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151. R2P Monitor, Issue 39, 15 May 2018

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 39 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Burundi, Iraq and Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Syria, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

152. Future Challenges for Israel’s Iron Dome Rocket Defenses

Author:
Ari Kattan
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
After Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets at northern Israel during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the Israeli government began a crash program to find a technological solution to the rocket threat. The result was Iron Dome, which shot down its first rocket on April 7, 2011, and saw large-scale combat during wars in 2012 and 2014. The system has been hailed in Israel and worldwide as a success, with the Israeli military claiming a 90 percent interception rate. Some American defense commentators have even touted Iron Dome as evidence in favor of ballistic missile defense. However, serious questions remain about Iron Dome’s true technical efficacy, both in terms of its past performance and how it is likely to perform in the future under different conditions. Because so much about Iron Dome is classified, information provided by the Israeli military cannot be independently verified. Analyses performed by outside experts—both those questioning Iron Dome’s efficacy and those defending the Israeli government’s claims—are inconclusive. Assuming for the sake of argument that Iron Dome did, in fact, perform as advertised during its previous engagements, it is far from certain that it will be as successful in future engagements, where the volume of rocket fire will be higher and the rockets more accurate. This paper argues that Israel may have already reached “peak Iron Dome,” and the system’s military and political benefits will decrease in future wars until another technological breakthrough is made on rocket defense. This is not to say that Iron Dome was not worth the cost and should not have been procured. But expectations about Iron Dome from the Israeli military, Israeli civilians, and interested parties abroad should be tempered. If they are not, Iron Dome’s decreased success rate in future wars may pose political problems for Israel domestically and give Israel’s adversaries a decisive propaganda victory.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Missile Defense, Hezbollah, Propaganda, and Anti-Semitism
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

153. The Tunnel Tension: Potential Trajectories of Escalation Between Israel and Hezbollah

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
As Israel’s Operation Northern Shield continues, with the aim of dismantling the tunnels discovered on the Lebanese border, the Israeli policies mark a remarkable shift in confronting Hezbollah’s threats. The operation comes as part of a series of parallel measures, employing a tactic different from the military escalation scenario, which cannot be completely ruled out in the future with the aim of launching a preemptive strike. However, with no variables yet to enhance such scenario, the Tel Aviv tactic will focus on linking the party’s new threat and escalation with the latter, along with Iran, on the Syrian front, on the belief that the party's new approach stems from the interactions of the equation itself. On the other hand, Hezbollah has reacted in a similar way, based on calculations that do not lean toward engaging in mutual escalation, albeit threatening of military “surprises” as part of a defensive strategy. Among those “surprises” is deploying the new and unconventional techniques of its missile capabilities, which have been developed by its expertise on the Syrian ground and with the help of Iran. Apart from these expected messages, Hezbollah has, since the discovery of tunnels, questioned Tel Aviv's account of the issue. Hezbollah's various media platforms have focused on attributing the escalation to the Israeli internal developments, amid the crisis facing Netanyahu's government, after the withdrawal of former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman from the government coalition.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Borders, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

154. One City, Two Realities: Jerusalem Public Opinion Survey 2018

Author:
Dan Miodownik and Noam Brenner
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Israel/Palestine Creative Regional Initiatives (IPCRI)
Abstract:
This public opinion survey covers different issues of life in Jerusalem of its Israeli and Palestinian residents. It surveys their expressions about local needs, who they view as their local leadership, their social attitudes and ways of communication. It also explores perceptions of violence, life satisfaction and also questions about the future of Jerusalem and municipal elections. ​ This survey is a part of a larger peacebuilding initiative in Jerusalem called “Building Visions for the Future of Jerusalem: A Bottom-Up Approach”. As such, the survey is one of a few ways to collect and give voice to the residents’ needs and perceptions regarding their life in Jerusalem. Its final objectives are to to better understand the foundations for cooperation between the two populations in this contested city, in order to assist in improving their well-being.
Topic:
Demographics, Territorial Disputes, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem

155. The Motives and the Consequences of the Gaza Great Return March

Author:
Omar Shaban
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For four consecutive Fridays, tens of thousands of Gaza’s gather close which began on Friday, 30/3/2018 to the Gaza border with Israel what became known as “Gaza Great Return March, GRM. According to several reports, it can be said that the most the important motive for the Great Return Marches, are the tragic conditions in which Gaza’s live. Gaza has been besieged for more than 11 years. It suffers from a severe Palestinian division, and its people are suffering from a shortage of electricity, water scarcity, and inability to travel. Not to forget the three previous wars that destroyed everything in the Gaza Strip. Not to mention the failure of both options; the peace process led by the PA and armed resistance led by Hamas. The GRM was driven by the siege, the high level of unemployment, the ongoing consequences, up to today of the three wars, and the prevention of freedom of movement. However, raising the slogan “right of return” for the march was a unifying factor that helps to mobilize tens of thousands of participants. This slogan goes beyond any ideologies or socio-political issues. The march has achieved part of the goals, which is to have peaceful movements that begin with the commemoration of Land Day on March 30 till May, 15, the 70th anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba.
Topic:
International Security
Political Geography:
Palestine

156. A Sense of Victory on Both Sides: A Recipe for Escalation in Gaza?

Author:
Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Following the "March of Return" events led by Hamas on two turbulent Fridays at the border fence between Israel and the Gaza Strip, both sides declared victory. And in the case of such a blatantly asymmetric conflict between parties with opposing aims, both sides can indeed claim victory, precisely because they are conducting parallel maneuvers. Israel operates largely on a physical dimension (protecting its sovereign territory), while Hamas works mainly on the cognitive-political level. In a world of images, intensive information campaigns, and mass media (including fake news), a sense of victory on both sides could intensify the hostilities on the Gaza border and perhaps even beyond in the coming weeks. Israel must stress that it is defending a recognized international border; clarify the legality and proportionality of its use of live fire; expand its visual documentation of the events; update Arab countries about the facts and balance the pro-Hamas messages delivered in the Arab media; and prepare for an escalation of the conflict. Finally, while focused on the immediate challenge of mass demonstrations on the Gaza border, Israel must continue to address the underlying issue: the growing distress in Gaza and the collapse of its infrastructures will make it hard for Israel to continue managing the situation with relatively low political, military, and financial costs. Mid-May will be followed by the month of Ramadan and another scorching summer. Temporary success in containing the new challenge posed by Hamas will not defuse the social-economic-military time bomb ticking in the Strip.
Topic:
Terrorism, Infrastructure, Conflict, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

157. From the First Intifada to the "March of Return"

Author:
Yohanan Tzoreff
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The "March of Return" events have brought out the masses. It seems that since the first intifada the Palestinian arena has not witnessed such widespread mass participation as evident in the recent protests along the Gaza Strip border. At the same time, it is doubtful whether the crowds can deliver the same achievements they furnished in the first intifada. This is due to public suspicions regarding the intentions of both Fatah and Hamas, the absence of international and Arab support so far, and the deterrent element of Israel's response. A new chapter appears to have opened in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, in which the Palestinian public is asked to decide which of the two paths proposed by the respective leaderships – in Ramallah and in Gaza – should be adopted. In the background are the echoes of failure of both paths – the path of negotiation and security coordination led by the Palestinian Authority, and the path of armed opposition led by Hamas. The main test now is for Hamas, as the ruler of the Strip. Will it succeed by means of the "March of Return," which it is leading but did not initiate, to extend the common denominator between the rival Palestinian camps, to heighten the motivation to maintain the tension along the border, until the planned climax on May 15? Or will it be satisfied with the attempt to place the blame for the failure of internal Palestinian reconciliation and the weakening internal reality on the Palestinian Authority leadership in Ramallah? Time will tell.
Topic:
Refugees, Conflict, Hamas, and Palestinian Authority
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

158. The Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Victory within the Political Status Quo

Author:
Eldad Shavit
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
In the May 6, 2018 elections in Lebanon, the Shia bloc led by Hezbollah succeeded in increasing its power in the parliament at the expense of Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri’s party. Nevertheless, due to the country’s electoral system, the political status quo achieved in December 2016 will likely be maintained. The process of forming the government will once again reignite the power battle between Hezbollah and Iran on the one hand and al-Hariri and his supporters in Saudi Arabia and in the international community, mainly France and the United States, on the other hand. The election results will encourage Hezbollah to continue to consolidate its power and its ability to wield influence in the Lebanese political arena. The drive to promote this objective may also act as a restraining factor in the organization’s conduct vis-à-vis Israel. Therefore, at the present time, Hezbollah will presumably opt to continue to use Syria as its preferred theater for action against Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Elections, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon

159. Israel Apartheid Week 2018

Author:
Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
In comparison to previous years, the 2018 Israel Apartheid Week (IAW) was somewhat smaller in scope, and calmer in the level of energies it generated among both protagonists and antagonists. Still, it would be unwise to dismiss the IAW phenomenon as insignificant. In addition to the repercussions of the cumulative effect of efforts to delegitimize Israel in general, and efforts to equate Israel with apartheid during IAW in particular, the growing number of Jewish students who support and even instigate passionate campaigning against Israel is troubling. While the Israeli government's controversial policies vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fuel some of the events, IAW, similar to the BDS campaign, should not be mistaken for a pro-peace, pro-two-state, or pro-dialogue endeavor. Thus, both the State of Israel and Israel supporters should be minded toward engaging in a long term effort; strive to develop quantifying and measurement indices capable of obliterating the "noise" generated by IAW; monitor new trends in the phenomenon; and enable free and secure flow of knowledge between all relevant players in their efforts to counter IAW events. Findings also emphasize the state's important role in working systematically and strategically to bridge between the Jewish communities in Israel and in the Diaspora.
Topic:
Apartheid, Diaspora, Protests, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

160. The Future of Jerusalem: Between Public Opinion and Policy

Author:
Zipi Israeli and Udi Dekel
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The waves of terror in Jerusalem in recent years have disproved two false assumptions that have long guided Israeli governments. The first is that it is possible to maintain the status quo in the city, including on the Temple Mount. The second false assumption is that Jerusalem is a united city. This line of thinking is at odds with the reality in the east of the city, especially the neighborhoods and villages where for 51 years, neglect has reigned supreme and few Israeli Jews ever enter. Even now, Israeli control there is limited, especially in areas on the outer side of the security barrier. A clear majority of Israelis agree that today, in practice, Jerusalem is divided into a Jewish city and an Arab city. Consequently, a string of urgent actions is needed, first and foremost improvements to municipal services, infrastructures, and quality of life in East Jerusalem, as well as incentives to involve the Arab population in the Jerusalem municipal authority. Most of the Israeli Jewish public feels that the current reality in Jerusalem is highly problematic and difficult to sustain forever. Therefore, at present there is growing openness to new and creative ideas, and the steps proposed to improve living conditions support a range of future options for East Jerusalem.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Refugee Crisis, Borders, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine