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1. Displacement and the Vulnerability to Mobilize for Violence: Evidence from Afghanistan

Author:
Sadaf Lakhani and Rahmatullah Amiri
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Forced displacement affects over 70 million people worldwide and is among the most pressing humanitarian and development challenges today. This report attempts to ascertain whether a relationship exists between displacement in Afghanistan and vulnerability to recruitment to violence by militant organizations. The report leverages an understanding of this relationship to provide recommendations to government, international donors, and others working with Afghanistan’s displaced populations to formulate more effective policies and programs.
Topic:
Development, Taliban, Violent Extremism, Radicalization, Displacement, Violence, and Mobility
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Central Asia

2. Taking Stock of the Taliban’s Perspectives on Peace

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? On 29 February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement meant to prompt peace talks between the militant group and the Afghan government. Many issues have delayed those talks, including widespread concerns about the Taliban’s willingness to compromise in a political settlement ending the war. Why does it matter? The U.S.-Taliban deal opened a fragile window of opportunity to settle the world’s deadliest conflict. But for talks among Afghans to progress, the Taliban will need to move beyond vague governing principles and put forth concrete negotiating positions on reconciliation, power sharing and governance. What should be done? The Taliban should swiftly determine clear negotiating positions and be prepared to debate – and eventually reach compromises – on these as intra-Afghan talks unfold. The U.S. and other donors should leverage prospects of post-transition assistance as encouragement, while the Afghan government and civil society should engage the group and its ideas.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, Taliban, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

3. Twelve Ideas to Make Intra-Afghan Negotiations Work

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Eighteen years after the U.S. war with Afghanistan’s Taliban began, all sides are taking the first formal steps toward a political settlement. From designating a neutral mediator to agreeing on “rules of the road”, Crisis Group lays out twelve prerequisites for keeping the talks going. What’s new? On 29 February, the U.S. and Taliban signed an agreement on a phased U.S. military drawdown, Taliban guarantees to sever ties with terrorist groups, and swift initiation of peace negotiations among Afghan parties to the war. These intra-Afghan negotiations could commence as soon as 10 March. Why does it matter? Intra-Afghan negotiations would be the first formal step to politically settle Afghanistan’s conflict since the U.S. toppled the Taliban regime in 2001. The U.S.-Taliban deal sets the stage for those talks, but it does not resolve issues among the Afghan parties that could prevent them from making progress. What should be done? All parties have crucial preparations to make, both before intra-Afghan negotiations start and during the talks’ early stages. Crisis Group has identified twelve key points that could make the difference between a successful beginning to a peace process and delays or early stagnation.
Topic:
War, Taliban, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

4. India’s Role in Afghan Peace Process

Author:
Ghulam Mustafa, Aamir Junaid, Rana Basam Khan, and Imran Wakil
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The disastrous event of 9/11 changed the Political and Security dynamics of the world. The event of 9/11 provided a chance for India to enter into Afghanistan. Afghanistan attracts the world powers due to its strategic importance. Afghanistan is a gateway to the energy rich Central Asian Republics. India’s involvement in Afghanistan is quite realistic. India had never established cordial relations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The event of 9/11 gave India a chance to establish cordial relations with the Afghan political government. India participated in the Bonn Conference and announced its support for the people of Afghanistan in the reconstruction of the country. India enjoyed its best relations with the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani in Kabul. India enhanced its ties with Iran to secure its interest in Afghanistan and to counter Pakistan. India and Iran have some common interests in Afghanistan. New Delhi has invested a big amount in various sectors in Afghanistan to enhance its influence in Afghan society. India has worked hard to facilitate Afghan Nationals to boost its soft power. India now influences the internal politics of Afghanistan. The world considers India a major market in South Asia. India’s presence in Afghanistan has always been a source of worry for Pakistan. Pakistan considers India’s presence in Afghanistan a threat to its National Security. Pakistan thinks India should work for the betterment of Afghan people but she should avoid using Afghan soil against Pakistan. Pakistan has already suffered a lot due to the disturbance in Afghanistan. Peaceful Afghanistan is in the favor of South Asia and for the Global Powers. This paper focuses on the Indian presence in Afghanistan and India’s role to bring peace in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Taliban, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and India

5. Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: Drawing on the Bank of Tradition

Author:
Scott Smith
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Many times over the past century, Afghan political elites have utilized a loya jirga, or grand national assembly, when they have needed to demonstrate national consensus. Based on traditional village jirgas convened to resolve local disputes, loya jirgas have been used to debate and ratify constitutions, endorse the country's position and alliances in times of war, and discuss how and when to engage the Taliban in peace talks. In light of the growing political uncertainty in Afghanistan, this report examines the strengths and weaknesses of the loya jirga as an institution for resolving national crises.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Taliban, Democracy, Crisis Management, Peace, and Jirga
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Central Asia

6. Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy

Author:
Ashley Jackson and Rahmatullah Amiri
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The system of shadow Taliban governance and the experiences of civilians subject to it are well documented. The policies that guide this governance and the factors that contribute to them, however, are not. This report examines how the Taliban make and implement policy. Based on more than a hundred interviews and previously unreleased Taliban documents, this report offers rare insight into Taliban decision-making processes and the factors that influence them.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Governance, Taliban, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Central Asia

7. Options for Reintegrating Taliban Fighters in an Afghan Peace Process

Author:
Deedee Derksen
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A central issue for Afghanistan in achieving stability is making long-lasting peace with the Taliban. The success of any such agreement will depend in large part on whether Taliban commanders and fighters can assume new roles in Afghan politics, the security forces, or civilian life. This report explores that question, drawing on lessons from how similar situations unfolded in Burundi, Tajikistan, and Nepal.
Topic:
Taliban, Violent Extremism, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Central Asia, Tajikistan, Nepal, and Burundi

8. Perspectives on Peace from Taliban Areas of Afghanistan

Author:
Ashley Jackson
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Notably absent from the debate around peace in Afghanistan are the voices of those living in parts of the country that have borne the brunt of the fighting since 2001—particularly those living in areas under Taliban control or influence. This report provides insight into how Afghan men and women in Taliban-influenced areas view the prospects for peace, what requirements would have to be met for local Taliban fighters to lay down their arms, and how views on a political settlement and a future government differ between Taliban fighters and civilians.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Taliban, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Central Asia

9. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 11 Issue 04: South Asian Militant Landscape in the Context of the Pulwama Attack and its Aftermath

Author:
Damien D. Cheong, Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Sara Mahmood, Abdul Basit, Neo Loo Seng, and Farhan Zahid
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The suicide attack on India’s paramilitary Central Reserved Police Force (CRPF) in Kashmir’s Pulwama district has once again exposed the sharp fault-lines between India and Pakistan, pushing them to the brink of war. The February 2019 attack, claimed by Pakistan-based anti-India militant group, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), killed 40 CRPF personnel. This attack and its aftermath underscores a new phase of militancy in violence-ridden Kashmir and renewed hostilities between India and Pakistan. India’s retaliatory airstrikes on alleged JeM camps inside mainland Pakistan (after a hiatus of five decades) have redefined the conflict threshold. In 1999, even at the height of the Kargil crisis between the two states, the Indian air force did not cross the Line of Control. Indian airstrikes signal a qualitative shift in the Indian position from the strategy of deterrence-by-denial to deterrence-by-punishment. Consequently, this will result in a new unstable equilibrium, lowering the threshold of a low-intensity, limited conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Moreover, the absence of a functional India-Pakistan crisis management mechanism further increases the probability of a limited conflict. The United States (US) and international community’s response to the Pulwama attack and its aftermath is also pertinent. Instead of urging both India and Pakistan to desist from escalation, for the first time, the US and international community acknowledged India’s right of self-defence and emphasised de-escalation only after Indian airstrikes on alleged JeM camps in Balakot. Barring China, no other country condemned India’s violation of Pakistani sovereignty. This will have long-term implications on strategic stability and balance of power in South Asia. The Pulwama attack has also witnessed emergence of new interlocutors in India-Pakistan tensions such as China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. JeM has 40,000 trained militants in its ranks and returned to Kashmir in 2016 with the Pathankot air base attack. Between then and the Pulwama attack, it has increased its activities and presence in parts of Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir (IAJK). The use of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) to hit a military convoy in a highly-militarised zone like Kashmir shows JeM’s enhanced operational capabilities. Accumulating 80 kilograms of highly explosive ‘RDX’ and preparing a VBIED signify the expertise of JeM’s cadres. The suicide bomber Adil Rashid Dar was a local Kashmiri, whom JeM had recruited by exploiting his anger and quest for revenge against the Indian state to serve its agenda of ‘liberating’ Kashmir. After witnessing a dip between 2008 and 2013, violence and militant recruitment have spiked in Kashmir since 2015. The number of militants killed in Kashmir rose from 130 in 2016 to 200 in 2017 and 240 in 2018. In the first two months of 2019, 31 militants have been killed in Kashmir. At the policy level, Pakistan’s response to the JeM threat is critical. Kinetic measures against militant groups such as sanctions, arrests and crackdowns, helpful in the short-term, need to be supplemented. Non-kinetic measures like an effective counter ideological narrative and a comprehensive de-radicalisation and rehabilitation plan would be necessary to create incentives for JeM members to shun militancy. The larger question is how will Pakistan create a counter ideological narrative against JeM without compromising on the state’s identical stance on Kashmir? Moreover, effective rehabilitation of a large number of militants will require massive time and resources and a strong political will by the Pakistani military and political leadership. In 2002, when the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf banned JeM and took action against its cadres, the group retaliated with two assassination attempts on him, alongside several high-profile attacks inside Pakistan. In the event of another round of crackdowns initiated against JeM, a serious backlash cannot be ruled out. Moreover, if JeM splinters as a result of heavy-handed crackdowns, some of its members might gravitate towards terror groups like Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). India and Pakistan, beyond proxy warfare, will have to dispassionately discuss the security challenges arising out of various terrorist groups operating in the region. India and Pakistan will have to create joint counter-terrorism and counter-extremism frameworks to overcome the challenge of militancy, notwithstanding who launched and supported these groups since the 1980s. Against this backdrop, the current issue features four articles looking at different aspects of the Pulwama attack and its aftermath. In the first article, Farhan Zahid traces the background and current status of JeM and its founder Maulana Masood Azhar. The author maintains that Azhar’s ideology had a significant impact on the evolution of Kashmir’s militant landscape. Headquartered in Pakistani Punjab’s Bahawalpur province, JeM has longstanding ties and nexuses with other militant groups in the region such as Al-Qaeda (AQ), the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). These ties have allowed JeM to evade bans and crackdowns from the Pakistani security forces in the past. Notwithstanding information that Azhar is critically ill and his brother Mufti Abdul Rauf Asghar and brother-in-law Qari Talha are running JeM’s day-to-day operations, the author emphasises the need to create counter-narratives against Azhar’s violent ideology. The second article by Muhammad Sinan Siyech dissects the Pulwama attack using Louise Richardson’s conceptual framework of the Three Rs (Revenge, Renown and Reaction). According to the author, the Pulwama attack manifested all three Rs making it a highly successful attack for the JeM. The suicide bomber was seeking revenge for repeated arrests and humiliation faced at the hands of Indian security forces. JeM also drew maximum attention from mainstream and social media in the aftermath of the attack. The attack centre-staged Kashmir as a core dispute between India and Pakistan and a nuclear flashpoint that needed serious international attention. It also prompted immediate reactions from India in the form of retaliatory airstrikes on JeM camps in Balakot, escalation of India-Pakistan tensions and stringent security measures in Kashmir. The author argues that such security measures in Kashmir would likely provide JeM with fresh recruits and funding. To mitigate this likelihood, there is need to examine India’s domestic responses in Kashmir, with continued diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to take action against anti-India militant groups. It is also necessary to strengthen international ties to ensure timely information and intelligence sharing to curtail terrorist networks and their financing. The next article by Damien Chong and Neo Loo Seng discusses whether Kashmir could turn into a future bastion for the Islamic State (IS) akin to Marawi in the Philippines in the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack. Various arguments are discussed for and against such a scenario. On one hand, continued violence, socio-economic and political instability in Kashmir, similar to the situation in Marawi in 2017, are pull factors for transnational threat groups such as IS. This is particularly in light of the recent collapse of IS’ territories in Syria/Iraq prompting it to re-group elsewhere. Proponents of the contending view argue that such an outcome is implausible as threat groups have thus far failed to effectively exploit the Kashmir conflict, given it is framed as a territorial and political dispute as opposed to an Islamist conflict. By assessing a broad spectrum of scenarios, the article discusses the pitfalls of the Marawi case and how they can be avoided in Kashmir. The last article by Abdul Basit and Sara Mahmood looks at the security and geopolitical implications of possible US withdrawal from Afghanistan on South Asia’s complex and diverse militant landscape in the context of the Pulwama attack. After 9/11, the US presence in Afghanistan had kept India-Pakistan tensions under control to ensure Islamabad’s cooperation in the border areas to track and hunt AQ remnants. A case in point is the US-brokered 2003 cease fire agreement between India and Pakistan. Now that the war in Afghanistan is nearing its end, tensions between the two South Asian nuclear rivals over Kashmir threaten to provide fresh fuel for regional militancy and bilateral tensions to persist. It seems that several militant groups like JeM which diverted their fighters to Afghanistan after 9/11 to assist the Afghan Taliban in fighting the US are now returning to their old conflict zones through incidents like the Pulwama attack. The Afghan Taliban’s perceived victory in Afghanistan will create a triumphant jihadist narrative for a plethora of militant groups in the region, giving them new zeal and fervour which will make the South Asian militant landscape more lethal and violent.
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, Kashmir, and Southeast Asia

10. Afghanistan Ahead of the Next Turbulent Presidential Election

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The U.S. cancellation of peace talks with the Taliban means that the presidential election in Afghanistan planned for 28 September will take place in an environment of an escalating civil war. The most important challenge for the authorities is to ensure the security and credibility of the electoral process. Although the elections carry the risk of deepening the internal political crisis, they can also strengthen the position of the new president in possible government negotiations with the Taliban, which would give the country a chance to launch an intra-Afghan peace process. Western partners can support this approach by confirming their support for the new authorities and intensifying military pressure on the Taliban.
Topic:
Security, Government, Elections, Taliban, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia