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71. Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Denys Yurchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, shocked the world. Currently, the Russian-Ukrainian war is the biggest European war since the end of World War II.[1] The full-scale invasion was a continuation of unlawful actions in 2014 when Russia seized and temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia’s actions sparked heated debates between realists and liberals while every school of international relations tried to explain why Russia used force to change the internationally recognized borders of its neighbor—Ukraine. In September 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer published the article Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.[2] His work tried to explain the causes of conflict from an offensive realism point of view. Mearsheimer defined the core idea of offensive realism in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[3] It is as follows: States—especially great powers—are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them. In other words, there is nothing to prevent predatory behavior at the international level. This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power.[4] The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony. Through this lens, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was part of its attempt at regional hegemony.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Culture, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

72. Russia’s Space Program After 2024

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since 2022, Russia’s space program has been in a state of turbulence and uncertainty. However, the deterioration started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began the first round of the war against Ukraine. Multiple factors have made the sustainable development of the Russian space program impossible: sanctions, an embargo on advanced industrial equipment, workforce shortages, limited financial resources spread among too many projects, cancellation of space cooperation with Western partners except operations on the International Space Station (ISS), and the economic inefficiency of the Russian space industry. The Russian government and Roscosmos are struggling to increase space expenditures, but monetary inflation, cost-plus inflation within the space industry, and devaluation of the ruble do not allow them to reverse the negative trends. Despite these factors, Russia will keep manned spaceflights and the military space program at any cost. Consequently, Russia has two main priorities by the 2030s. First, it must maintain the presence of Russian astronauts in outer space even after the ISS era and without any significant scientific outcomes. Second, it must switch satellite manufacturing from space-grade electronics to relatively simple and cheap consumer-grade electronics. This preference for quantity over quality of satellites would allow Russia to boost its manufacturing of short-lived satellites, which will be replaced quickly and provide the armed forces with communication and intelligence capabilities. In the area of satellite navigation, Russia will struggle to maintain the current architecture of GRusslobal’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), and the development of new architecture with less satellites is also questionable. The optimistic scenario is that Russia’s satellite navigation system with new architecture will cover only the Russian and neighboring territories. However, the Russian armed forces use the consumer-grade GPS and BeiDou trackers, so the deteriorating GLONASS is not a crucial problem for them.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

73. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

Author:
Igor Delanoë
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy on the Black Sea naval theater was contested in the early stage of the conflict. Ukraine’s anti-surface and drone capacities have challenged the Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy at sea, creating a form of sea denial. The Black Sea Fleet adapted its posture to a conflict of attrition. The scope of the missions fulfilled by the Black Sea Fleet has increased over time to include more protection and detection tasks, while active defense remains the general posture at sea. The post-conflict Black Sea Fleet should be more littoralized than before the “special operation.” Lessons already learned from conflict, constraints created by the sanctions, and financial priorities should accelerate the littoralization and the kalibrization of the Black Sea Fleet.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Black Sea Fleet
Political Geography:
Russia and Black Sea

74. Russian Women in the Face of War Against Ukraine

Author:
Egle Murauskaite
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Consider the following pieces of a puzzle. Russia’s war against Ukraine has revealed stories about the heroic resistance efforts of Ukrainian women[1]: from a grandmother launching a pickle jar against a drone[2] to volunteers with territorial defense units.[3] However, comparable stories have been entirely lacking on Russia’s side: How come? Here is another piece: the stories of rape and abuse in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories have shaken the world, with male Russian soldiers featured as systematic perpetrators of war crimes.[4] Were there any female soldiers or pro-Russian civilians involved? The historical background of multiple conflicts across continents does suggest an active women’s role as perpetrators of war crimes (including rape) and terrorism, not only victims.[5] Perhaps it is only a matter of time until stories of Russian women involved in these crimes start to emerge. How do these pieces fit together? I delve into these narratives in an information environment that is still extremely limited (particularly in terms of Russian-language sources)
Topic:
Women, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

75. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

76. How the War in Ukraine Shapes Iran’s Strategic Gains and Ambitions

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine War has strengthened military-industrial ties between Moscow and Tehran. Most concerning is their deepening collaboration in dual-use technologies and disruptive weapons systems. Moscow has provided technical assistance to Tehran in key areas, including its space program, which can help the Islamic Republic develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, Iran’s interest in Russian anti-stealth radars and air-superiority fighters is worrying. Russia’s extensive use of Iranian-supplied drones has allowed the Iranian defense technological and industrial base to advance its drone warfare systems, collect large amounts of operational data, and improve its loitering munitions designs and production. A Russian victory in Ukraine would likely accelerate such cooperation, given the two countries’ geopolitical ambitions, among other factors. So far, the Islamic Republic has been the winner of the Russia-Ukraine War. Below are some key highlights from this policy memo: The Russian military’s reliance on using munitions from Iran to exhaust Ukraine’s combat capabilities has provided Tehran with unprecedented opportunities. In the absence of adequate deterrents in place, Iran has already become a combat drone supplier to the world’s second-largest arms exporter, the Russian Federation, turning the Islamic Republic into a menacing threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance’s eastern and southern fronts. Open-source intelligence tracks a meaningful rise in the Russian military’s use of Iran-supplied Shahed baseline loitering munitions, indicating that the joint Russo-Iranian drone plant in Tatarstan, Russia, is capable of producing scores of kamikaze drones annually at low cost. Such facilities can soon mushroom across the Russian Federation. With Tehran demonstrating growing control over its airspace while the country moves closer to obtaining military-grade nuclear capabilities, Russia can help the Islamic Republic make its airspace more dangerous than ever. A combination of anti-stealth radar, the Su-35 air-superiority fighter squadrons protected by underground basing, and a large number of layered strategic air defenses can prove lethal even against fifth-generation, stealth combat aircraft. Accordingly, the Western intelligence community should remain vigilant over any cooperation between Moscow and Tehran involving anti-stealth radars and space program assets, keeping in mind that the latter can easily translate into intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, Iran is now investing in infrastructure within Russia—including dredging the Volga River and establishing shipping companies in the port city of Astrakhan—allowing the two countries to further expand the strategic route across the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

77. Beyond the counter-offensive: Attrition, stalemate, and the future of the war in Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a war of attrition – which on current projections Russia is set to win. Ukraine can only achieve its war aims if it moves to a war of manoeuvre; without this, it cannot regain its lost territory. Western supplies and efforts at defence-industrial consolidation are failing to provide Ukraine with the replacement armaments it needs to survive the war of attrition, let along switch to manoeuvre warfare. The West and Europeans in particular need to overhaul their financial regulations and create economies of scale to radically stimulate the production of drones, ammunition, armoured fighting vehicles, and more. Only if they carefully absorb the lessons learned from this war will Europeans be ready for the types of great power confrontation that are becoming more likely in the 21st century
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

78. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

79. Energising eastern Europe: How the EU can enhance energy sovereignty through cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Sovereignty, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

80. Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects

Author:
EUROPEUM
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On April 18th, EUROPEUM’s Brussels Office in partnership with PISM Brussels Office under the Think Visegrad platform hosted a discussion titled “Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects”. This event was attended by 15 experts from think tanks and representatives of EU institutions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe