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291. Cocaine Cities: Exploring the Relationship between Urban Processes and the Drug Trade in South America

Author:
Ignacio A. Navarro
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
The relationship between the cocaine trade and urban land markets in South America has been overlooked by the mainstream economics and urban studies literature. This paper examines two avenues through which the cocaine trade can have a large impact on urban development in producer countries: (i) through an employment multiplier effect similar to that of other legal exports, and (ii) through money laundering using urban real estate. We test our hypotheses using the Bolivian case and find that urban growth patterns are closely related to fluctuations in cocaine production. Further, even though our estimates suggest that the cocaine trade affects urban growth through the two avenues presented in the paper, we find that formal urban employment generated by the cocaine trade has a modest effect on urban growth and most of the effect seems to be explained by money laundering using real estate and other paths.
Topic:
Corruption, Crime, Narcotics Trafficking, and Urbanization
Political Geography:
South America and Latin America

292. Irregular Urbanization as a Catalyst for Radical Social Mobilization: The Case of the Housing Movements of São Paulo

Author:
Lucy Earle
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This study focuses on the city of São Paulo, Brazil and examines the ways in which irregular and illegal growth have influenced the collective action of social movements of the urban poor. The study describes how São Paulo grew as a socially segregated city during the twentieth century due to calculated neglect on the part of the municipal authorities. Highlighting the city's sociospatial inequality, degradation of the central districts and widespread irregularity, it illustrates how these factors have both negatively affected the urban poor and provided a catalyst for social mobilization.
Topic:
Poverty, Social Stratification, Social Movement, and Urbanization
Political Geography:
South America and Latin America

293. The Post-American Hemisphere

Author:
Russell Crandall
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
On August 18, 2010, a Venezuelan drug trafficker named Walid Makled was arrested in Colombia. U.S. officials accused him of shipping ten tons of cocaine a month to the United States, and they made a formal extradition request to try him in New York. Although the Venezuelan government had also made an extradition request for crimes Makled allegedly committed in Venezuela, senior U.S. diplomats were confident that the Colombian government would add him to the list of hundreds of suspects it had already turned over to U.S. judicial authorities in recent years. So it came as a surprise when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced in November that he had promised Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez that Makled would be extradited to Venezuela, not the United States. Colombia, Washington's closest ally in South America, appeared to be unveiling a new strategic calculus, one that gave less weight to its relationship with Washington. What made the decision all the more unexpected is that the U.S. government still provides Colombia with upward of $500 million annually in development and security assistance, making Colombia one of the world's top recipients of U.S. aid. For the United States in Latin America today, apparently, $500 million just does not buy what it used to. Across the region in recent years, the United States has seen its influence decline. Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the United States and seeking friends and opportunities outside of Washington's orbit. Some U.S. allies are even reconsidering their belief in the primacy of relations with the United States. Much of this has to do with the end of the Cold War, a conflict that turned Latin America into a battleground between U.S. and Soviet proxies. Washington has also made a series of mistakes in the years since then, arrogantly issuing ultimatums that made it even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America.
Topic:
Cold War
Political Geography:
United States, New York, Washington, Colombia, South America, and Latin America

294. One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize

Author:
Matias Spektor
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Americas Quarterly
Institution:
Council of the Americas
Abstract:
Read any Brazilian foreign policy college textbook and you will be surprised. Global order since 1945 is not described as open, inclusive or rooted in multilateralism. Instead, you learn that big powers impose their will on the weak through force and rules that are strict and often arbitrary. In this world view, international institutions bend over backwards to please their most powerful masters. International law, when it is used by the strong, is less about binding great powers and self-restraint than about strong players controlling weaker ones. After finishing the book, you couldn't be blamed for believing that the liberal international order has never established the just, level playing field for world politics that its supporters claim. This intellectual approach is responsible for the ambiguity at the heart of Brazilian strategic thinking. On one hand, Brazil has benefited enormously from existing patterns of global order. It was transformed from a modest rural economy in the 1940s into an industrial powerhouse less than 50 years later, thanks to the twin forces of capitalism and an alliance system that kept it safe. On the other hand, the world has been a nasty place for Brazil. Today, it is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Millions still live in poverty and violence abounds. In 2009, there were more violent civilian deaths in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone than in the whole of Iraq. No doubt a fair share of the blame belongs to successive generations of Brazilian politicians and policymakers. But some of it is a function of the many inequities and distortions that recur when you are on the “periphery” of a very unequal international system. The result is a view of global order that vastly differs from perceptions held by the United States. Take, for instance, Brazilian perceptions of “international threats.” Polls show that the average Brazilian worries little about terrorism, radical Islam or a major international war. Instead, the primary fears concern climate change, poverty and infectious disease. Many Brazilians, in fact, fear the U.S., focusing in particular on the perceived threat it poses to the natural riches of the Amazon and the newfound oil fields under the Brazilian seabed. Perceptions matter enormously. It is no wonder that the Brazilian military spends a chunk of its time studying how Vietnamese guerrillas won a war against far superior forces in jungle battlefields. Nor should it be a surprise that Brazil is now investing heavily in the development of nuclear-propulsion submarines that its admirals think will facilitate the nation's ability to defend oil wells in open waters. But Brazil is nowhere near being a revolutionary state. While its leaders believe that a major transition of global power is currently underway, they want to be seen as smooth operators when new rules to the game emerge. Their designs are moderate because they have a stake in preserving the principles that underwrite Brazil's emergence as a major world player. They will not seek to radically overturn existing norms and practices but to adapt them to suit their own interests instead. Could Brazilian intentions change over time? No doubt. Notions of what constitutes the national interest will transform as the country rises. Brazil's international ambitions are likely to expand—no matter who runs the country. Three factors will shape the way national goals will evolve in the next few years: the relationship with the U.S., Brasilia's strategies for dealing with the rest of South America, and Brazil's ideas about how to produce global order. When it Comes to the U.S., Lie Low Brazilian officials are used to repeating that to be on the U.S. “radar screen” is not good. In their eyes, being the source of American attention poses two possible threats. It either raises expectations in Washington that Brazil will work as a “responsible stakeholder” according to some arbitrary criteria of what “responsible” means, or it turns Brazil into a target of U.S. pressure when interests don't coincide. As a result, there is a consensus among Brazilians that a policy of “ducking”—hiding your head underwater when the hegemonic eagle is around—has served them well. Whether this judgment is correct or not is for historians to explore. But the utility of a policy based on such a consensus is declining fast. You cannot flex your diplomatic muscle abroad and hope to go unnoticed. Furthermore, being a “rising state” is never a mere function of concrete things, such as a growing economy, skilled armies, mighty industries, a booming middle class, or a functional state that is effective in tax collection and the provision of public goods. The perception of other states matters just as much. And nobody's perception matters more than that of the most powerful state of all: the United States. Brazil's current rise is therefore deeply intertwined with the perception in Washington that Brazil is moving upwards in global hierarchies. Securing the acceptance or the implicit support of the U.S. while maintaining some distance will always be a fragile position to maintain. But as Brazil grows more powerful, it will be difficult to accomplish its global objectives without the complicity—and the tacit acceptance—of the United States. For Brazil this means that the “off the radar” option will become increasingly difficult. Not the Natural Regional Leader Brazil accounts for over 50 percent of South America's wealth, people and territory. If power were a product of relative material capabilities alone, Brazil would be more powerful in its own region than China, India, Turkey or South Africa are in theirs. But Brazil is not your typical regional power. It has sponsored layers of formal institutions and regional norms, but its leaders recoil at the thought of pooling sovereignty into supranational bodies. Yes, Brazil has modernized South American politics by promoting norms to protect democracy and to establish a regional zone of peace, but its efforts at promoting a regional sense of shared purposes have been mixed and, some say, halfhearted at best. Brazilian public opinion and private-sector business increasingly doubt the benefits of deep regional integration with neighbors, and plans for a South American Free Trade Zone have gone asunder. And yes, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1998 to 2007, Brazil spent far more on its armed forces than Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela combined. Yet, Brazil's ability to project military power abroad remains minimal. The end result is that many challenge the notion that Brazil is a regional leader. From the perspective of smaller neighboring countries, it remains a country that is too hard to follow sometimes. If you are sitting on its borders, as 10 South American nations do, you find it difficult to jump on its bandwagon. This is problematic for Brazil. As a major and growing regional creditor, investor, consumer, and exporter, its own economic fate is interconnected with that of its neighbors. Crises abroad impact its banks and companies at home as never before. Populism, ethnic nationalism, narcotics trafficking, guerrilla warfare, deforestation, unlawful pasturing, economic decay, and political upheaval in neighbors will deeply harm Brazilian interests. Whether, when and how Brazil will develop the policy instruments to shape a regional order beneficial to itself remains to be seen. But curiously enough, Brazilian leaders do not normally think their interests in South America might converge with those of the United States. On the contrary, Brazil in the twenty-first century has geared its regional policies to deflect, hedge, bind, and restrain U.S. power in South America to the extent that it can. This is not to say that Brazil is a stubborn challenger of U.S. interests in the region. That would be silly for a country whose success depends on the perception of economic gain and regional stability. But it means that future generations of Brazilians might discover that if they want to unlock some of the most pressing problems in the region, perhaps they will have to reconsider their attitude towards the United States...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Law, and Islam
Political Geography:
United States, America, Washington, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, South America, Venezuela, and Chile

296. Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Daniel Flemes and Thorsten Wojczewski
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Given the importance of the assertion or prevention of regional leadership for the future global order, this paper examines the strategies and resources being used to assert regional leadership as well as the reactions of other states within and outside the respective regions. Secondary powers play a key role in the regional acceptance of a leadership claim. In this article we identify the factors motivating secondary powers to accept or contest this claim. Three regional dyads, marked by different degrees of “contested leadership,” are analyzed: Brazil vs. Venezuela, Indis vs. Pakistan, and South Africa vs. Nigeria. The research outcomes demonstrate that the strategies of regional powers and the reactions of secondary powers result from the distribution of material capabilities and their application, the regional powers' ability to project ideational resources, the respective national interests of regional and secondary powers, and the regional impact of external powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Globalization, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, South Asia, India, Brazil, South America, Venezuela, and Nigeria

297. Sustainable security in Latin America and the Caribbean

Author:
Ben Zala
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
This report summarises the analysis from a consultation of specialists on Latin America and the Caribbean applying the concept of sustainable security at a regional level. Hosted by Oxford Research Group (ORG) and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (Noref), the recommendations include: Addressing political fragmentation in order to provide the capacity to respond effectively to the security challenges of climate change, militarisation and increasingly marginalised populations. A number of regional powers - particularly Brazil - are well placed to provide leadership but it would require a national consensus on a regional leadership role at a time when Brazil's focus is on developing a stronger global role; Initiatives such as the South American Defence Council should be given top priority in foreign and defence policies and their institutionalisation should be adequately funded and supported by all member states; New policy options are needed in the short-medium term to combat increasing environmental stresses and resource depletion; States across the region need to regain public confidence in relation to their ability to meet the security needs of their populations without resorting to military force. This will need to include steps to de-militarise the police, intelligence agencies and policies to limit the general remit as well as specific missions of the armed forces; Over the next 5-10 years, a radical shift towards sustainable approaches to security will be hugely important. If there is no change in thinking, security policies will continue to be based on the assumption that an elite minority can maintain its position, environmental problems can be marginalised, and the lid can be kept on dissent and insecurity.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, and Crime
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, Latin America, and Caribbean

298. Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy

Author:
Hal Brands
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. During Lula's nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a multipronged grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from unipolarity and Western economic hegemony to a multipolar order in which international rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing against the United States, building coalitions to magnify Brazilian negotiating power, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Brazil, South America, and Latin America

299. Brazil in Haiti: the challenges ahead

Author:
Monica Hirst
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
In light of the January 2010 earthquake, Brazil\'s decision to contribute immediate humanitarian assistance and long-term reconstruction in Haiti is not a new challenge. The mandate fits seamlessly into the existing foreign policy priorities of the Lula administration. Brazil has sent dozens of medical professionals as well as food, water and first aid supplies to Haiti, along with a donation of $18.8 million of which $5 million have already been delivered to the UN. Brazil is determined to be a leader in the international reconstruction efforts in Haiti, aligning itself with other bilateral donors and multilateral agencies. The South American nation\'s intentions to lead the efforts are clear, with the Brazilian foreign minister suggesting a proposed Marshall Plan for Haiti be reconsidered as a “Lula Plan”.
Topic:
Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, United Nations, Caribbean, and Haiti

300. Discurso y narración en las dinámicas de cons-titución identitaria. La experiencia kirchnerista en Argentina

Author:
María Mercedes Patrouilleau
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
CONfines de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política
Abstract:
The presidencial discourse has regained interest since the current theory of populism, and in Agentina spe-cially from discursive interpellation of its main leaders in last years, Néstor Kirchner y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. This work examines discoursive interpellation of both leaders emphasizing the narrative dimension of discourse. Kirchnerismo as political subject proposes a new meaning of traditional elements of the national and popular (and peronism in particular), by the promotion of an “historic citizenship” for argentines and the arti-culation of a political history along a path marked by institutional disruption.
Topic:
Communications and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Argentina and South America