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81. Palestinian Fragmentation: Case Study of Jenin and Nablus

Author:
Zohar Palti
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
One of the most serious implications of four years of incessant violence and terrorism is the fragmentation of Palestinian society. Notwithstanding the debate over the impact of the Israeli presence in the territories, Palestinian quality of life cannot improve without radical reform in the structure of the Palestinian Authority (PA), its leadership, and its methods of governance. Indeed, PA Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei cited chaos as the reason for his recent resignation (which he subsequently rescinded). Similarly, on July 21, PA minister in charge of municipal governance Saeb Erekat, stated, "If we can't restore public order and law . . . this will bring the greatest damage to the Palestinian people and their cause. . . . It's the whole social fabric that is collapsing now." According to a June 2004 poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 88.6 percent of Palestinians believe that their government is corrupt, with most respondents stating that this corruption is widespread.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Arabia

82. Assessing the Current Challenge to Arafat

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasir Arafat is facing a serious challenge to his authority, perhaps the most serious since he arrived in the territories from Tunis a decade ago this month. Yesterday, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) voted by a 43-4 margin to accept the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei (a.k.a. Abu Ala), who earlier this week warned he would quit due to the lack of reform in the PA and the lack of authority granted him to halt chaos in the West Bank and Gaza. In doing so, the PLC called for the formation of a new reform-oriented government, a move that could actually serve to strengthen Qurei's position in a power struggle with Arafat. The resignation marks the second time in ten months that a Palestinian prime minister has resigned due to complaints about lack of authority.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Arabia, and Gaza

83. Israel's Security Fence: Effective in Reducing Suicide Attacks from the Northern West Bank

Author:
Zohar Palti
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The International Court of Justice is expected to rule this Friday, July 9, on the legality of Israel's security fence. The Palestinians strongly oppose the security fence, claiming that the fence negatively affects them. Israel is now seeking to address their concerns through a variety of means relating to the route of the fence and to the creation of a humanitarian office to minimize the impact of the fence on the Palestinians. At the same time, it is indisputable that the fence is succeeding in its main objective of minimizing the risk of infiltration to Israel by suicide bombers in the northern West Bank. The entire fence is expected to be completed by the end of next year.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia

84. Sharon's Disengagement Plan: A Likud Perspective

Author:
Zalman Shoval
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On June 6, the Israeli government approved a plan for unilateral separation by a 14 to 7 vote. The plan includes complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (with the exception of the so-called "Philadelphi Corridor" on the Egypt-Gaza border) and from certain West Bank settlements. It is scheduled to be implemented beginning in March 2005 and should be completed by the end of that year.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia

85. After the Likud Referendum: The Future of the Sharon Government

Author:
Yosef (Tommy) Lapid
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 17, 2004, Israeli justice minister Yosef (Tommy) Lapid addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. Mr. Lapid became head of the Shinui Party in 2000. Under his leadership, Shinui has rapidly grown in popularity and is now the third-largest faction in the 120-member Knesset and the second-largest in Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's coalition. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks. Recent polls show that 70 to 80 percent of Israelis support Sharon's Gaza withdrawal initiative. Therefore, they are unlikely to accept the Likud Party referendum of May 2, 2004, rejecting this initiative. At the same time, Israel cannot afford to allow a post-withdrawal vacuum to emerge in the territories, which the Iranians could potentially fill (Tehran supports Hizballah, which in turn supplies Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ]). Therefore, the withdrawal initiative must be altered somewhat from its original concept. Such a change would allow Sharon to say that he is accepting the ruling of his party while nevertheless moving forward with disengagement. His Gaza plan may turn out to be a three-stage process that is acceptable to Shinui. In any case, if an alternative formula is not proposed soon, Shinui will be forced to reconsider its participation in the government. We cannot sit idly and hope that Washington holds out on Israel's behalf against the interventionist tendencies—or so-called "goodwill"—of the Quartet. Shinui's formula for conflict management differs from that of both Sharon and the Israeli left, coming as it does from the center of the Israeli political spectrum. Shinui is well aware of the Roadmap's stipulation that measures must be taken against terrorism. Although Israel should indeed resume the reciprocal processes outlined in the Roadmap, it must also recognize that Palestinian Authority (PA) prime minister Abu Ala cannot dismantle Hamas and PIJ under the current circumstances without causing a civil war. Yasir Arafat does not want to make peace. Hence, Abu Ala must unite the PA's sixteen security organizations under one entity, which he should then head rather than allowing these forces to remain under Arafat's leadership. In the past, Shinui opposed talking to Abu Ala until he put a stop to terrorism, but the party has changed its stance for the time being. When Likud rejected Sharon's initiative, Shinui realized that the right was attempting to create a stalemate. Shinui cannot subscribe to any such policy. If these delay tactics continue, international parties may attempt to enter the arena both politically and physically. Israelis must therefore take the initiative to speak with Abu Ala based on the acknowledgment that he is unable to wage a comprehensive fight against terrorist organizations. If Likud does manage to move forward with disengagement in the near term, however, Shinui will rethink its policy toward Abu Ala.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, and Gaza

86. A Roadmap for Revived Palestinian Reform?

Author:
Nabil Amr
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 13, 2004, Nabil Amr addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. Mr. Amr, an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, served in previous Palestinian Authority cabinets as minister of information and minister for parliamentary affairs. A former member of the Palestinian delegation to peace talks with Israel, he is currently a visiting fellow at the Institute. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Norway, Palestine, and Arabia

87. America after 9/11: Public Opinion on the War on Terrorism and the War with Iraq

Author:
Karlyn H. Bowman
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Polls should not be used to make policy whether the issue is sending troops into battle or shoring up Social Security. They are too crude for that purpose. That said, policy makers need to be aware of what the public is thinking. That is what this collection is designed to do. We are very grateful for the cooperation the pollsters have given us in making this collection possible. The document is a work in progress. We began putting it together in late September 2001, and we have updated it weekly, adding new sections as new issues have arisen. With 14 national pollsters in the field on a regular basis, the polling environment has become very competitive. The different ways that pollsters approach a topic and the responses they receive are often useful in understanding what Americans are thinking.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Palestine

88. Saudi Arabia's Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism

Author:
Dore Gold
Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
Saudi Arabia's past involvement in international terrorism is indisputable. While the Bush administration decided to redact 28 sensitive pages of the Joint Intelligence Report of the U.S. Congress, nonetheless, Saudi involvement in terrorist financing can be documented through materials captured by Israel in Palestinian headquarters in 2002-3. In light of this evidence, Saudi denials about terrorist funding don't hold water. Israel retrieved a document of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) which detailed the allocation of $280,000 to 14 Hamas charities. IIRO and other suspected global Saudi charities are not NGOs, since their boards of directors are headed by Saudi cabinet members. Prince Salman, a full brother of King Fahd, controls IIRO distributions "with an iron hand," according to former CIA operative Robert Baer. Mahmoud Abbas, in fact, complained, in a handwritten December 2000 letter to Salman, about Saudi funding of Hamas. Defense Minister Prince Sultan has been cited as a major IIRO contributor. It was hoped, after the May 12 triple bombing attack in Riyadh, that Saudi Arabia might halt its support for terrorism. Internally, the Saudi security forces moved against al-Qaeda cells all over the kingdom. But externally, the Saudis were still engaged in terrorist financing, underwriting 60-70 percent of the Hamas budget, in violation of their "roadmap" commitments to President Bush. Additionally, the Saudis back the civilian infrastructure of Hamas with extremist textbooks glorifying jihad and martyrdom that are used by schools and Islamic societies throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ideological infiltration of Palestinian society by the Saudis in this way is reminiscent of their involvement in the madrassa system of Pakistan during the 1980s, that gave birth to the Taliban and other pro bin-Laden groups.
Topic:
Security, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Arab Countries, and Saudi Arabia

89. Unilateral Separation as Roadmap Insurance

Author:
Gerald M. Steinberg
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
The record of formal efforts to negotiate peace in protracted ethno-national conflicts (Balkans, N. Ireland, Sri Lanka, etc.) is not encouraging. Israel needs a serious insurance policy, in the form of unilateral separation, to minimize vulnerability to another and potentially more deadly terror campaign, should the "roadmap" fail. The construction of a separation barrier is supported by over 70 percent of the Israeli public, representing a broad consensus from across the political spectrum that favors a physical barrier blocking access to Israeli cities in order to prevent a resumption of the Palestinian terror campaign of the past three years. Political separation will also promote a two-state solution, allowing Israel to remain a culturally Jewish and democratic society while fostering Palestinian sovereignty. Key policy issues concern the pace of construction and the route to be taken for the remaining sections. While options range from a minimalist 300 km line to a 600 km alternative that would include most Israeli settlements, a pragmatic middle route including settlement blocs like Ariel and Gush Etzion may provide the optimum mix under present circumstances. If the Palestinian security framework proves its capabilities in preventing terror, and political negotiations on borders progress, the barrier can be relocated.
Topic:
Security, Religion, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Arabia, Balkans, and Ireland

90. The UN and the Assault on Israel's Legitimacy: Implications for the Roadmap

Author:
Anne Bayefsky
Publication Date:
07-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
The roadmap has significant roots in the UN, an organization long understood as biased against Israeli interests and Jewish well-being in general. Examples include the work of the UN "Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories," established in 1968, and the UN "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People," created in 1975. There is a pressing need to clarify with the American administration what attributes of sovereignty will not be accorded a Palestinian state with provisional borders prior to final status negotiations. Israel must reassert that its consent is necessary for any decision affecting its essential interests. An American commitment to object to any unilateral declaration of independence should be immediately forthcoming and clearly understood by the parties. The UN and the European Union must be kept out of any monitoring and assessment function. Recognition of a fundamental breach, and the ability to apply the necessary consequences, require that precise and public monitoring by Israel start now.
Topic:
Security, Religion, and United Nations
Political Geography:
America, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia