« Previous |
1 - 10 of 64
|
Next »
Number of results to display per page
Search Results
2. Implications of a Security Pact with Saudi Arabia
- Author:
- Paul R. Pillar
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Biden administration is seeking a deal in which Saudi Arabia would extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel in exchange for the United States providing Saudi Arabia a security guarantee, assistance in developing a nuclear program, and more unrestricted arms sales. Such an arrangement would further enmesh the United States in Middle Eastern disputes and intensify regional divisions. It would work against a favorable pattern of regional states working out their differences when the United States leaves them on their own — illustrated by the Chinese-brokered détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Besides being an authoritarian state lacking shared values with the United States, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has aggressively pursued regional dominance, most notably with its highly destructive war in Yemen. A U.S. security guarantee could motivate MBS to engage in even riskier behavior and draw the United States into conflicts in which it has no stake, such as the sectarian dispute that had led Saudi Arabia to break relations with Iran. An expanded Saudi nuclear program would have a military as well as an energy dimension, with MBS having openly expressed interest in nuclear weapons. Granting the Saudi demand for help in enriching uranium would be a blow to the global nonproliferation regime as well as a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy. A race in nuclear capabilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia may result. Meeting MBS’ demands would not curb Saudi relations with China, which are rooted in strong economic and other interests. The United States could compete more effectively with China in the region not by taking on additional security commitments but instead by emulating the Chinese in engaging all regional states in the interest of reducing tensions. Normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would not be a peace agreement, given the already extensive security cooperation between them. Even the gift of normalization with Riyadh would be unlikely to soften Israel’s hard-line positions regarding the war in Gaza and the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and instead would only reduce further Israeli motivation to resolve that conflict.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, National Security, Conflict, Normalization, Joe Biden, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
3. False Dawn: Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Amidst Improved Saudi-Iranian Relations
- Author:
- David Wood
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 17 October 2019, furious protests erupted across Lebanon as citizens came to a shocking realization: the country’s leaders had destroyed the economy. Decades of corruption and mismanagement had emptied the state’s coffers, trig- gering a domestic banking collapse and frittering away many Lebanese residents’ life savings. Now, almost five years later, the situation has only grown worse. The Lebanese lira (LBP) has been devalued to the point of irrelevance, crashing from 1,507.5 LBP for 1 USD to over 140,000 LBP in March 2023. House- holds give up essentials like health insurance to pay for diesel power generators and solar panels, as public electricity provisions—along with many other key state services—barely function.1 Meanwhile, the country’s leaders stubbornly resist implementing much-needed economic reforms, blaming the economic crisis on a wide range of factors, from Syrian refugees to general instability in the Middle East. A regularly proffered excuse emphasizes the role of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose rivalry has periodically played out on Lebanese soil. This theory argues that Lebanon is a “penetrated society,” inextricably tied to and paralyzed by geopolitical competition, including the Saudi–Iranian con- frontation.2 Thus, Lebanese leaders cannot resolve their disputes until these two regional heavyweights, amongst other foreign powers, reconcile their conflicting interests in Lebanon. Regional competition overlays a domestic political structure already prone to deadlock, which rigidly apportions power between Lebanon’s frequently feuding sectarian communities. Accordingly, various Lebanese politicians hoped that improved Iranian-Saudi relations—facilitated in March 2023 by Chinese mediation—would lead to a breakthrough in their ability to tackle Lebanon’s economic meltdown. Yet, this optimistic reading overestimates the extent of Tehran and Riyadh’s cautious détente, which is unlikely to translate into constructive engagement in Lebanon any time soon. It also downplays the true obstacle to Lebanon’s economic reform process: corruption in the country’s own political and financial elite.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Diplomacy, Economic Crisis, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon
4. The Yemen Annual Review 2023
- Author:
- Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia
5. Mending fences: Europe’s stake in the Saudi-Iran detente
- Author:
- Julien Barnes-Dacey and Cinzia Bianco
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Saudi-Iran rivalry has long deepened conflict lines in the Middle East. But growing mutual vulnerabilities prompted a quiet rapprochement, culminating in the 2023 Beijing de-escalation agreement. While it hasn’t led to conflict resolution, this detente has helped contain regional escalation. Dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran remains frequent amid the Gaza crisis and could become even more important after the Israeli killing of Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Europeans should actively support Saudi-Iran engagement as a vital diplomatic path to regional stability, rather than viewing it as Iran’s attempt to evade US sanctions. If Iran’s new leadership is willing to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue and other files, Europeans should see Saudi Arabia as a channel to help facilitate necessary economic relief to Iran as part of any new deal. Europeans could help both countries navigate tension around America’s regional involvement, ensuring Saudi-Israel normalisation does not undermine Saudi-Iran diplomacy. If Iran refuses to enter negotiations and relations with the West deteriorate further, Europeans should still consider Saudi Arabia as a valuable mediator between the West and Iran.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Rapprochement, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia
6. Second Meeting in Beijing: China-Facilitated Iran-Saudi diplomatic reconciliation efforts amid US apprehensions
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- On April 6, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, signed a joint statement in Beijing announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which follows a tripartite agreement signed under China's auspices on March 10.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Reconciliation, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
7. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen
- Author:
- Annelle Sheline
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- • The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
8. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI-IRAN DEAL FOR YEMEN
- Author:
- Marta Furlan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region of northern Yemen, aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been removed following the Arab Spring uprisings. Together, they defeated the government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and established control over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and the entirety of northern Yemen. At that time, Iran began to progressively increase its support for the Houthis, seeing partnership with the group as an opportunity to advance its revisionist agenda in the region and establish its influence in the southern Red Sea, an area of immense strategic significance. Threatened by aggressive Iranian expansionism at its doorstep, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia entered the war alongside Hadi. As Iran sided with the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sided with Hadi, Yemen became the battlefield of both a domestic competition for power between different local factions and a regional competition for influence between Teheran and Riyadh.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, Houthis, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria
9. Is There a Way Forward for Political Resolution in Yemen?
- Author:
- Fatima Abo Alasrar and Ibrahim Jalal
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- Director of MEI's Arabian Peninsula Program Gerald Feierstein speaks to MEI Non-Resident Scholars Fatima Abo Alasrar & Ibrahim Jalal on a host of current events in Yemen. What have been the takeaways from U.S. Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking's recent visit to the country - and what are the current trends in the Saudi-Houthi dialogue?
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Politics, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations
10. Progress toward a breakthrough in Saudi-Israeli relations: ‘Haste is from the Devil’
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The positive and businesslike approach that marked the meeting of the Negev Forum Steering Committee and Working Groups in Abu Dhabi (January 9-10, 2023) proves that the drive to entrench and deepen the Abraham Accords is still ongoing despite the change of government in Israel. Hopes for a breakthrough in Saudi-Israeli relations are also still being nurtured, reflected in practical steps already taken. Moreover, the issue was raised with Jake Sullivan during his visit to Israel. Still, as the Arab saying goes, al-’ajalah min al-shaytan – haste is from the devil – and premature pronouncements have done more harm than good. The change will not come overnight: the Palestinian issue is still a stumbling block, and political dynamics in the Kingdom are complex, at least as long as King Salman still reins in some of his son’s ambitions.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Leadership, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia