Search

Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Russia

51. Missile Defense in NATO: A French Perspective

Author:
Bruno Gruselle
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In France, missile defense comes with a long and complicated history. When the U.S. Congress passed the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999," which called for the development and deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system, Paris reacted negatively. At that time, France still considered missile defense to be both unnecessary and destabilizing. French policy makers still considered the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to be the cornerstones of strategic stability. French thinkers viewed missile defense as jeopardizing both the doctrine and the Treaty, as well as risking a new arms race with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, France, and North America

52. The Defense Monitor, Volume XXXVIII - July/August/September 2009

Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
The international Global Zero Commission, a group of political and military leaders from the United States, Russia and other key countries, held an intensive two-day meeting in Washington, D.C. on June 28-29, 2009 - where they presented a practical and comprehensive plan calling for the phased and verified elimination of all nuclear weapons over the next 20 years, and briefed senior Obama administration officials on their recommendations in advance of the July 6-8 Moscow Summit.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Washington, and Moscow

53. Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Miles A. Pomper, and William Potter
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Control of tractical nuclear weapons (TNW) has remained an elusive goal since the early 1990s when the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia adopted a set of unilateral parallel political obligations to reduce and store at central locations the larger part of their TNW forces. Efforts by the international community to nudge the two countries to give these unilateral statements a legally binding, verifiable character did not succeed, and one can point to little headway with respect TNW arms control in the intervening 18years.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

54. Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Dennis M. Gormley, Miles A. Pomper, Patricia M. Lewis, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, and Leonard S. Spector
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
In late April 2009, the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany requested that the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) undertake studies on four emerging issues in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, to be completed by June 15, 2009. The four issues were: The need to address the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional arms reduction, if the United States wants to entice others to go along the path to Global Zero. The world after drastic nuclear arms reductions, including the fear of U.S. conventional superiority/global strike capabilities;  The need (and promising areas) to make (nuclear) arms control and disarmament a strong component of NATO's new strategic concept;  Missile Defense, also covering a possible threat from others than Iran and the need to bring missile defense into the NATO-Russia Council; and Substrategic nuclear weapons, with a description of a way to achieve mutual transparency, reduction, and elimination in Europe.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

55. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and China

56. The Defense Monitor, Primed and ready

Author:
Philip E. Coyle, Whitney Parker, Bruce Blair, and Brian Ellison
Publication Date:
05-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
American And Russian political rhetoric attaches the highest priority to imposing ironclad control over their nuclear arsenals. The two nations cooperate extensively and devote substantial resources to achieving this aim, but both nations are shooting themselves in the foot by allowing hoary cold War priorities to take precedence. The anachronistic mind-set of the cold Warrior still dominates their nuclear establishments, their agendas, and their relationship in ways that deeply undermine their efforts to contain “loose nukes.” They spend 25 times more money to preserve their c old War nuclear deterrent postures than they spend on shoring up security against theft.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, America, Europe, and Asia

57. The Pugwash Newsletter: To the Pugwash Community

Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
Celebrations in honor of the 50th anniversary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs are occurring around the world in 2007. National groups from Denmark to Russia, Sri Lanka to the United States, and Spain to Japan, are organizing events to commemorate the very first meeting, held in July 1957 at the home of Cyrus Eaton in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, and to remind the world of the ever-present threat posed by nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Iraq, Middle East, Denmark, and Spain

58. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Moscow - Washington Alliance

Author:
Ken Berry
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The United States and Russia have the biggest responsibility for countering nuclear terrorism because together they account for the overwhelming share of global nuclear materials, expertise and weapons. The two countries also have between them the most substantial capacities in counter-terrorism intelligence and response. There is little to separate the two in their policies against nuclear terrorism. Where there are differences in approach on some aspects of nuclear proliferation, the two countries have accepted an obligation as the pre-eminent nuclear powers to try to narrow their differences. The international community cannot defeat nuclear terrorism or limit it without an active and vigorous alliance between Washington and Moscow.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, International Cooperation, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Washington, and Moscow

59. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005

Author:
Richard F. Grimmett
Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its various policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government (FMS) transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

60. EU-Russia - Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy

Author:
Michael Emerson
Publication Date:
05-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
On the 10th of May the EU and Russia signed four 'roadmap' documents at summit level in Moscow, on the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. This was the culmination of two year's work since the May 2003 summit that decided in principle to create the four spaces as a long-term project. It was intended also to give new momentum to the relationship, after seeing that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 had not become a motor for anything very substantial, while the subsequent phase (in 1999) of swapping common strategy documents also led nowhere in particular.
Topic:
International Relations and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia