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71. The Russian Handicap to U.S. Iran Policy

Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
There are voices in the Obama Administration who believe that the Kremlin is able and willing to exert pressure on Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, perceived geopolitical and economic benefits in the unstable Persian Gulf, in which American influence is on the wane, outweigh Russia's concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran. The Kremlin sees Iran not as a threat but as a partner or an ad-hoc ally to challenge U.S. influence. Today, both Russia and Iran favor a strategy of "multipolarity," both in the Middle East and worldwide. This strategy seeks to dilute American power, revise current international financial institutions, and weaken or neuter NATO and the OSCE, while forging a counterbalance to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Russian technological aid is evident throughout the Iranian missile and space programs. Russian scientists and expertise have played a direct and indirect role in these programs for years. According to some reports, Russian specialists are helping to develop the longer-range Shahab-5, and Russia has exported missile production facilities to Iran. Moscow has signed a contract to sell advanced long-range S-300 air-defense systems to Iran. Once Iran has air defenses to repel Israeli or American air strikes and nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, it will possess the capacity to destroy Israel (an openly stated goal of the regime) and strike targets throughout the Middle East, in Europe, and the Indian subcontinent. Beyond that, if and when an ICBM capability is achieved, Tehran will be able to threaten the U.S. homeland directly. Given the substantial Russian interests and ambitions, any grand bargain would almost certainly require an excessively high price paid by the United States to the detriment of its friends and allies. Russia simply does not view the situation through the same lens as the U.S.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

72. A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region

Author:
Martha Brill Olcott
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With Washington's influence on the Caspian region at its lowest ebb in many years, the Obama administration could reverse this trend with a new approach that accepts Russia's presence and China's interest as historical and geographical givens and emphasizes short- and medium-term problem solving in multilateral and bilateral settings instead of long-term political and economic transformations. The United States can accomplish more in the Caspian region by focusing on military reform and building security capacity than on forming military alliances. The United States should switch from a multiple pipeline strategy to a policy that advances competition by promoting market pricing for energy producers, consumers, and transit states. The United States could facilitate the introduction of renewable sources of energy as a stimulus to economic recovery and a source of enhanced social security. The United States should develop a nuanced strategy that encourages political development through social and educational programs and local capacity building. The Obama administration should name a high-level official as a presidential envoy to this region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Washington, and Central Asia

73. Understanding the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate

Author:
Christopher F. Chyba and J. D. Crouch
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 requires the U.S. secretary of defense to conduct a nuclear posture review (NPR) in consultation with the secretaries of energy and state, and to report the results to Congress before the end of 2009.The NPR, therefore, will be the Obama administration's forum for reviewing U.S. nuclear weapons policy, posture, and related programmatic and technical issues. Navigating and choosing among sharp disagreements in each of these areas, in order to map the wisest path forward for national and international security, is a difficult task. President Barack Obama has already made decisions on a number of important nuclear issues, but the NPR will need to relate these to the overall nuclear weapons posture. How will his desire to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) relate to the size and capabilities of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex? Should the United States arm some Trident submarines with conventionally/-tipped ballistic missiles? Should it pursue new arms control agreements with Russia beyond negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)? What should medium/-term U.S. objectives for strategic and non/-strategic warhead numbers and types be? What about ballistic missile defense? The list of important questions is long and, unless integrated into a broader strategic vision, presents a disparate jumble of choices.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

74. Russia, the United States, and the Challenge of Global Nonproliferation

Author:
John Beyrle
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Speaking to Russian students at the New Economic School graduation during his visit to Moscow in July, President of the United States, Barack Obama, succinctly expressed the greatest challenge facing us: the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Economics and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Moscow

75. Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal

Author:
Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The United States and the other members of the P5+1 are struggling to launch the first in-depth negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program in which the United States has participated. The United States comes to the table with few good options. Sanctions have failed to change Iran's decisions about its nuclear program, and no feasible set of sanctions (given the limits of what China, Russia, and others will agree to) is likely to convince Iran to give up its enrichment program. Military strikes against Iran would probably not set back Iran's program for longer than a brief period and would greatly increase Iran's incentive to go straight to the bomb at covert sites (as Iraq did after Israel destroyed its facilities at Osiraq).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Middle East

76. Medvedev's Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but not a Veto in a New European Security System

Author:
Richard J. Krickus
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European security system? This question has preoccupied analysts on both sides of the Atlantic ever since Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed that the existing one was deeply flawed and had to be replaced. Vladimir Putin's protégé observed in a series of speeches last summer that the American “unipolar moment” upon which it rested was over, and the United States could no longer dominate the international agenda. At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a relic of the Cold War and incapable of addressing existing and anticipated flash points of conflict on the Continent. How could the existing security system function when it excluded Russia—the largest country in Europe—and surrounded it with a curtain of steel on its western frontier?
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

77. Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals

Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States continue to maintain hundreds of nuclear weapons capable of striking the other side, and to have at least some of these nuclear forces at Cold War levels of alert, that is, ready to fire within a few minutes of receiving an order to do so. Even during the Cold War, alert levels were not static and moved up or down in step with changes in the strategic and tactical environments. While the operational readiness of some weapon systems has been reduced, there has been no major change in the readiness levels of most of the nuclear weapon systems in the post–Cold War era. This is in considerable part because Russia and the United States believe that despite fundamental changes in their overall relationship, vital interest requires maintaining a high level of nuclear deterrence. The post–Cold War experience also demonstrates that alert levels can be reduced and measures can be taken to reduce the risk of accidents or unauthorized takeover of nuclear weapons. Further measures could be taken to reduce operational readiness of nuclear arsenals. U.S. and Russian experts alike stressed survivability as a key element in the acceptance of these measures because of its importance to maintaining deterrence.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and United Nations

78. Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Miles A. Pomper, and William Potter
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Control of tractical nuclear weapons (TNW) has remained an elusive goal since the early 1990s when the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia adopted a set of unilateral parallel political obligations to reduce and store at central locations the larger part of their TNW forces. Efforts by the international community to nudge the two countries to give these unilateral statements a legally binding, verifiable character did not succeed, and one can point to little headway with respect TNW arms control in the intervening 18years.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

79. Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Dennis M. Gormley, Miles A. Pomper, Patricia M. Lewis, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, and Leonard S. Spector
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
In late April 2009, the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany requested that the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) undertake studies on four emerging issues in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, to be completed by June 15, 2009. The four issues were: The need to address the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional arms reduction, if the United States wants to entice others to go along the path to Global Zero. The world after drastic nuclear arms reductions, including the fear of U.S. conventional superiority/global strike capabilities;  The need (and promising areas) to make (nuclear) arms control and disarmament a strong component of NATO's new strategic concept;  Missile Defense, also covering a possible threat from others than Iran and the need to bring missile defense into the NATO-Russia Council; and Substrategic nuclear weapons, with a description of a way to achieve mutual transparency, reduction, and elimination in Europe.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

80. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and China