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1. Trump’s tinderbox: US politics and the next war in the Balkans

Author:
Adnan Ćerimagić and Majda Ruge
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over recent years, Serbia’s government and Serb nationalists elsewhere in the Western Balkans have increased their revisionist agitation in the region. They recently adopted an “all-Serb declaration” that seeks to overturn the post-Dayton settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and claims Kosovo as an inseparable part of Serbia. Though some international observers have criticised the Biden administration for its concessions to Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president, it deserves credit for containing Belgrade’s ability to realise its ambitions and preventing two worst-case scenarios: the disintegration of the Bosnian state and armed escalation between Serbia and Kosovo. That fragile status-quo would come under significant threat from a new Trump presidency in the US. Among other risks, his second administration may seek to reverse sanctions that have constrained separatist appetites among Bosnian Serbs and to revive dangerous proposals for a Serbia-Kosovo land swap. Peace in the region is at stake. Particularly in the event of a Trump victory on 5 November, the EU should prepare a package of new deterrence mechanisms that it can apply in the Western Balkans independently from the US and spoiler member states like Hungary. And in either eventuality, it should take more responsibility for stabilising the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Serbia, Balkans, North America, and United States of America

2. Kosovo in Russian Foreign Policy- Discourse Fostering Instability in Kosovo and Countering Euro-Atlantic Integration

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi, Ardit Orana, and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Russian influence and interests in the Western Balkans are primarily centered around Serbia. According to a 2024 survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI), for Kosovar citizens, after Serbia (83%), Russia (8%) is seen as the main threat to the country, while 87% say that the country’s foreign policy should only be pro-European Union and pro-West, and 59% say that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely unjustified. Main takeaways from this paper include: Russia deploys state-controlled media (RT, Sputnik) and partners with Iranian outlets to spread narratives portraying Kosovo as a failed state, full of instability. Russia capitalizes on deep cultural, religious, and political ties with Serbia to maintain influence in the Balkans, utilizing ties with the the Serbian Orthodox Church and with Serbian elites to the detriment of Kosovo. There are indications that Russia had prior knowledge of or involvement in the Banjska terrorist attack in Kosovo, aimed at escalating tensions. By stirring instability in Kosovo, Russia aims to divert Western attention and resources away from Ukraine, creating a multi-front challenge for NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Interests, Instability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Serbia, and Western Balkans

3. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens

Author:
Jelena Pejic Nikic and Predrag Petrovic
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
There are many findings of domestic and foreign research organisations that unequivocally indicate that Serbia is a captured state, with a hybrid political regime. Security institutions play a major role in the capture of the state and the collapse of democracy in Serbia, as well as in preserving the situation the way it is. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) was one the first organisations in Serbia to notice this negative trend; consequently, in 2019 and 2020, we investigated and documented in detail the role of the security intelligence services, the police, the army and private security companies in capturing the state, as well as the impotence of oversight and control bodies. In the research that followed in 2021, we established that the government of the Serbian Progressive Party, led by Aleksandar Vučić, had completed the capture of the state and that today’s security institutions are operating with the aim of preserving such a state of affairs. We also researched the foreign policy aspects of this negative process. Public opinion surveys conducted by BCSP have also established that the majority of the citizens are aware that Serbia is a captured state, i.e. that politicians, organised into interest groups, use state institutions together with financially powerful actors to further strengthen their political and financial power, all to the great detriment of citizens. Since state institutions are deeply captured and the citizens are aware of that fact, we have decided not to further document this process; in this study, we rather tried to determine how to organise the security institutions and strengthen their external overseers so that the security sector can no longer be easy prey for those who are politically and financially powerful. In other words, we wanted to determine how to ensure that security institutions work in the interest of citizens, precisely as the Constitution of Serbia requires. The starting point of this endeavour were the findings of the above mentioned BCSP research, in which we identified the “gray areas” and “veto points” within the security sector, that is, legal and institutional solutions that made it possible to capture these institutions quite easily. We verified the solutions for the reorganisation of these gray areas against the opinions of our interlocutors, former and current employees of the security institutions and the judiciary, diplomats, journalists, attorneys, politicians and representatives of civil society. We verified the solutions for the reorganisation of these gray areas against the opinions of our interlocutors, former and current employees of the security institutions and the judiciary, diplomats, journalists, attorneys, politicians and representatives of civil society. The interviews helped us to confirm, but also to refute our assumptions.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Institutions, and State Capture
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

4. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

5. The politics of dialogue: How the EU can change the conversation in Kosovo and Serbia

Author:
Engjellushe Morina
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU is concerned at rising tensions in the north of Kosovo and the prospect of Russian interference in disputes between Kosovo and Serbia. To address this, the EU drew up a new proposal for engagement between Kosovo and Serbia, which the two sides have agreed to. The agreement makes some progress on the unresolved question of mutual recognition but is not yet a roadmap to full normalisation. Tepid EU efforts to enable Western Balkans states to advance Euro-Atlantic ambitions are part of the reason for the unresolved issues in northern Kosovo. The EU can transform this dynamic by setting out clearer prospects for accession for both Kosovo and Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Normalization, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

6. Balkan Csárdás: Hungarian Foreign Policy Dance

Author:
Srđan Cvijić, Ivana Ranković, Luka Šterić, Maja Bjeloš, and Marko Drajic
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Since Orbán reassumed power in 2010, the Hungarian government has taken a more active role in the Western Balkans. In a short time period, it has increased its political and economic footprint. This paper is one of few all-encompassing efforts to explain Hungarian policy and involvement in the Western Balkans, and it attempts to do so by asking the following questions: What interests and strategic considerations drive Hungarian foreign and trade policy in the region? Who formulates foreign policy priorities in Hungary and what is the interplay between formal and informal actors? What economic interests shape Hungarian foreign policy in the region? How much has Hungarian foreign policy in the region changed as a result of the war in Ukraine? To answer these questions, this paper is divided into four main sections. The first focuses on Hungary’s foreign policy strategy in the region. The second, as a special case study, investigates the effects of Orbán’s minority politics in Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (Vajdaság in Hungarian). The third, researching the Hungarian media empire in the region, and finally the fourth focuses on the economic drivers of Hungary’s approach in the region. The paper builds upon numerous secondary sources and online and in-person interviews conducted with 19 government representatives, politicians, foreign policy experts, scholars, and journalists from Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trade, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Western Balkans

7. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

8. The impact of COVID-19 pandemic on Turkish foreign policy towards the Western Balkans

Author:
Jan Niemiec
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The scientific aim of this paper is to analyse and evaluate actions taken by Turkey’s leading politicians with regard to the Western Balkan states (i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, Turkey has attempted to increase its international influence through diplomatic, economic and cultural measures. Western Balkans region, with which Turks have historical and ethnic ties, is one of the key areas in AKP’s doctrine. Adopting image theory in international relations as the theoretical foundation, this research examines implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Western Balkans in times of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic. By employing available original Turkish sources (academic publications, public reports, press releases), the main objectives of Turkey’s political strategy towards the region have been determined. Detailed analysis of official statements and speeches of Turkish policy-makers was also fundamental for this study. In this context, the values and symbols to which the AKP government refers in its activities in the Western Balkans have been identified. Based on content analysis, comparative analysis and political discourse analysis, this research seeks to explain the rationale of Turkish actions in recent months. As a conclusion, future prospects for Turkey’s involvement in the Western Balkans have been presented and discussed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, COVID-19, Policymaking, and Regional Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Turkey, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia

9. Public Perception of Serbian Foreign Policy in the Midst of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Vuk Vuksanovic, Luka Steric, and Maja Bjelos
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Perception
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, and Balkans

10. Two Opposite Viewpoints: Overview on How Citizens See Kosovar Bilateral Relations with Serbia and with Albania

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Mentor Vrajolli
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report examines the perception of Kosovar citizens on bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and Kosovo and Albania. The report is divided into three chapters: elaborating the findings on citizens’ perceptions regarding ethnic distancing with the two countries, bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and bilateral relations between Kosovo and Albania.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, and Albania