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1. Building Blocks and Challenges for the Implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa

Author:
Sergio Carciotto and Filppio Ferraro
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Forced displacement continues to be a major challenge to human security across the globe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the global population of forcibly displaced people increased by 2.3 million people in 2018, and by the end of the year, more than 70 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR 2019a). UNHCR also estimated that, in 2018, 13.6 million people were newly displaced as a result of conflicts and droughts (ibid.). Building on the predicament of global sustainability and the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is a framework based on four strategic objectives: to (1) ease pressures on host countries, (2) enhance refugee self-reliance, (3) expand access to third-country solutions, and (4) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity (UNHCR 2018; UN General Assembly 2019). The GCR urges the international community to respond comprehensively and innovatively to the plight of refugees, and to make a paradigm shift in global humanitarian aid to emphasize refugee self-reliance and livelihoods. One of the risks of such a nonbinding and thin agreement, however, is that the GCR will give rise to a bureaucratic process that “does not come even close to dependably addressing the operational deficits of the refugee regime” (Hathaway 2019, 594). This article looks closely at the prospects for the GCR in sub-Saharan Africa based on the need to shift from a humanitarian system of “care and maintenance” to comprehensive and effective development responses to refugee crises. It also discusses some of these experiences and best practices to promote a resilience-based development approach. It recognizes that development initiatives implemented or still to be implemented under the normative framework of the GCR and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) are subject to a multiyear planning and implementation cycle. Therefore, this article does not intend to evaluate their efficacy or measure progress under the GCR, but rather to identify key challenges and to highlight achievements and promising initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa. It particularly focuses on implementation and rollout of the CRRF in Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, and Zambia in Africa.
Topic:
United Nations, Refugees, Displacement, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Zambia, Chad, Sahara, and Sub-Saharan Africa

2. Addressing the Challenges of Urbanization in Africa

Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA)
Abstract:
Africa is the world’s least urbanized continent, and yet the rate at which its cities are expanding is growing faster than no other worldwide – at an average of 3.5 percent per year. This growth of urbanization does, however, vary across the continent, ranging from the already heavily urbanized North Africa (47.8 percent) to the least urbanized Sub-Saharan Africa (32.8 percent).The aggregate rate of urbanization on the continent is projected to grow from 40 percent in 2015 to 56 percent in 2050. The enormous speed at which Africa’s cities are growing is linked to other key development trends, most prominently accelerating economic and population growth, increasing migration from rural to urban areas, and the youth bulge. It is strongly driven by Africans’ perceptions that cities – in contrast to the continent’s rural areas – offer an abundance of livelihood opportunities, including employment and income-generating opportunities, food security, and access to finance, education and social capital as well as social protection.
Topic:
Urbanization, Economic growth, Urban, Population Growth, and Cities
Political Geography:
Africa, North Africa, and Sahara

3. Assessing Attitudes of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Professionals

Author:
Kwesi Aning and Joseph Siegle
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Africa’s armed forces are in transition from an independence-era model to one more suited to today’s conflicts and threats. They are increasingly called upon to engage in preventive action, resolve domestic security crises, combat transnational threats, and protect the progression toward more democratic governance. Understanding how African security sector actors’ perceptions may be shifting in light of these changes can provide insights to improving their effectiveness. This study, involving 742 African security sector professionals from 37 countries, assesses differences in the attitudes, motivations, and values of the emerging generation of African security sector professionals. Understanding these differences may raise awareness, provide a basis for reform, and create an impetus for improving the citizen-security actor relationship.
Topic:
Globalization, National Security, Democracy, State Building, and transnationalism
Political Geography:
Africa, Mediterranean, and Sahara

4. Shifting Borders: Africa’s Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications

Author:
Wendy Williams
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Recent years have seen record numbers of Africans forcibly displaced from their homes. The most recent figure of 25 million people displaced is a 500-percent increase from 2005. While much attention focuses on economic migrants who are trying to cross into Europe, 95 percent of those who are displaced remain on the continent. Two-thirds of these are displaced within their home countries. In short, the reality faced is more accurately characterized as an African displacement, rather than a European migrant, crisis. This paper explores the drivers of population displacement in Africa, security ramifications, and priorities for reversing this destabilizing trend.
Topic:
Migration, Diaspora, Political stability, and Displacement
Political Geography:
Africa, North Uganda, South Sudan, and Sahara

5. Multilateral Damage: The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes

Author:
Jérôme Tubiana, Clotilde Warin, and Gaffar Mohammud Saeneen
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This online report studies the effects of EU migration policies and the externalisation of EU border control on Saharan migration routes and on practices in the border regions connecting Niger, Chad, Sudan and Libya. Authors Jérôme Tubiana, Clotilde Warin and Gaffar Mohammud Saeneen find that, in response to the obstacles and opportunities that border externalisation policies present for migrants, migration routes diversify and move to other countries. Beyond the fact that migration is a transnational phenomenon not linked to one particular route or itinerary, this continuous moving of routes is made possible by cross-border Saharan trade and trafficking networks that have put in place the necessary logistics to facilitate migration and which often fall outside government control. Pushed by EU efforts to curtail migration, states such as Niger, Chad and Sudan have shored up border patrols and anti-smuggling operations in the border regions under study here. The report shows that this has been done in a manner that is often not conducive to stability in the region and which contributes to the ‘militia-isation’ – the growing power of militias whose presence undermines the state – of the countries at issue.
Topic:
Migration, Border Control, European Union, and Trafficking
Political Geography:
Sudan, Libya, Chad, Niger, Sahara, and Africa

6. The United States and Namibia: Promoting Success in a Young African Democracy

Author:
Thomas F Daughton
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Just 27 years old, the Republic of Namibia is among Africa’s youngest countries, but one that stands out on the continent for its functioning multiparty democracy, open market economy and history of peaceful transitions of presidential power. The reasons for Namibia’s success lie in the international process that created it and in the pragmatism of its people. That international process and the United States’ involvement in it have also complicated the U.S.-Namibia relationship in the last three decades. But the United States has long recognized that an investment in the success of a country like Namibia is a strategic long-term investment in our own security. With that in mind, the United States has invested heavily since Namibian independence in 1990 to help ensure that the young country succeeds. In many respects, Namibia is a country of extremes. It is both the driest African country south of the Sahara and, with an area twice the size of California’s and a population of just 2.4 million, the world’s second-least densely populated nation. Namibia is home to the desolate Skeleton Coast, to one of the world’s driest deserts and to the world’s oldest sand dunes, but also to lush, flood-prone forestland lying along some of Africa’s great rivers. Namibia is a major source of diamonds and uranium, but has one of the highest income inequality rates in the world. And Namibia’s people are a multiethnic, multiracial mix that encompasses everything from descendants of German colonists to the San, the world’s most ancient human population. Namibia’s colonial experience featured similar extremes. After one of the First World War’s early military campaigns ended 30 years of German colonial rule in 1915, the League of Nations placed the former German South West Africa under the mandate of the Union of South Africa. The successor Republic of South Africa later refused to surrender that mandate, instead imposing the full oppression of apartheid and seeking to incorporate South West Africa into its territory. The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), a Marxist liberation movement formed in 1960, carried on an insurgency against the apartheid regime for three decades as the United States and other Western nations sought a negotiated route to independence. In 1978 the United States co-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 to establish a framework for Namibian independence, but an eight-year mediation begun by the Reagan administration in 1981 linked independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. That linkage is still viewed by many Namibians as having delayed their country’s independence for a decade. Thirty years later, the United States continues to confront perceptions that Namibia would have achieved independence years earlier if not for Cold War concerns in the West about Communist influence and support to SWAPO from the old Eastern Bloc. Namibian independence in 1990 was the culmination of a unique negotiation and self-determination process administered by the United Nations pursuant to UNSCR 435. Nearly 25 years later, I presented my credentials as the tenth U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia, just two days before general elections that would sweep the country’s third president, Dr. Hage Geingob, into office with 87 percent of the popular vote. No stranger to government, Dr. Geingob chaired the assembly that drafted the Namibian constitution in 1989 and served as the country’s first prime minister. Harkening back to the international effort that created what Namibia is today, President Geingob likes to say that his country is “a child of international solidarity, midwifed by the United Nations.” At independence, the SWAPO liberation movement became the popular political party that has ruled Namibia continuously since 1990. While the restyled Swapo Party put aside most of its Marxist principles when faced with the reality of governing, Namibia’s foreign policy has remained strongly shaped by gratitude to its erstwhile allies and adherence to its non-aligned, liberation-era ideals. At the same time, however, Namibia’s approach to its foreign development partners has generally been marked by pragmatism and a desire to be, as the country’s current president puts it, “friend to all and enemy to none.” The United States has sought since Namibia’s founding to support the new country in its building of a modern, democratic state. Even before the Namibian flag was raised for the first time, the United States offered major assistance in removing the explosive remnants of war—an intense effort that required more than