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1. Playing the long game: Russia in the Mediterranean

Author:
Giangiuseppe Pili, Alessio Armenzoni, Gary C. Kessler, and Diane M. Zorri
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia has fi rmly re-established its presence in the Mediterranean. Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis reveal that Russia is currently more active in North Africa and the Middle East, including operating a shadow fl eet of tankers that economically sustains Putin’s regime and its war eff orts in Ukraine. Given its size and capabilities, the current Russian squadron is not intended to engage in a full-scale naval battle against any NATO fl eet. Instead, it is deliberately kept weak enough to avoid being perceived as a major military threat.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Navy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

2. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:
George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

4. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

5. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Mobilisation in Wartime

Author:
Andriy Stavytskyy
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we launch a new series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the first brief of the series, Andriy Stavytskyy examines Ukraine’s need to mobilise, prepare and train half a million men to relieve those who have fought since the start of the full-scale war. This will not only challenge the military but will also have profound economic effects.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Mobilization, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. US-Germany Missile Agreement: Deterrence or Escalation?

Author:
Polina Sinovets
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
This October was marked by a statement by the Head of the German Foreign Service Intelligence, Bruno Kahl, who claimed that by the end of this decade at the latest, Russian troops could “carry out an attack” against NATO.[1] The defence chief could hardly be accused of hyperbole. His comments took place at the time of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the Kremlin’s growing nuclear blackmail of the West and regular threats to use some measures[2] against any NATO country whose military deployments might potentially affect Russian missiles’ striking capabilities. Against this backdrop and with the new US administration coming to power in 2025 under the slogan of turning all its attention to China, Europe will have to care much more about its defence and security than before 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed the weak spots of the European NATO pillar in terms of arms production, military budgeting and general preparedness for a large-scale war in European territory, which turns out to be critical for the security of the continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

7. Satellites in the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Ron Gurantz
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Satellites and counterspace systems have shown themselves to be important parts of modern warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War but have also been subject to various restrictions to prevent escalation. This monograph examines the role of satellites and counterspace systems in the Russia-Ukraine War’s high-technology warfare and the effects of satellite proliferation and commercialization on the conduct of the war. It also analyzes the restrictions under which space-based capabilities have been operating and the implications of these limits for future conflicts—a subject that has received little attention. Relying on an exhaustive study of open-source material and the application of limited-war theory to the case of the Russia-Ukraine War, this monograph will help officials and strategists better understand the roles satellites are likely to play in future conflicts and the limits under which states will operate them as governments seek to gain military advantage and avoid escalation.
Topic:
Space, Escalation, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Satellites
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects

Author:
Dara Massicot
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Ukraine and the West sharpens, it will be critically important for policymakers and warfighters to anticipate, monitor, and respond to Russia’s military reconstitution progress in the years ahead.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
Topic:
Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America