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81. Czech-Russian Relations. Russian Disinformation Campaign

Author:
Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
After the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Czech Republic became fully aware of the threats posed by the Kremlin despite President Zeman has denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and has criticised the EU sanctions against Russia. Czechia belongs to the group of countries through which Russia influences the EU, to gradually and deliberately erode its structures. Russia exerts a strong influence on the Czech Republic by non-military means, including disinformation and propaganda, the activities of secret services, and penetration of its economy and specifically its energy sector. The article aims to answer the question about the role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the context of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. The role of Russian disinformation and propaganda and how Russia influences Czechia is extensively analysed. The main hypothesis is that Russia treats the Czech Republic as a key state for espionage and disinformation activities and as a zone of influence, undermining the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the role of NATO and the EU.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Resilience, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Czech Republic

82. Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons

Author:
Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Key Takeaways: (1) Big leap forward. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has moved past the previous client-patron dynamic, with Iran emerging as an important provider of defense technology to Russia. Bilateral cooperation has expanded both in degree and in kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, and military-to-military contacts—engagement has accelerated or deepened. Since 2022, Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, alongside Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war and assistance with expertise on evading sanctions. (2) The gloves are off. Since February 2022, what were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance. Key constraints—Russia’s susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; or historical mistrust—have become less relevant with Moscow’s growing dependence on Iran and its increased enmity toward the United States and Europe. (3) Growing institutionalization. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Those have included work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001, forays into joint production of some weapon systems, and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure that should provide a further boost to defense cooperation. (4) Thinking about the future in three steps. We propose a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for potential high-impact scenarios and developments that may trigger dramatic shifts in cooperation. The latter include various scenarios of war in the Middle East, the end of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, and regime change in either Russia or Iran. (5) Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance. Present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once the war in Ukraine ends. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Other constraints—chiefly both countries’ challenges in procuring advanced components because of sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the Gulf Arab states, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—will also likely continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship, precluding it from developing into a full-fledged military alliance.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

83. Russia, The Global South and Multilateral Nuclear Diplomacy after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had a detrimental impact on multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The war caused an earthquake in procedure, paralyzing processes at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations First Committee, and meetings dealing with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the case even as Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling and occupation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and Europe’s recommitment to nuclear weapons, demonstrated the ongoing need for nuclear dialogue. States from the Global South tended to navigate cautiously vis-à-vis Russia across the multilateral nuclear negotiating forums. Amid greater difficulties in forging common positions on nuclear issues related to the Ukraine war, these states were also frustrated with what they perceived as a deprioritization of their interests in multilateral nuclear diplomacy. Western states, especially during the first year of the war, were seen as exercising unwelcome pressure on the Global South to take sides against Russia. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a dual strategy, undermining nonproliferation efforts and chipping away at trust in legacy institutions, while also leveraging these forums in pursuit of greater alignment with states in the Global South. The implications of these different dynamics for the health of the nuclear order may take some time to fully play out, but will likely be profound.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and Global South

84. Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media. The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

