Author:
Taewoo Kim
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
In the last decade the ROK-U.S. alliance has soured as the two ideologically slanted predecessor administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun brandished 'idealist policy experiments' over issues critical to the alliance. Under the banner of 'autonomy,' the Roh administration initiated the 2007 decision to separate operational control (OPCON) and dismantle the Combined Forces Command (CFC) by 2012. The Defense Reform 2020 was a decisive masterpiece to placate the conservative realists critical to the Roh's leftist experiments. The task of redressing the vestige of distortions belongs to the newly elected Lee Myung Bak, who already began restoration of the bilateral relations since the two summits in 2008, which promised to forge a 'strategic alliance.' If the 2007 agreement over OPCON and CFC is irreversible, the Lee administration has no other choice but to formulate a new security cooperation while utilizing the Defense Reform as the highway leading to military transformation and upgraded ROK-U.S. cooperation in that regard. The rationale is that the U.S. will remain a critical partner even after the transfer of OPCON in all defense areas such as collaboration upon a Korean contingency, purchase of new weapon systems, and interoperability. There are other critical issues that need mutual adjustment and understanding. For South Korea, more active participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is worth a try. The U.S. needs to understand South Korea's hesitation to fully participate in the U.S.-initiated TMD. Technically, the proximity to North Korea's high speed ballistic missiles may nullify the South's missile defense efforts. Politically, such participation will irritate China and Russia. Particularly, U.S. recognition of Japan's claim over Dokdo (Takesima) island, if any, will pour cold water on ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral maritime cooperation, and dishearten 'ordinary South Koreans' who pin high expectations on the 'strategic alliance.'
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, and Island

40. Regional Overview

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's choice of Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China for her first official trip overseas helped shine a spotlight on Asia as a high priority region this quarter, as did North Korean Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's announcement that he intended to conduct a satellite launch in early April. The drama surrounding the anticipated launch provided an unfortunate back drop for otherwise very positive pronouncements about intended Obama administration policies in East Asia, even if the quarter closed with only a handful of those eventually to be tasked with implementing these policies at their desks. ASEAN leaders finally held their postponed summit and celebrated the entry into force of their much-maligned Charter. Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visited Washington to underscore that the U.S. and Australia are still “mates,” even as his reluctance to send more combat forces to Afghanistan foreshadowed the difficulty President Obama faces in getting allies to sign up for his “surge” there. Finally, economic forecasts kept being adjusted downward as Asian leaders prepared for the G20 summit in London in hopes that this would bring a turnaround.
Topic:
Security, Government, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, South Korea, London, and Australia