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261. Assessing Realist and Liberal Explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Many commentators have claimed that the Russo-Ukrainian War invalidates or refutes core aspects of realist international relations (IR) theory. However, the opposite is the case: many realists correctly predicted the war, and realism offers a compelling explanation for its causes, while explanations based on liberal IR theory are weak and often inconsistent with the evidence. By focusing on factors like the balance of power and the security dilemma, the realist explanation for the Russo-Ukrainian War emphasizes Russian security concerns in the face of NATO expansion and Western-sponsored regime change. Liberal explanations, by focusing on the internal attributes of states and their decision-makers, instead attribute the war to the pathologies of the Russian government. The dominant liberal narratives regarding the causes of the war are that Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been intent on reincorporating Ukraine into Russia and/or that the democratic example set by post-Maidan Ukraine would threaten President Putin’s own autocratic rule at home. Neither of these explanations stand up to scrutiny. For decades, a long list of policymakers, diplomats, and scholars warned against Western encroachment on Russia’s borders and cautioned that a crisis like the current war could erupt due to continued NATO enlargement. These predictions are consistent with realist theory and the explanations for the war offered by realists. Liberal IR theory encourages a crusading, messianic, and highly militarized foreign policy that consistently produces outcomes inimical to U.S. interests. Realist IR theory offers a better framework through which to understand international politics and encourages a more prudent foreign policy that defends fundamental U.S. security interests while avoiding unnecessary conflicts with other powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Liberalism, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

262. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

263. El lugar de Venezuela en las restricciones chino-estadounidenses: una mirada desde la prensa española en el marco de la invasión rusa a Ucrania

Author:
Iván Luis Alonso Peláez
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo hace un recorrido histórico para conocer cuál ha sido el papel de Venezuela en el marco de las relaciones chino-estadounidenses, especialmente los cambios ocurridos a partir de 1999 con los gobiernos de Hugo Chávez y Nicolás Maduro. Acorde con lo descrito por la abundante bibliografía sobre el tema, se constata que se ha producido un cambio de roles en el que China progresivamente ha ido ocupando en Venezuela el espacio comercial preferente que tradicionalmente había ostentado Estados Unidos desde el restablecimiento de la Democracia en 1958. A través de un análisis informativo utilizando como fuente un grupo de textos periodísticos publicados en los seis principales diarios de circulación nacional editados en España, se valora cómo la invasión rusa a Ucrania promueve un todavía incipiente deshielo en el curso de las sanciones impuestas por Washington a la industria petrolera venezolana.
Topic:
Oil, Sanctions, Energy Crisis, Newspapers, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

264. La invasión rusa de Ucrania bajo el prisma de las teorías de control reflexivo

Author:
Arturo Esteban Ceballos
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El presente artículo analiza las causas del fracaso de la fase inicial de la invasión rusa de Ucrania de febrero de 2022 desde el prisma de la teoría del control reflexivo. Esta teoría fue formulada en los años sesenta por el matemático y psicólogo Vladimir Lefebvre, y constituye hoy día una de las fuentes de inspiración de la moderna doctrina político militar de Rusia. Para ello, se ha utilizado un método hipotético deductivo sobre la base de una hipótesis que relaciona este fracaso con el manejo inadecuado de los marcos de información por parte de Rusia. Dado que la moderna doctrina militar de Rusia descansa en gran parte en las teorías del control reflexivo, el fracaso de este último provocó que no se alcanzasen las condiciones decisivas del enfrentamiento en las fases iniciales del conflicto. Ucrania había resistido las medidas activas rusas, lo que ocasionó un error de cálculo en el diseño estratégico inicial del Kremlin.
Topic:
Intelligence, Military Strategy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Reflexive Control
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

265. Dimensión digital de la guerra de Rusia contra Ucrania: perspectivas endógenas en situaciones de emergencia

Author:
Jacinto Gómez-López, Jesús Miguel Flores-Vivar, and Ángel Gómez de Agreda
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Los conflictos armados provocan disrupciones en las redes de comunicaciones y su empleo malicioso por parte del enemigo. Si bien las causas que lo originan son distintas, las consecuencias son, a menudo, similares a las que se producen en emergencias de la sociedad civil. El establecimiento de protocolos y mecanismos que fomenten la resiliencia de las redes y aplicaciones tecnológicas existentes y que prevean el uso de otras alternativas es una parte fundamental en el correcto funcionamiento de los servicios de emergencia. El artículo presenta algunas reflexiones y resultados preliminares para la mejora de estos servicios, basadas en las enseñanzas extraídas del conflicto en Ucrania-Rusia. Se recogen acciones para la mejora de las actuaciones en las redes sociales y en aquellos servicios que estas habilitan.
Topic:
Communications, Propaganda, Disinformation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Emergency Services
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

266. Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put military mobility on top of the EU and NATO agendas. The return of traditional military threats and a renewed interest in territorial defence call for greater attempts to eliminate obstacles preventing armed forces from swiftly moving across EU borders. This Policy Brief maps the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It identifies and analyses current EU objectives, outlines key challenges, and provides recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe. Several challenges are analysed by the author, which should be urgently addressed by the EU and the member states, especially in relation to the Action Plan 2.0. These include limited funding for dual-use transport infrastructure projects at the EU level, administrative and regulatory barriers, and the lack of political will in the member states to enhance military mobility. Furthermore, the paper provides a SWOT Analysis of military mobility in Europe and the following recommendations are put forward: The commitment to advancing military mobility needs to be long-term. Military mobility needs to be complemented by a civilian dimension. EU member states should urgently prioritise developing military mobility plans. Undergo a lessons-learned process from the movement of military equipment in the context of EU and allies’ support to Ukraine. Regions and cities’ network of exchanges at the European level should include discussions on funding and dual-use infrastructure. Consider setting up an EU-NATO Centre of Excellence dedicated to military mobility in Europe.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

267. EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path

Author:
Svitlana Taran
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
During the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, EU trade-liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes and allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market. However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. While a compromise between the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary trade-liberalisation measures for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure their smooth operation. This Discussion Paper provides recommendations on how the EU can further intensify efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. These include: Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU; Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridors; Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states and Ukraine; Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes' disruptions; Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks; Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Trade Liberalization, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

268. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:
Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

269. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

270. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe