Search

Begin New Search Topic Conflict Political Geography Saudi Arabia

31. Don’t throw MBS under the bus

Author:
David M. Weinberg
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Saudi Crown Prince isn’t a democrat or a strategic savior, but don’t give the evil leaders of Turkey and Iran a victory by weakening US-Saudi ties.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

32. Beyond the proxy powder keg: The specter of war between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
An Iran-Saudi Arabia war is unlikely, but it is now more likely than ever before. A military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran should command respect and inspire concern because it could cause tremendous harm to an already volatile Middle East and possibly to the global economy. Iran seems to have an upper hand in a direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia because of its combat experience, geography, manpower, strategic depth, and greater cost tolerance. However, none of these attributes give Iran any decisive advantages in a contest with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is neither helpless nor without military options. While it is easy to start a war with Iran, it is anything but to finish it. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to think hard about the capabilities of the Saudi military and the resilience of Saudi society before embarking on such a risky course. In any war dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. military intervention or support would be the most decisive exogenous factor for both Riyadh and Tehran. The United States has a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the extent to which Washington can tolerate subtle Iranian aggression against the kingdom that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, while potentially upending Saudi stability, is unclear.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

33. Yemen at the UN – June 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In June, the Saudi-led military coalition and associated ground forces began their long-anticipated offensive against Houthi-held Hudaydah city. The ports of Hudaydah and nearby Saleef, along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, are the entry point for the majority of the country’s commercial and humanitarian imports. This creates the potential for catastrophic humanitarian fallout from the offensive given that 8.4 million Yemenis are already on the verge of famine. United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, spent most of June engaged in shuttle diplomacy with the belligerent parties to the conflict, and in consultations with the UN Security Council (UNSC), pushing a plan to preempt the attack by having Houthi forces turn control of Hudaydah port over to UN monitors (see ‘The UN Special Envoy’s Plan for Hudaydah Port’). Griffiths also revealed his new proposed framework for wider peace negotiations to the UNSC. While including some elements that differentiate it from previous UN-led peace initiatives, contentious items that led earlier efforts to fail were carried over into Griffiths’ latest proposed framework (see ‘The Special Envoy’s New Peace Framework’). The UNSC itself held three closed-door sessions regarding Yemen in June. The Swedish mission led calls for the UNSC to demand a halt to the Hudaydah attack, while the United Kingdom and Kuwait were at the forefront of pushing back against this effort, with the latter parties largely being successful. Council products regarding Yemen last month thus amounted to generic statements regarding respect for international humanitarian law and the need to protect civilians (see ‘UNSC Discussions on the Hudaydah Offensive’). In the United States, the White House appeared to give tentative approval to the Hudaydah offensive (see ‘White House Position on the Hudaydah Offensive’), while bipartisan opposition to the campaign was notable in Congress (see ‘Congressional Opposition to the Offensive’ and ‘Senate Passes Bill Making US Refueling of Coalition Aircraft Conditional’). In Yemen, the Hudaydah offensive, dubbed ‘Operation Golden Victory’, was launched on June 13, with the United Arab Emirates in primary command of the campaign, supporting and coordinating between various anti-Houthi ground forces (see ‘The Hudaydah Offensive’). These forces managed to take Hudaydah airport from Houthi fighters before Abu Dhabi announced that it would temporarily suspend the attack to allow the UN Special Envoy an opportunity to pursue negotiations (see ‘UAE Announces Pause in Offensive’). The Hudaydah offensive raised widespread humanitarian concerns and concerns regarding the safety of civilians in the city, while also prompting widespread price spikes for basic commodities. In economic developments last month, the Central Bank of Yemen finalized a framework to support the importation of basic commodities, the Austrian firm OMV restarted tests on wellheads in Shabwa governorate, and the Yemeni government launched a new Internet network in an attempt to supplant the Houthi authorities’ control over the national telecommunications. Also in June, Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi visited the UAE and met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Shortly after, Hadi flew to Aden, the Yemeni government’s current capital in the country, for his first visit in more than a year and a half.
Topic:
Security, Development, Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

34. The Yemen Review – September 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In September, the Yemeni rial’s recent decline accelerated precipitously, with the currency’s value dropping to record lows by month’s end. While the rial has been under multiple, intensifying pressures stemming from the war for several years, a large increase in the money supply – through a 30 percent increase in civil servant salaries – and the collapse of peace talks last month appear to have spurred a rial sell-off in the market (see ‘Domestic Currency Hits Record Low’). A nation-wide fuel shortage ensued. Retail fuel stations closed en masse and prices for available petrol on the black market jumped an average of 130 percent relative to August, and as much as 230 percent in some areas (see ‘Fuel Shortages and Prices Surges Across Yemen’). The UN-brokered consultations between the main warring parties – the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement – collapsed before they even began due to logistics issues in transporting the Houthi delegation to Geneva for the talks (see ‘Failure of the Geneva Consultations’). The Saudi-led military coalition-backed assault on the Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah – which the coalition had “paused” in July – reignited in earnest. The coalition claimed that a victory in Hudaydah was necessary to force the armed Houthi movement back to the negotiating table (see ‘Offensive on Hudaydah City Resumes’). In southern Yemen, public protests that began in Aden in August grew and spread to other governorates, with protesters calling for measures to stem the rial’s plunge and tame rocketing prices (see ‘Protests Spread in Southern Governorates’). In northern Yemen, pro-government forces began an assault on Maran, Sa’ada governorate, which holds symbolic and strategic importance as the ancestral town of the al-Houthi family (see ‘Yemeni Government Forces Advance in Sa’ada’). Meanwhile, in the United States, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that the Saudi-led military coalition was taking measures to reduce harm to civilians in Yemen, as was mandated by Congress in August for continued US support for the coalition. A former State Department adviser subsequently told the Sana’a Center that “objectively, [Pompeo’s] conclusion is false”, (see ‘State Department Certifies Coalition Efforts to Reduce Civilian Casualties’). In Europe, Spain annulled an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, then backtracked, Germany approved new arms exports to coalition members, and the UN Human Rights Council extended the mandate of an experts group investigating human rights violations in Yemen. Also in September, the Sana’a Center organized the largest foreign press delegation visit to Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate, since al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was expelled from the city in 2016.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Conflict, Negotiation, Currency, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

35. The Yemen Review – November 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Representatives from Yemen’s warring parties sat at a negotiating table for the first time in more than two years at the beginning of December. The peace consultations – which took place in Sweden and were mediated by the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths – followed international pressure for a ceasefire that began in October and intensified through November. Rifts between Saudi Arabia and its most important ally, the United States, over the former’s intervention in the Yemen conflict appeared to deepen last month with the announced end of US in-flight refueling for Saudi-led military coalition aircraft operating over Yemen, and a vote in the US Senate to debate a bill to suspend military assistance to the coalition. Various governments in Europe also took steps toward banning arms sales to members of the coalition. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member states began negotiating a new draft resolution related to the Yemen conflict in November, calling for measures to de-escalate the war and address the humanitarian crisis. This was the first proposed UNSC resolution related to Yemen since April 2015. Lobbying from Saudi Arabia and the United States, however, appeared to postpone any vote on the text at least until after the negotiations in Sweden. In Yemen, the domestic currency rebounded sharply in value against the US dollar in November after a steep collapse in the months previous. While this had the potential to help mitigate the humanitarian crisis, most of the benefits of the Yemeni rial’s recovery were absorbed before they reached consumers. Acting as a cartel to manipulate the currency market, money exchangers profited significantly from the Yemeni rial’s appreciation and most commercial retailers refused to lower prices to match the rial’s recovery. Meanwhile, international humanitarian organization Save the Children released an estimate that some 85,000 children had died of hunger in Yemen since the conflict began. In military developments, a spike in violence around Hudaydah City at the beginning of November sparked a surge in suspected violations of humanitarian and international human rights law by the warring parties involved. Elsewhere, anti-Houthi forces made battlefield gains on multiple frontlines in both the north and south of the country. Also in November, one of the main fissures in the anti-Houthi coalition appeared to mend somewhat. Following a visit by representatives of Yemen’s Islah party to Abu Dhabi, it appeared that the party had reconciled long-standing differences with the United Arab Emirates. Despite this, however, tensions between UAE-backed forces and Islah partisans once again erupted in Taiz governorate, including a spree of tit-for-tat assassinations.
Topic:
United Nations, Economy, Conflict, Negotiation, UN Security Council, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

36. Solitaire Arabian Style

Author:
A. Frolov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
LAST SPRING, an event in the Arab world shocked everyone. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, the capital of Qatar, their ally. One of the smallest members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) was accused of supporting “anyone threat- ening the security and stability of the GCC whether as groups or individ- uals – via direct security work or through political influence ... and hos- tile media.” On June 5, 2017, the KSA, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt officially dis- continued diplomatic relations and all types of communication with Qatar. Later, they were joined by the Maldives, Mauritius and Mauretania. Jordan and Djibouti lowered the level of their diplomatic representations in Doha. Several African countries – Senegal, Niger and Chad – recalled their ambassadors. Kuwait and Oman, both GCC mem- bers, stayed away from the action. Later, the three initiators handed Doha a list of 13 demands to end a major Gulf crisis, insisting that Qatar should shut down the Al Jazeera network, close a Turkish military base and scale down ties with Iran. They gave Qatar 10 days to comply with the demands and agree to annu- al audits in the following 10 years.1 Qatar rejected this ultimatum as inter- ference in its sovereignty. Possible repercussions notwithstanding, what happened to Qatar can be described as a manifestation of the deeply rooted social and political changes in the Arab East caused by the color revolutions unfolding amid globalization, informatization, democratization, gradual destruction of the traditional values of Eastern societies, and the frantic efforts to find adequate answers to these challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

37. Con Artists of Tehran

Author:
Uzi Rubin
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A recently disclosed ruling by Iran’s supreme leader caps the range of Iran’s missiles at 2,000 kilometers, a distance that threatens Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt but doesn’t threaten Western Europe. Practically speaking, this ruling is neither new nor truthful. Europe has a good reason to be concerned.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia

38. The Blockade of Qatar

Author:
Richard W Murphy
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Accusing Qatar of supporting Islamic militants and Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain abruptly announced in June a travel blockade on Qatar. They tabled 13 demands for their fellow member state in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to fulfill before the blockade would be lifted. Egypt, which is particularly sensitive to Qatar’s hosting of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood personalities critical of the Sisi regime, joined in this action. Qatar has protested that the demands constitute an unacceptable infringement on its sovereignty. It has offered to discuss the demands but has been told that the demands are non-negotiable. The blockade adds a further complication for American policymakers dealing with current Middle Eastern power struggles. The initiative for blockading Qatar appears to have been led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Bahrain joined, but Oman has steered clear of the controversy, perhaps partly because of its appreciation of Iranian support in earlier decades for the Sultan’s leadership against rebel Omani forces. Kuwait has sought to mediate the dispute but lacks the weight to alter Saudi and Emirati policies.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Persian Gulf, and UAE

39. Yemen's National Dialogue

Author:
Charles Schmitz
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Facing popular protests, a secessionist movement in the south, a spiraling security crisis, and a deep fracturing of political factions, Yemen’s political elite acceded to the Gulf initiative in 2011, which established a caretaker transitional government. The agreement signed in Riyadh stipulated a two-year transitional period and created a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as a forum to solve the country’s political problems. The results of the National Dialogue will form the basis for a new constitution, and Yemenis will then elect a new government to conclude the transitional period. The National Dialogue has concluded, but it is not clear whether it can really solve Yemen’s political problems. The two-year transitional period ended without a new constitution or elections—these will be held at some undetermined later date—and facts on the ground may be outpacing the deliberations of the political elite and their international backers. The government cannot prevent attacks on its oil pipelines or electrical grid; al-Qa`ida operates with almost impunity in the capital city Sana; the Houthi movement is expanding its area of control, recently taking the symbolically important towns of Huth in Amran and Dammaj in Sa`ada; and the south remains unsettled and far from accepting of any solutions proposed by the Sana elite. In February 2014 the committee created to “resolve” the issue of southern rebellion decided on a federal system of government composed of six regions. Yet most Yemenis do not know what federalism is, and what’s more, they don’t care. Deteriorating security and the rise of poverty have overwhelmed any interest most citizens might have in the details of the elite’s visions for the future of the country. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States, the most important foreign actors in Yemen and backers of the Gulf initiative, are focused on their own regional interests, sometimes to the detriment of Yemeni interests. The Saudis want to maintain their influence on the Yemeni government, fight Iranian influence, and control threats from Yemeni soil spilling over into Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudis recently expelled from the Kingdom hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers, exacerbating Yemen’s desperate economic situation. The United States is focused on al-Qa`ida and Iran. The American drone campaign continues to wreak havoc, recently killing members of a wedding party in spite of President Obama’s new procedures to bring the targeted assassinations under the color of law, and the United States seems unable to relinquish its misperception that the Houthis in Sa`ada constitute a new Hezbollah. With such deep divisions in Yemen’s political body and in the competing regional agendas of Yemen’s foreign backers, Yemen’s prospects for a peaceful political settlement that will allow the country to stabilize and grow seem dim.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and Gulf Nations