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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Russia

31. ABM Defense Prospects of a New Russia-us 'Reset'

Author:
Yury Fedorov
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
The Obama administration recently suggested concluding a legally binding agreement on transparency that would confirm that American BMD does not pose a threat to Russia's deterrence forces, and also concluding a framework agreement on further cutting Russian and American nuclear arsenals. The USA may be interested in reducing the tensions with Russia over the missile defense with a view to break the deadlock on a wide complex of hard security and proliferation issues, including the hot problems of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe and Iran and the North Korean nuclear programs, and also to ensure Russia's support in managing regional crises – these days, especially that in Syria.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Korea, and Syria

32. The future of the CWC in the post-destruction phase

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders, Richard Guthrie, Cindy Vestergaard, Ralf Trapp, and Yasemin Balci
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
At the 17 th Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) held in November 2012, the subject generating the most debate concerned the place of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in CWC meetings and whether their role should be rather passive (i.e. 'attend') or be characterised by more active involvement (i.e. 'participate'). The latter option would allow them to address States Parties at meetings or organise side events within (rather than outside) the conference building. Addressing one of the core functions of the disarmament treaty, Libya, Russia and the United States reported in detail on progress and issues affecting the destruction of their respective chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles. Despite the fact that all three countries had missed the ultimate destruction deadline of April 2012, no state raised its flag to comment, question or protest about the delays. When the negotiators of the CWC concluded their business in September 1992 and decided to forward the treaty text to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) for assent, missing the destruction deadlines was universally viewed as one of the worst possible breaches of the CWC. In practice, a robust verification regime combined with permanent in - formation sharing, voluntary transparency beyond the requirements in the Convention, and dialogue over the years yielded commonly approved decisions to extend the destruction deadlines with strict monitoring and reporting requirements. Confident that the holders of the three largest declared CW stockpiles have no malicious intent, States Parties can continue with the implementation of all dimensions of the CWC without recriminations or deadlock.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, International Law, International Organization, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Libya

33. How to Stop Doing Business with Russia's Arm Exporter

Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
As part of the United States plan to begin military withdrawals from Afghanistan in 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) contracted with the Russian state owned arms dealer, Rosoboronexport, to provide helicopters to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). DOD has continued and expanded its purchases from Rosoboronexport even while acknowledging that the Russian arms dealer has enabled mass atrocities by supplying Syria's Bashar al-Assad with weapons that have been used to murder Syrian civilians.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Human Rights, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

34. Crisis Diplomacy from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush

Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self Determination at Princeton University convened a special Colloquium, “Diplomacy from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: A Holistic and Proactive Approach” in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein, April 19-22, 2012. The colloquium brought together over seventy participants, including senior representatives, experts, academics, and civil society representatives from Austria, Azerbaijan, the European Union, Germany, Georgia, France, Iran, Israel, Liechtenstein, Russia, Qatar, Switzerland, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Participants engaged in both plenary and working group discussions about ways to address the four key issues: crisis diploma - cy with Iran; the ongoing crisis in Syria; Afghanistan in transition; and preventing the escalation of crises in this macro region. This was the third LISD-sponsored colloquium on developments in the Mediterranean to Hindu Kush region since the Arab Spring. The colloquium was off the record according to Liechtenstein Colloquium rules, and was financially supported by LISD, The House of Liechtenstein, the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein, and the SIBIL Stiftung in Vaduz. The Colloquium was chaired by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Director of LISD. This chair's summary includes an updated postscript.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, Middle East, France, Arabia, Germany, Syria, Qatar, and Austria

35. Beyond Treaties: Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The U.S. political parties are divided on nuclear weapons policy. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia have reached an arms control impasse and no new agreement is on the horizon. Confidence-building measures could help reduce nuclear risks between the United States and Russia, advancing the goals of both countries and both U.S. presidential candidates.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

36. Raising our Sights: Russian-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Michael Kofman
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States and Russia have sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war by limiting offensive strategic capabilities through negotiated agreements, relying on mutual deterrence based on reciprocal threats and the corresponding fear of retaliation. Although nuclear arsenals have been pared, this is fundamentally the same way the United States and Soviet Union sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war during the Cold War, when both were impelled to do so because they were adversaries and able to do so despite being adversaries. It is ironic—not to say unimaginative—that although the two are no longer adversaries, they stick to a path chosen when they were. This current approach is inadequate given new strategic vulnerabilities brought on by technological change. Both the opportunity and the need now exist for a different, more ambitious approach to avoiding strategic conflict—one designed for new possibilities as well as new vulnerabilities. The United States and Russia can and should raise their sights from linear numerical progress to qualitative transformation of their strategic relationship.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

37. Conventional Arms Control in Europe and Related Regional Security Concerns

Author:
Isabelle Francois
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional arms control in Europe remains relevant more than two decades after the singing of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). Today, it could serve as a useful vehicle for collaboration with Russia on a broad range of security issues, and productive movement forward would also do much to reassure and secure smaller NATO allies and regional partners. Ultimately, what is needed is a paradigm shift away from "mutual assured destruction" and towards a concept of "mutual assured stability."
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

38. Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Nuclear-Weapon States

Author:
Peter Crail and Xiaodon Liang
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Following a decade-long impasse, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) is finally on a path to being endorsed by the world's five recognized nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Agreement by these nuclear powers to respect the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and to provide legal assurances that they will not use such weapons against zone members helps to strengthen the commitment by regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons, and contributes more broadly to global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts,
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, France, and Southeast Asia

39. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is experiencing the most significant level of public dissatisfaction with Vladimir Putin since he assumed power a decade ago. While the sizeable street protests in Russia may well signal a political and social watershed moment for the country, a more minor political event a few months ago provided a telling sign regarding one of the regime's most important projects—a massive program for military modernization.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

40. Military capabilities in the Arctic

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In recent years the forecast of far-reaching climate change in the Arctic has led to fears of future conflict in the region. Such fears have been expressed in official documents, including defence policy documents, of the five Arctic littoral states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Three of them—Canada, Denmark and Russia—have recently adopted foreign and defence policies that have put a special emphasis on the Arctic. They have strengthened their military presence in the Arctic or increased military capabilities for Arctic use and have presented plans for additional military strengthening. Meanwhile, Norway has moved a substantial part of its operational forces to the north of the country. Of the five littoral states, only the USA has placed less focus on Arctic security.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Climate Change, Natural Resources, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark