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121. A Worst Case Scenario? Assessing the Impact of a Complete ISAF Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
As the U.S. begins implementing an expected 2014 drawdown in Afghanistan, speculation abounds about what Afghanistan will look like if left in the hands of its national security forces (ANSF). Many analysts have argued that the Taliban will easily take control of their Pashtun homeland in southern Afghanistan. This result is attributed to the Taliban’s provision of shadow governance, its support from Pakistan, its relative success versus ISAF forces in the south, and the general weakness of the Afghan government, both politically and militarily. Though this result may not be so straightforward, there is a significant question of what a conflict would look like following such an outcome. In short, would the Taliban be able to take the rest of the country, or would the ANSF be able to hold off an advance?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

122. Optimism and Obstacles in India-Pakistan Peace Talks

Author:
Stephanie Flamenbaum and Megan Neville
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Following March 2011's “cricket diplomacy,” there is reason to be optimistic about progress on South Asian normalization as India and Pakistan have resumed bilateral dialogues. Improved relations are critical to U.S. interests in South Asia with respect to the stabilization of Afghanistan, reduction in Pakistan-based militant threats, and alleviation of regional nuclear tensions. Terrorism and the Kashmir issue remain the most toxic points of divergence which could derail progress as in past bilateral talks. Bilateral economic agreements should be pursued in order to enable commercial progress to facilitate political reconciliation. With the looming drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014, and the subsequent shift in the regional power balance, it is imperative that the international community utilize its leverage to ensure that Pakistan-India talks progress.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, and India

123. The Paradox of Proximity: India's approach to fragility in the neighbourhood

Author:
Nitin Pai
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The risks posed by fragile states have moved to the centre-stage of Western security consciousness only in recent years, fundamentally as the result of globalisation and precipitously due to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The threats posed by fragile states to the Western countries are palpable and proximate-for instance, in the form of terrorist plots, influx of refugees and organised crime-but the origins of the threats are relatively remote. Western policymakers and publics, therefore, enjoy a certain geographical and temporal insulation, not only allowing for detached analysis but also allowing a broader range of policy options.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Development, International Affairs, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
United States, South Asia, and India

124. Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future

Author:
Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In recent years, Pakistan has stumbled from one crisis to another. A number of political and socioeconomic challenges threaten to further destabilize a country that already is reeling from insurgencies along its northwestern border. Pakistan's newest democratic government is struggling to maintain control over parts of its territory where militant religious groups are intent on challenging its authority and legitimacy. The country's conflict with India over Kashmir, now in its seventh decade, appears as intractable as ever, and the war in neighboring Afghanistan has deepened instability throughout Pakistan. The transition from a near-decade-long rule under a military dictatorship is slow and complicated, as rampant corruption and politicization of the bureaucracy present huge obstacles to the state-building process.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Development, Economics, Education, and Health Care Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

125. Re-energising the India-Russia Relationship: Opportunities and Challenges for the 21st Century

Author:
Katherine Foshko
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
This paper assesses the India-Russia relationship in today’s context and explains why it is time for the two countries to re-energise the bilateral. Contemporary scholarly publications on the Indian-Russian relationship almost invariably mention Raj Kapoor‘s films and Indian tea—both wildly popular in the Soviet Union decades ago—and, going further back in time, often recollect hoary anecdotes about Rabindranath Tagore‘s closeness with Leo Tolstoy. These images accurately reflect the historically close bonds between India and Russia, but also say little about what the relationship signifies for the two generations of Indians and Russians that were born or came of age after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Discussions of the India-Russia partnership in policy circles likewise are still too often shrouded in the mists of nostalgia for the close diplomatic, military, commercial, and cultural ties of the Cold War years with little reference to the new realities in both nations. Yet, much of the oratory rooted in the rich history between the Soviet Union and India does not translate into pragmatic prescriptions for re-energising a relationship that, while truly privileged, is showing multiple signs of structural challenges and inertial thinking. These bilateral ties need strengthening which should come from a more active involvement not just from scholars but also political, media, and, critically, corporate figures. The Indo-Russian marriage is long past its youthful bloom and must at this point be based on realistic assessments of mutual strengths and opportunities as opposed to idealized and impracticable mythologizing about the bright future of “Hindustan-Russia Bhai Bhai.” On Dec 20, Ronen Sen, the former Indian Ambassador to Russia, the U.K. Germany and the United States, released Gateway House’s report on re-energising the India-Russia relationship. Addressing the progress in India-Russia relations over the past year – 30 MoU’s were signed, two Russian nuclear reactors were set up in India and visa regimes have been eased considerably- the report suggests measures to lift the relationship from the benign neglect of the past.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Gas, Investment, Trade, Soviet Union, Pipeline, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, and India

126. 9/11: Ten Years Later

Author:
Gateway House
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
On September 12, 2001, a day after 9/11, the Times of India published a story titled, ―India hopes U.S. will now pressurise Pak.‖ At the time, this relayed a common national sentiment – India may finally get the United States to become a close ally against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, and help India in eradicating terrorism. Ten years hence, neither has the U.S. taken a position against Pakistan, nor has India prepared itself better to fight terrorism and insurgency on its home ground. A massive explosion at the Delhi High Court this week left at least 14 dead and some 60 injured. It served as a horrific reminder that India continues to be at the receiving end of terrorism. This is the third major terrorist attack in Delhi since 9/11, following the one on Parliament on December 2001 and another at the Sarojini Nagar Market in October 2005. Mumbai has seen similar attacks with the serial blasts in March 1993, train bombings in July 2006, the 26/11 attacks of November 2008 and coordinate attacks of July 2011. Many more such incidents have taken place across the country in smaller cities like Jaipur and Pune. Yet, rather than designing and executing ways to secure our borders, we remain enamored with the effects of 9/11 and anniversaries of attacks in London, Madrid, and elsewhere. The government‘s response is the same – they had some intelligence, law enforcement was in a state of alert, but there was no actionable intelligence, and of course, somewhere along the chain of command between the Home Minister and the constable on the street, our counter-terrorism strategy was never converted into skills or systems that would prove useful. The usually communicative, media-friendly politicians have no comment to give, reflecting only their incapability or worse, indifference. The media gives it due importance for 24 hours, then in the absence of any new information from the government or the public, moves on to other news-worthy items.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Borders, and 9/11
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

127. Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan

Author:
David J. Bercuson, J. L. Granatstein, and Nancy Pearson Mackie
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan Canada fought for a decade in Afghanistan, its troops sustaining casualties and inflicting them. The war became progressively more unpopular at home, even while Canadian troops, well trained and well equipped, scored successes in the field. But what were the lessons of the war for Canada’s leaders? Did we secure more influence with our Alliance friends? Were there factors that made battlefield success more difficult to achieve? Were there flaws in the government’s organizational structure? In the goals it sought? Canada first went to Afghanistan in December 2001, dispatching some forty members of its secret Joint Task Force 2 to operate against al Qaeda. Early in 2002, the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry began serving in Kandahar Province with a United States Army division and after six months returned home. In July and August, 2003, the Canadian Forces began to return to Afghanistan in force with some 2000 troops, becoming the largest troop contributor to the Kabul Multinational Brigade under the stillnascent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), operating in the Afghan capital while the United States’ Operation Enduring Freedom had operational control in the rest of Afghanistan. The Canadian role there would last for over two years, and it included key leadership positions in ISAF Headquarters. In late 2003-04 policymakers in Ottawa began to consider a transfer of Canadian troops as part of ISAF’s expansion out of Kabul to cover all of Afghanistan with either civilian- or military-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs would be accompanied by NATO troops tasked to secure them and to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In general, ISAF’s PRT mission aimed to improve the lot of rural Afghans and thus to build closer relations between the people and the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. Another component of the effort to improve Afghan governance was the SAT-A, the Canadian-provided Strategic Advisory Team—Afghanistan that from 2005 to 2008 placed Canadians in key advisory roles with Afghan government ministries. For a variety of reasons, including advice from the Canadian diplomatic, aid, and military leadership in Kabul, the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa believed that Canada ought to establish a Battle Group and PRT presence in Kandahar, beginning in 2006, in order to play a more central, more visible role in Afghan reconstruction. There were some dissenters and the two lead departments jockeyed for control over the Afghan file – and where DND, providing the boots on the ground, including the vast majority of those in the PRT, naturally enough assumed that there should be no contest. But there was general agreement that, with this deployment, Canada would raise its profile in the international community and among its NATO partners (especially the United States) and signal an end to the “human security agenda” period of the Chrétien government. For the Army leadership as well, the Kandahar commitment provided the opportunity to strike squarely at the mythology of peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the desire to help Afghanistan and to achieve political and status gains may have overridden the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was wide open and the Taliban insurgency was beginning to grow in Kandahar and Helmand provinces by late 2005. This was largely ignored until Canada took its first casualty in the new campaign on January 15, 2006 – even before the Canadian area of operations moved south - when diplomat Glyn Berry, who was to run the Canadian PRT from Camp Nathan Smith in a northern suburb of Kandahar City, died in a suicide bomb attack. In total, some 157 Canadian servicemen and women have been killed in Afghanistan, along with an undeclared, but large, number of soldiers wounded.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Canada, and North America

128. How Obama Can Get South Asia Right

Author:
C. Raja Mohan
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
One of the major contributions of Barack Obama's presidential campaign during 2007—08 was his political success in shifting the focus of the U.S. foreign policy debate away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan. The reversal of fortunes in the two major wars that President George W. Bush had embarked upon during his tenure (a steady improvement in the military situation in Iraq during the last two years of the Bush administration and the rapidly deteriorating one in Afghanistan) helped Obama to effectively navigate the foreign policy doldrums that normally sink the campaigns of Democratic candidates in U.S. presidential elections. Throughout his campaign, Obama insisted that the war on terror that began in Afghanistan must also end there. He attacked Bush for taking his eyes off the United States' ''war of necessity,'' embarking on a disastrous ''war of choice'' in Iraq, and promised to devote the U.S. military and diplomatic energies to a region that now threatened U.S. interests and lives: the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and South Asia

129. Pakistan and the Future of U.S. Policy

Author:
Malou Innocent
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
A spreading Islamic insurgency engulfs the amorphous and ungoverned border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. After initial victories by the United States and the Northern Alliance in autumn 2001, hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters fled Afghanistan to seek refuge across the border in Pakistan's rugged northwest. Since 2007, the number of ambushes, militant offensives, and targeted assassinations has risen sharply across Afghanistan, while suicide bombers and pro-Taliban insurgents sweep through settled areas of Pakistan at an alarming pace. For better and for worse, Pakistan will remain the fulcrum of U.S. policy in the region—its leaders continue to provide vital counterterrorism cooperation and have received close to $20 billion in assistance from the United States, yet elements associated with its national intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, covertly assist militant proxy groups destabilizing the region
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Islam, and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, and Asia

130. Indian Involvement in Afghanistan: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block to Regional Hegemony?

Author:
Melanie Hanif
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Due to its geo-strategic location between the Central Asian, South Asian, and Middle Eastern security complexes, Afghanistan is often defined as an insulator state, and sometimes also as a connector. This in-between position has led to constant instability: ever since the creation of the Durrani Empire, the country has suffered from internal power struggles as well as outside interference. External attempts to control Afghanistan have nonetheless proven extremely difficult. This also holds true for the current conflict management efforts of the US-led coalition. But what could the alternatives be? This paper seeks to explore the prospect of regional security cooperation as a path towards stability for Afghanistan. Although the academic debate has thus far not considered Afghanistan as a primarily South Asian country, I will focus on the South Asian subsystem for three reasons: Firstly, current security matters in Afghanistan are highly connected to the situation in Pakistan. Secondly, with its accession to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Afghanistan has shown an interest in establishing stronger ties with South Asia. Thirdly, India as a rising regional power is the only country in the region that might possess the capabilities, the willingness, and the legitimacy for a long-term engagement in Afghan security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and Asia