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72. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material
- Author:
- Matthew Bunn
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
73. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive
- Author:
- Charles V. Peña
- Publication Date:
- 07-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
74. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment
- Author:
- Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
- Publication Date:
- 04-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia
75. The End of the Post-Gulf War Era
- Author:
- Dore Gold
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- Abstract:
- Three basic conditions prevailed when the Arab-Israeli peace process began in 1991 in Madrid and accelerated in 1993 at Oslo. First, the Soviet Union crumbled and eventually collapsed, removing what had since 1955 been the strategic backbone of the Arab military option against the State of Israel. Second, Iraq was militarily crushed and under both UN sanctions and monitoring, and was therefore removed from the political and military calculus of relations between Israel and the Arab world. Third, Iran was still recovering from its eight-year war with Iraq and was far from ready to have an impact in the Middle East. Together, these three conditions created a unique moment of Pax Americana, maintained not just by virtue of American power, but by the consent of its potential rivals.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, War, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Soviet Union
76. A Verification Regime for Warhead Control
- Author:
- Liu Suping
- Publication Date:
- 01-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Security and Cooperation
- Abstract:
- After a brief period of progress, the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction process has reached a stalemate. This situation causes us to rethink the following issues: What is the motivation for the two nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear reductions? How can the focus of the nuclear arms reduction process be changed from verification of reduction of delivery vehicles to verification of reduction of warheads and nuclear materials? What is the objective for future nuclear reductions? What kind of verification regime will be required for future nuclear reductions?
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
77. Rep. Tauscher on Winning the Post-Cold War
- Author:
- Jon B. Wolfsthal
- Publication Date:
- 10-1999
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Russia's nuclear weapons complex is spread across 10 remote, closed and formerly secret “nuclear cities,” which employ almost 1 million scientists, engineers and technicians. Moscow's economic collapse has left these former “jewels” in the Russian nuclear crown struggling to survive, and workers with access to nuclear materials and expertise routinely go for months without getting paid. The U.S. Department of Energy, as part of the Clinton Administration's cooperative threat reduction efforts, has launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to reduce the proliferation risks created by the poor economic conditions in these closed cities. By promoting the development of private industry in these cities, NCI seeks to prevent a brain drain of Russian nuclear experts to would-be nuclear-weapon states.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
78. The Nonproliferation Regime under Siege
- Author:
- George Bunn
- Publication Date:
- 09-1999
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Security and Cooperation
- Abstract:
- The nuclear nonproliferation regime was challenged in 1998 by nuclear-weapon tests in India and Pakistan, by medium-range missile tests in those countries and in Iran and North Korea, by Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and by the combination of “loose nukes” and economic collapse in Russia. Additional threats to the regime's vitality came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia that resulted from NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia—with additional harm to relations with China resulting from U.S. accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan's announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a U.S.-Chinese “one China” agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms-control treaties in the Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate, from a change in U.S. policy to favor building a national defense against missile attack, and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small tactical nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Government, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, South Asia, Middle East, Israel, East Asia, Asia, and Korea
79. Strategic Arms Control -- Moment of Decision?
- Author:
- Rodney W. Jones, Michael Nacht, Sergei Rogov, Kenneth Sr. Meyers, Steve Pifer, Nikolai Sokov, and Alexei Arbatov
- Publication Date:
- 06-1997
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In his introductory remarks, Jones pointed out that key Russian interests in the terms of START II, which the United States shared and helped address in the early 1990s -- the denuclearization of Ukraine and the decoupling of Russian strategic forces from dependence on missile production plants in Ukraine -- faded into the background after START I entered into force and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in December 1994. Russian criticism of START II thereafter focused on U.S. missile defense developments that could affect the ABM Treaty, on the heavy costs to Russia of implementing reductions, and on the unequal U.S. and Russian reconstitution potential under START II ceilings. By 1996, reactions to NATO expansion had become a further obstacle to START II ratification in Moscow.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, and Ukraine
80. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference 1997 Agenda
- Author:
- Brad Roberts, Richard Speier, Leonard Spector, James Steinberg, Hank Chiles, Rüdiger Hartmann, Harald Müller, Leonard Weiss, Ben Sanders, Valery Tsepkalo, Shai Feldman, Phebe Marr, Riaz Kokhar, Virginia Foran, Dennis Gormley, Michael Moodie, Gennady Pshakin, Wendy Frieman, Shah. Prakash, Munir Akram, Michael Krepon, and Alexei Arbatov
- Publication Date:
- 06-1997
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Enhancing the Tools of the Trade." Each year, preparing the agenda for this meeting and preparing my opening remarks, provides me the opportunity to survey our field, to take stock of recent accomplishments and set backs, and to anticipate the challenges ahead. In many respects the news in our field has been good. Since we met last, in February 1996: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature. The South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has entered into force for the regional parties, and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has been opened for signature. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been upgraded and the way opened for further enhancements, under the second part of the 93+2 program. In the area of export controls, multilateral regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, have added several new members and refined their rules... and China has strengthened its non-proliferation commitments by pledging not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear installations. In addition, there have been no new stories of significant leaks of nuclear materials from Russia or the other Soviet successor states, and U.S. cooperative programs to enhance security over such materials have gained considerable momentum. Reinforcing the norm of non-proliferation, the two nuclear superpowers continue to dismantle nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and there are reasonable prospects for further reductions under the pending START II treaty and an anticipated START III accord. Looking at the threshold states... Pakistan is continuing its freeze on the production of fissile material, although Israel and India are apparently adding to their plutonium stockpiles. The North Korean nuclear weapons effort appears to remain frozen, as the result of the October 1994 Agreed Framework understanding with the United States. Finally, Iran's nuclear weapons program, according to recent testimony by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, has not progressed in the past two years, while Iraq's nuclear activities are being suppressed by UNSCOM, and Libya's nuclear program appears to be languishing.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Africa, Russia, United States, and Iran