a decade to complete. The Peace Corps answered a plea for help from Namibia’s new leaders in 1990 by sending a cadre of educa­tion volunteers. In the quarter-century since, Peace Corps has maintained and ex­panded its presence in Namibia. More than 1,600 volunteers have served in the country since 1991, offering their skills in education, health and community economic development. The Peace Corps was not the only U.S. government agency that lent a hand with education. A decision at independence by Namibia’s new leaders to make English the national language prompted a 15-year, USAID-administered assistance program to convert the national education system from Afrikaans, train the country’s teachers to instruct in English and improve school infrastructure. Namibians say theirs was the first country in the world to enshrine environmental pro­tection in its constitution. Support provided by the United States through USAID in the 1990s helped establish Namibia’s internationally renowned, community-based conserva­tion system. The country has a larger wildlife population now than at any time in the past century and is home to nearly half of the world’s remaining black rhinos and most of the world’s cheetahs. The Namibian conservation model built together with USAID created 82 registered communal conservancies that allow local communities to benefit from the sus­tainable use of wildlife through tourism and sport hunting. In 2013, the conservancies generated about $7 million in direct revenue and in-kind benefits. The success of the model has created a powerful incentive for those living within conservancies to protect wildlife and manage natural resources responsibly. Indeed, the conservancies are largely responsible for the rebound in Namibia’s elephant population from 7,500 in 1995 to more than 20,000 in 2016. In 2007, Namibia qualified for an assistance compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Negotiations on the details of the compact took more than 18 months, but ultimately produced a blueprint for spending $305 million on an array of infrastructure and other development projects focused on education, tourism and agricul­ture. The five-year compact, which ended in 2014 having met or exceeded all of its targets, was regarded by both the Namibians and the MCC as a signal success. As it was under­way, Namibia also achieved upper-middle income (UMI) status according to the World Bank—one of the indirect effects the MCC compact was intended to achieve. Ironically, that success meant the country was not eligible for another compact. The crown jewel of U.S. government assistance to Namibia remains our support in fighting HIV/AIDS. When the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, better known as PEPFAR, began working with the Namibian government in 2004, the country had one of the highest HIV burdens in the world. More than 23 percent of the population was infected, and more than 15,000 Namibians were getting infected with HIV each year. More than 30 percent of babies born to HIV-positive mothers were infected with the virus, and nearly 10,000 Namibians were dying from AIDS every year—out of a population of just 2 million. Our success in working with the Namibian government to fight HIV/AIDS has been nothing short of remarkable. Last year, fewer than 8,000 Namibians were newly infected with HIV, less than 5 percent of babies born to HIV-positive mothers became infected and fewer than 3,200 patients died from HIV/AIDS. Currently, more than 70 percent of Namibians have been tested for HIV and know their status. Free antiretroviral treatment is widely available across the country; 67 percent of infected adults and 90 percent of infected children are on it. Most striking, an estimated 100,000 Namibian lives—nearly 5 percent of the country’s total population—have been saved. The United States has played an integral role in these achievements, and it has required a major investment. Of the more than $1.1 billion in foreign assistance the U.S. gov­ernment has invested in Namibia since 2006, the majority has been dedicated to the fight against HIV/AIDS. But our investment has been dwarfed by the Namibian govern­ment’s own contribution to the fight. Namibia’s government directly funds two-thirds of the national HIV response, demonstrating to the world its leadership and commit­ment to its citizens. Our shared success in fighting HIV/AIDS has not come easily. Widely scattered populations, distances between health facilities, shortages of skilled health care providers, limited infrastructure and difficult terrain contribute to the reality that not all Namibians have access to the same health services. To meet the challenge, our work through PEPFAR in Namibia has required innovation and flexibility. It has also necessitated a model of government-to-government cooperation in which U.S. resources have supplemented and expanded upon the Namibian government’s efforts rather than leading them. Our support has helped move Namibia within realistic reach of achieving the UNAIDS 90/90/90 targets* for HIV epidemic control by 2020. This means Namibia has the potential to be among the first high-burden countries in Africa to reach the targets and, if the epidemiolo­gists are right, to achieve an AIDS-free generation. As the size of Namibia’s younger population increases, so do their demands for education, social services and jobs. The country’s UMI status means that international development assistance once aimed at bolstering Namibia’s young democracy is now going to countries in greater need. And as Namibia’s liberation-heroes-turned-graying-politicians seek to respond to the demands of the younger population, they also face the inevitable reality of transition to a post-liberation-era generation of leaders. Navigating that transition is the most significant political challenge the country will face in the next decade. Cognizant of their legacy and committed to an enduring democracy, Namibia’s leaders are working to ensure that their country maintains its standing as a haven of peace and stability. It remains in the national interest of the United States to help them—and Namibia—succeed.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Environment, Post Colonialism, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, North America, Namibia, and Sahara

7. Selected Effects of Climate Change on Africa

Author:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Africa is more vulnerable to climate change than any other region on the planet. This map reflects a few of the ways the changing environment is straining Africa’s social systems.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Poverty, Water, Political stability, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, Sahel, and Sahara

8. Acute Food Insecurity and Conflict in Africa

Author:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Nineteen African countries are facing acute levels of food insecurity. Ten of those countries are experiencing internal conflict.
Topic:
United Nations, Refugee Issues, Authoritarianism, Food Security, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Sahel, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sahara

9. Lack of Dissuasive Policy: the Case of Ifni-Sahara War / La ausencia de política disuasoria: el caso de la guerra de Ifni-Sáhara

Author:
Juan Pastrana Piñero
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The lack of a dissuasive policy was one of the key factors that explains the outbreak of the last Spanish colonial war. This article analyses the contradictory policy of general Franco’s regime about its territories of the Africa Occidental Española. Especially, it deals with the absence of a credible dissuasive policy in contrast to the increasing menacing presence of the so-called Army of Liberation of the Sahara.
Topic:
War, History, Colonialism, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
France, North Africa, Morocco, and Sahara

10. Pulling Apart at the Seams: How the Smuggling and Narcotics Trade Are Helping to Reshape Governance in the Sahel

Author:
Andrew Lebovich
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The jihadist takeover of northern Mali in mid-2012 caught many regional observers by surprise. For years, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and later the AQIM splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO in French), were seen largely as smugglers, criminals, and “narco-traffickers.” This perception led to a curious process by which some analysts dismissed the risk posed by these groups, while others (chiefly, Western governments) developed a near obsession with the prospect that money from smuggling operations, particularly drugs, would finance jihadist activity in the Sahara and Sahel.[1] While regional experts have since aggressively critiqued the notion of extensive ties between Sahelian militant groups and smuggling, particularly in the narcotics trade,[2] it is nonetheless important to assess the extent of these connections and how they fit into a larger regional context. ​ The purported link between cocaine trade and militant groups gained traction among outside observers due to the appearance of both in northern Mali at approximately the same time. Cocaine first began circulating through and in northern Mali in the early 2000s, while the group that would become AQIM, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), achieved notorious renown in 2003 with the kidnapping of 32 Europeans in southern Algeria. [3] Analysts also focused extensively on cocaine, despite the large circulation through and within the region of cannabis products, amphetamines, and other drugs.[4] However, the rise of smuggling networks and economies in the region long preceded the arrival of jihadist militancy. As anthropologist Judith Scheele and others have noted, smuggling in northern Mali began in the 1960s and 1970s with the trade in foodstuffs, especially powdered milk and pasta produced in Algeria, which was then re-sold in Mali and northern Niger.[5] In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, illicit or semi-licit (grey market) trades emerged, including the smuggling of subsidized petrol from Libya and Algeria into the Sahara, as well as the two-way movement of weapons, counterfeit or contraband cigarettes, and people.[6] This smuggling was itself part of an older process in a region that has always depended on the circulation of people and goods for survival...
Topic:
Crime, Al Qaeda, Borders, Drugs, and Smuggling
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Sahara