85. Democratic Russian Civil Society Outside Russia? A Window of Opportunity for Support

Author:
Nicolas Bouchet
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia has large sources of wealth and military power and is controlled by an autocratic, kleptocratic regime willing to devote these to aggression toward its neighbors, most violently in Ukraine. It is in the interest of Europe and the United States to support Russians who can help the country become more peaceful and democratic, alongside anti-regime measures. Repression has made supporting democratic actors in Russia extremely difficult but not impossible. That goal must now be complemented. Around 1 million people have left Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022. This opens a window of opportunity for unimpeded access to a large number of Russians to aid the spread of democratic ideas; raising the prospect of a democratic civil society developing outside the country. Europe and the United States need a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent emigrants. Their largest concentrations are in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans as well as Israel, Türkiye, the EU and the United States. The bulk of the emigrants are young adults who are richer, more educated, and more politically interested or active than the average citizen in Russia. For most, the motivations for leaving mixed political, economic, and lifestyle factors, and for many also unwillingness to be drafted into the military. The majority have democratic, anti-regime, and antiwar views. The emigrants include long-standing and newly civically and politically active individuals. A large share continue engagement abroad in diverse organizations and initiatives. Their activities focus on rebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs) and media abroad, supporting democratic actors and spreading independent information in Russia, and antiwar initiatives. They provide help to new emigrants and aim to build up their communities. These activities are carried out from one or more host countries, building transnational networks. There are new grassroots actions and initiatives by emigrants who had less or no direct experience of activism in Russia. Emigrant groups mostly operate through horizontal, fluid networks. Many of these are small and informal, but there are larger, more structured ones. Emigrant communities also offer a space for critical debate about the need for democratic change and the link between this and Russia’s colonial/imperial heritage and aggression. The recent emigrants’ activities face many challenges, including those in operating networks reliant on online resources; in connecting digital and non-digital activism; and in planning beyond the short term without sufficient resources. They are hampered by reliance on small (often part-time) core teams and volunteers. Many activists experience financial precarity, employment insecurity, and burnout. Security is a major concern due to the risk of infiltration, destabilization, and cyber and physical attacks by Russia’s security apparatus. The situation for emigrants has become more restrictive or less safe in some host countries. Individuals and organizations that oppose the Russian regime are also affected by restrictive international measures against it, such as ones against money laundering and the monetization of online content, or the denial of access to financial, professional, and commercial services. As Russians have realized that emigration will be for a longer term, the phase of settling in a host country became more prominent than the earlier exit phase. For many, this includes the need to move from the first host country, with those more politically active more likely to look for one with a safer, more enabling environment. This will largely mean seeking to move to an EU or other Western country. The non-EU countries easiest for Russians to access are also the ones where their prospects are more uncertain, whereas the EU countries are harder to access but offer more certain prospects. Russia in the 1990s showed how an unpredicted democratic opening can fail to lead to lasting or deep change. Today, alongside aiding political and nongovernmental actors, democracy-support providers should also try to help Russian society evolve in a democratic direction. The new emigrant activities are seeds for a democratic civil society abroad that is closely connected to, and supportive of, the one in Russia. Three principles should underpin a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent Russian emigration: shifting emphasis to the settling phase of emigration, prioritizing connectivity within the emigration, and helping weave a civil society abroad. To foster the development of a democratic civil society among Russian emigrants, assistance musttarget the building of a wider community that can be more effective and serve as a model in Russia. For this, the landscape of Russians outside Russia can be seen as four concentric circles, based on their degree of direct political activity: the political opposition in exile; the civil society sector of democracy, human rights, and media organizations; the community of emigrants since 2022, and in particular the new grassroots actors and initiatives emerging within it; and the older, multigeneration Russian diaspora. A democracy support strategy for Russian emigrants should not be open-ended but time-bound, with a pragmatic approach in an uncertain environment. It can be assessed in 2030, when President Vladimir Putin’s current term as president is due to end, which could be a time of political turbulence. The strategy can be initially implemented within the next 12–24 months, with annual review of support offered to civil society, especially at the grassroots, with the potential to grow and to reach out to the apolitical emigrants. Support should consist of mostly small, short-term assistance to actors and initiatives that would have until 2030 to show that they have impact and longer-term potential. It is crucial to support the widest range of diverse, dispersed actors of different sizes so that they can keep operating. The focus should not be only on formal organizations but also on more bounded initiatives and projects. Part of the assistance should focus on enabling politically and civically active emigrants to connect physically and virtually across locations, and to focus on flexible networking suited to their mobility challenges. Funders need to think widely in terms of locations and formats for delivering support. Using different, sometimes unconventional, ways of engaging emigrant actors is a necessity. Support should not rely only on usual formats, not least since new ones for activities are emerging from within the emigrant landscape. Such support is also key for encouraging and amplifying the critical thinking in the emigrant landscape as well as connections to new antiwar and anti-imperialist initiatives—a prerequisite for any democratic progress in Russia. Connections are what make a society more than a collection of groups. For the development of a democratic civil society outside Russia, support should be directed not only within the individual circles of the emigration but also at connections between them. The primary focus should be on relations between the second (established CSOs) and third (new grassroots actors) circles to prevent the diverse civically and politically active emigrants and groups being in silos. Contacts with recent emigrants could also eventually encourage changes in attitudes within the older diaspora toward the Russian regime or democratic civic engagement in general.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, Refugees, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

86. Putin verbatim: Ukraine’s Use of NATO Deep Strike Missiles Would Put West at War with Russia

Author:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Pres. Putin says that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range high-precision weapons to strike deep inside Russia would require Western satellite guidance and personnel support to “assign flight missions to these missile systems.” Thus, as he sees it, the West would be directly involved in such strikes, and this would put “NATO countries… at war with Russia.” Contains full official statement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

87. A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

88. Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Rosatom, its entities, and its senior personnel should be subjected to far greater sanctions by the United States and its allies. Sanction carveouts or waivers can be granted for nuclear reactor safety considerations, operating nuclear reactors, and for other Rosatom customers as they wind down existing contracts. However, the status quo is not sustainable. It leaves the United States and its allies vulnerable to political and economic pressure by Rosatom and its owner Russia, with the constant threat that this Putin-controlled entity could cut off energy supplies. This already happened to Germany in September 2022 when Gazprom, another Putin-controlled entity, cut off natural gas supplies to Germany as a result of a clash over Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Only a mild winter staved off serious and needless suffering by the German people. Rosatom deserves sanctions today. It is not just a benign commercial nuclear energy supplier. Rosatom has actively participated in the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), a seizure causing an increased risk of a major nuclear accident. Rosatom officials are not authorized to operate these reactors. IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi has called this situation “not sustainable” and “risks nuclear safety and security.” Rosatom is also complicit in the human rights violations of Ukrainian plant personnel, violations that include torture. Rosatom also actively contributes importantly to the production of Russian weapon systems used against Ukraine. A case in point is the participation of one of its subsidiaries in the production of the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone that Russia has used to destroy much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and terrorize its civilian population.
Topic:
Sanctions, Nuclear Energy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

89. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine

90. Russian Decoy Drones that Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses

Author:
Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia has developed and deployed several types of decoy drones to assist missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. This report discusses two of those decoy drones, the Gerbera (also known as Gerber) and the Parody (also known as Parodiya) UAVs that mimic the Shahed 136 and other drone systems. Both of these drones can be mass produced quickly and are built from simple materials like plywood, foam, and a few electronics, making them inexpensive compared to their more costly counterparts. Ukraine has become increasingly proficient at identifying, tracking, and intercepting Russian airborne platforms, like missiles and drones. To increase the effectiveness of Russian barrages, these decoy drones are launched in large numbers alongside missiles and attack drones, like the Shahed 136 and Lancet-3, to overwhelm and confuse Ukrainian defenses to draw anti-aircraft fire on the decoys, allowing other weapons to reach their targets. Ukrainian defenders can never be entirely certain that an incoming drone does not carry an explosive warhead, forcing them to expend valuable munitions intercepting these drones. Because Ukraine has limited stockpiles of interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, and hunter-killer-drones, deploying decoy drones is a viable strategy to wear down Ukrainian defenders. Using decoy drones can also help Russian forces identify where Ukraine has positioned anti-aircraft defenses, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and target those in subsequent attacks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Drones, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine