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11. Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities.

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed open-source images and information found on the internet, identifying several key Western parts, commonly available on the commercial market, used in the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze drone. - The Lancet-3 is an effective combat drone that has been successful in combat operations against Ukrainian systems, including Western supplied armor and artillery. - This report follows a series of reports published in the last year by the Institute on Russian drone systems and its acquisition of foreign technology. - Russia is increasingly relying on large quantities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify, target, and attack Ukrainian positions, vehicles, and structures. - Russia has a limited capability to design and produce advanced strategic commodities. To build these UAVs, Russia depends on extensive procurement networks to acquire strategic commodities produced by foreign countries, particularly the United States. - Because of the use of civilian Western components in Russian military systems, the United States and its partners are intensifying controls on critical items used in Russian drones, but more needs to be done.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

13. The No Limits Partnership: PRC Weapons Support for Russia

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is growing concern about the possible involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in supplying Russia with weapons, munitions, and various other technology that could have dual-use applications. Notably, no significant provision of large-scale military hardware from the PRC to Russia is evident, as such equipment would have been easily identified on the battlefield amongst the major equipment losses suffered by Russian forces. There are, however, consistent reports substantiating the claim that Chinese companies are providing military and dual-use equipment to Russia. In the PRC’s political system, this type of transaction would be difficult to conduct without the government’s tacit approval or—at the very least—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities turning a blind eye. In February 2022, following a meeting ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the dimensions of their two countries’ strategic partnership (Global Times, February 5, 2022). Xi and Putin reiterated that “friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, [and the] strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (The Kremlin, February 4, 2022). The closing ceremony for the Beijing Winter Olympics was held on February 20. Four days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, there has been widespread speculation that the PRC leadership knew about the Russian invasion. Additionally, there have been heightened concerns regarding the extent of Chinese support for Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. In July, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported on the “Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia”, with indications of increased Russian reliance on the PRC (ODNI, July 2023). In 2022 total Russian imports from the PRC increased by 13 percent to $76 billion. In the same year, PRC chip exports to Russia increased by 19 percent. Many of these transactions were facilitated by shell companies in Hong Kong acting as agents of secondary sales from international suppliers via the PRC to Russia. The ODNI report stated that “the PRC is providing some dual-use technology that Moscow’s military uses to continue the war in Ukraine, despite an international cordon of sanctions and export controls. The customs records show PRC state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies” (ODNI, July 2023). French diplomats further corroborated this report, notifying the public of intelligence indicating that the PRC has been supplying Russia with dual-use technologies as well as non-lethal assistance equipment, such as helmets and body armor (SCMP, July 22). When asked if the PRC is assisting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, French presidential advisor Emmanuel Bonne responded by saying “there are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do” (SCMP, July 22). The PRC government has emphatically denied allegations that it has provided any weapons or military assistance to Russia. Former PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang was reported by his own ministry as saying that “China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations. Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10). The second part of Qin Gang’s statement is significant, as he clearly states that exchanges between Chinese and Russian enterprises—such as commercial ties—are not be impacted by the war in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, his comments appear to suggest that dual-use technologies and equipment could be subject to the PRC government turning a blind eye.
Topic:
Partnerships, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

14. Importing Instability How the War Against Ukraine Makes Russia Less Secure

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
ACLED data indicate that cross-border violence between Ukraine and Russia escalated in May-October 2023 in the wake of the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. Conflict incidents inside Russia have become increasingly deadly for both civilians and the Russian military. Although the Russian government has attempted to hush up the impact of the war’s spillover, local authorities — especially those in the border regions — are struggling to fend off cross-border attacks. Ukrainian drone attacks have surged since May 2023, reaching deeper into Russian territory and inflicting significant damage to Russia’s reputation, military, and infrastructure. While the Wagner Group mutiny revealed the Russian state’s inability to control the internal situation, it may also have rallied the establishment around President Vladimir Putin. Still, resistance to the invasion from individuals and armed groups within Russia shows no signs of abating, as attacks on military enlistment offices and rail infrastructure continue despite the government crackdown on opposition and protest.
Topic:
Security, Drones, Wagner Group, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. The sixth domain: The role of the private sector in warfare

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have for some time recognized, as NATO doctrine provides, five operational domains—air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space.1 Each of those arenas fully fits with the understanding of a domain as a “specified sphere of activity” and, in each, militaries undertake critical wartime actions. But in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, certain key operational activities have been undertaken by the private sector as part of the conduct of warfare.2 By way of example, private-sector companies have been instrumental both in providing effective cybersecurity and in maintaining working information technology networks. As part of such efforts, these firms have established coordinated mechanisms to work with relevant government actors. These operational and coordinated activities by the private sector demonstrate that there is a “sixth domain”—specifically, the “sphere of activities” of the private sector in warfare—that needs to be included as part of warfighting constructs, plans, preparations, and actions if the United States and its allies are to prevail in future conflicts. As will be elaborated below, that sphere of activities focuses mainly on the roles of information and critical infrastructures, including their intersections—ranging from the transmission and protection of information to the assurance of critical infrastructure operations. Many of the United States’ activities in the sixth domain will take place in the United States homeland. However, while “defending the homeland” is listed as the first priority in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, insufficient attention has been paid to the actions that will be required of the private sector beyond just the defense industrial base as part of accomplishing an effective defense.3 Likewise, when US military forces are engaged in overseas combat, private-sector companies in allied countries (as well as US companies operating overseas) will be critical for the effectiveness of US forces, as well as for the allies’ own militaries. In short, establishing an effective strategy for the private sector in warfare is a key requirement for the United States and its allies.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

16. Russian Military Drones: Past, Present, and Future of the UAV Industry

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since 2009, Russia has invested significant effort into developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, for military purposes. They have used drones for reconnaissance, targeting, electronic warfare, and direct strikes. Some of these UAVs have been used in Ukraine and Syria since 2014, while combat UAVs (i.e., the Orion and Altius drones) still were on the research and development phase at the beginning of 2022. However, after a year of war in Ukraine, the Russian military has lost the biggest part of its tactical reconnaissance and targeting UAVs. At the same time, it was still unable to deploy advanced combat UAVs. As soon as fall 2022, or roughly six months into Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Russia started the large-scale use of Iranian loitering munitions, and continues to be highly dependent on them as of fall 2023. Despite efforts towards increasing their production, Russia’s use of its own loitering munitions remains insignificant.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Russia-Ukraine War, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Russian Military UAV Used in Ukraine Depends on Foreign Parts

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia is well known to depend on foreign goods for its military equipment and industries. Recent Ukrainian social media reports illustrate the large fraction of foreign goods in Russia’s Orlan-10, a mid-range, gasoline-engine, propellor-driven reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) widely used by Russian military forces to pinpoint Ukrainian civilian and military targets for artillery strikes.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Russia’s War on Ukraine: Iran’s Growing Role and the Nuclear Threat

Author:
Alistair Taylor, Philip Breedlove, and Iulia-sabina Joja
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
In today's episode, Alistair Taylor sits down with experts from MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative to assess the trajectory of Russia's war on Ukraine. They discuss Russia’s growing attacks on critical infrastructure, its recent deployment of Iranian drones and their impact on the battlefield, the potential nuclear threat, and where things might be headed from here. Today's guests are General Philip Breedlove and Iulia-Sabina Joja. General Breedlove is a retired United States Air Force General who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of U.S. European Command. He’s the Distinguished Chair of MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative and a Distinguished Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. Iulia is a Senior Fellow and Director of MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative and Director of its "Afghanistan Watch" project. She teaches courses on European security at Georgetown and George Washington universities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Eastern Europe

19. A candle in the dark: US national security strategy for artificial intelligence

Author:
Tate Nurkin and Stephen Rodriguez
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
AI is expected to have a transformational impact on the future of geopolitics, defense, and security. The emerging geopolitical and security context influencing the future of AI technology development has been driven by the erosion of traditional geopolitical frameworks, increased conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism, the pervasiveness of social media use and 4IR-driven digitization of industries, as well as the ability of more actors to affect strategic and operational environments. However, the future of AI will depend on the decisions of great power competitors—the US, China and Russia—global trends development, and the management of uncertainties associated with emerging technologies. In this fluctuating environment, where the US is engaged in a high-stakes competition with is near-peer adversaries, and AI is enabling paradigm-shifting changes in public and private sector operations, how should the US respond? In this new Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, A Candle in the Dark: US National Security Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, Tate Nurkin and Stephen Rodriguez provide an integrated strategy to respond to this key issue. According to Former US Secretary of Defense Dr. Ashton B. Carter, author of the foreword, this paper “effectively articulates the current technological landscape and offers a coherent strategic framework for the United States and its allies to harness AI’s upside potential, while mitigating downside risks and defending against emerging threats.” In a world full of uncertainties, this paper provides a holistic way forward for the US to leverage the full potential of AI while maintaining America’s technological competitiveness.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Entrepreneurship, Drones, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. The North Korean Air Force: A Declining or Evolving Threat?

Author:
Noam Hartoch and Alon Levkowitz
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests during the Kim Jong-un era have strengthened the country’s military power, deterring South Korea, Japan and, in particular, the United States. While North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly improving, parallel developments aren’t occurring in the traditionally technical air and air defense forces. Plagued with aging airframes, technical problems, parts shortages and budget shortfalls, the North Korean Air Force no longer challenges the South Korean and American air forces. This paper examines the North Korean Air Force, analyzing its organization and deployment, air defense and early warning capabilities, aircraft acquisition, and aircraft production. Shortfalls in each of these areas caused Pyongyang to develop, test, and operate an increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. While North Korea won’t be able to build a state-of-the-art aircraft industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways to strengthen its air force capabilities.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Weapons, Drones, Missile Defense, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, Poland, Soviet Union, New Zealand, and United States of America