Search

Begin New Search Topic Conflict Resolution Political Geography Pakistan

31. Correcting America's Image Problem in Pakistan

Author:
Moeed Yusuf
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Despite receiving over $15 billion in U.S. aid since 9/11, perceptions of America in Pakistan remain acutely negative. If Pakistanis continue to be opposed to U.S. policies, the Pakistani government will not be able to deliver on its promises, and U.S. initiatives in Pakistan will not produce desired outcomes. American and Pakistani governments have forged a rather opaque relationship which has not helped to cultivate popular support for policies across Pakistan. Instead, it has fostered an anti- U.S. sentiment in Pakistan that increasingly puts pressure on the government in Islamabad. U.S. policy must be fundamentally changed to turn around the anti-American outlook among Pakistanis. In order to do so, the official relationship needs to be more transparent; frequency of visits by U.S. officials ought to be reconsidered; 'image correcting aid' should be provided in addition to the long-term assistance; Pakistani citizens should be engaged through constant dialogue and debate on U.S.-Pakistan relations; and American and Pakistani officials should remain sensitive about the internal impact of their public statements and actions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Imperialism, Mass Media, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, America, and South Asia

32. Navigating Negotiations in Afghanistan

Author:
Matt Waldman
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
There are reasons for skepticism about government-insurgent talks, especially as both sides are known for abusive, unjust and discriminatory policies. However, given the constraints of counterinsurgency, obstacles to an anticipated security transition, and the threat of worsening conflict, the potential for negotiations should be explored. Field research indicates that the coalition's military surge is intensifying the conflict, and compounding enmity and mistrust between the parties. It is therefore reducing the prospects of negotiations, which require confidence-building measures that should be incremental, structured and reciprocal. Strategies should be developed to deal with powerful spoilers, on all sides, that may try to disrupt the process. The form of pre-talks, and the effectiveness of mediators and “track two” interlocutors, will be critical. Pakistan provides assistance to, and has significant influence over, the Taliban. Talks require Pakistan's support, but giving its officials excessive influence over the process could trigger opposition within Afghanistan and countermeasures from regional states. The perceived threat from India is driving Pakistan's geostrategic policies, thus concerted efforts are required to improve Pakistan-India relations. Negotiations could lead to a power-sharing agreement, but implementation would be highly challenging, especially due to multifarious factional and other power struggles. An agreement could also involve constitutional or legislative changes that curtail fundamental civil and political rights, especially those of women and girls. Genuine reconciliation efforts are required to build better relations between hostile groups. For legitimacy and viability, any settlement must be both inclusive and just: it should therefore seek to reflect the aspirations of all elements of Afghanistan's diverse society. It should also seek to address underlying causes of the conflict, especially the abuse of power.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and India

33. Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Gretchen Peters
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protect organized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds flow through their command chains and how they interact—and sometimes fight—with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

34. Humanitarian Space Shrinking for Health Program Delivery in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Leonard S. Rubenstein
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, humanitarian space has shrunk as the Taliban and other insurgent groups have stepped up attacks on civilians, especially international aid workers, contractors and local leaders. Health programs continue to operate, but the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to recruit and retain staff and to travel outside Kabul has suffered. The United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other groups have sought to persuade the Taliban and other armed groups not to impede or interfere with humanitarian aid activities. These efforts have had some success where the aid is administered by Afghans, but they have not limited attacks on international staff, who along with all foreigners, remain at high risk of attack. Many NGOs act as implementing partners in the government's strategy to implement a comprehensive primary care system in Afghanistan under the direction of the Ministry of Public Health. They have managed to maintain those services with local staff despite their association with the government of Afghanistan, so long as they operate with impartiality and community engagement. The vulnerability of their staff to attack appears to be a product of generalized insecurity or the presence of foreign aid workers, rather than a result of collaboration with the Ministry.NGOs report that military activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and military involvement in the medical sector, have contributed to the shrinkage of humanitarian space. The military's provision of health services through Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other mechanisms, though well-intended, sometimes sows confusion about the allegiances of U.S. and other Western aid workers and creates tensions with humanitarian principles the agencies rely on to operate in conflict environments. The conduct of the Afghanistan National Army and Police and the Pakistan military in entering facilities to gain access to arrest insurgents or gather information also leads to greater insecurity for NGO personnel.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Aid, Islam, Non-Governmental Organization, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

35. Hydropolitics in Pakistan's Indus Basin

Author:
Daanish Mustafa
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Water problems in Pakistan result largely from poor management, but the consequences of management failures are accentuated, both materially and politically, by international and subnational hydropolitics. There is enough water in the Indus basin to provide for the livelihoods of its residents for a long time, provided that the water is managed efficiently and equitably and that additional water is made available not just through storage but, more importantly, through higher efficiency and intersectoral transfers. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) seems to moderate the worst impulses of India and Pakistan toward each other, and perhaps therein lies IWT's greatest strength. Pakistani engineers typically interpret the IWT's extensive technical annexures very literally, whereas the Indian engineers tend to emphasize the treaty's criteria for techno-economi¬cally sound project design. No single completed or proposed Indian project on the three western rivers of the Indus basin alone has the potential to significantly limit flows of water to Pakistan. But the long list of proposed Indian projects on the those rivers will in the future give India the cumulative storage capacity to reduce substantively water flows to Pakistan during the low-flow winter months. The IWT, by performing an amputation surgery on the basin, made matters simple and allowed India and Pakistan to pursue their nationalist agendas without much need for more sophisticated and involved cooperation in the water field. This lack of cooperative sharing of water leaves the ecological and social consequences of the treaty to be negotiated and contested at the subnational scale. The interprovincial conflict over water distribution in Pakistan has potential—albeit entirely avoidable—repercussions for stability, at both the subnational and international levels. Instead of constructing very expensive, environmentally damaging, and economically dubious water-storage megaprojects in Pakistan, enhancement of the existing infrastructure's efficiency, coupled with better on-farm water management and more appropriate irrigation and farming techniques, would perhaps more than make up for any additional water that might be gained from megaprojects. Since the drought in southern Pakistan in the latter half of the 1990s, the single-minded focus of the Pakistani water bureaucracy on water development has made the issue of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam project a surrogate for a litany of Sindhi grievances against the Punjabi-dominated political, military, and bureaucratic system in Pakistan. The emphasis on maximizing water withdrawals and on greater regulation of the Indus river system contributed to accentuating the very high flood peaks in 2010. Although the floods are being used by the pro-dams lobby to call for construction of more storage on the Indus, the tragedy ought to inspire a more nuanced and comprehensive reevaluation of the water-management system in the basin. The IWT is a product of its time and could be fruitfully modified and renegotiated to bring it more in line with contemporary international watercourse law, the Helsinki rules, and emerging concerns with water quality, environmental sustainability, climate change, and principles of equitable sharing. But that renegotiation, if it ever happens, is going to be contingent upon significant improvement in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. India could be more forthcoming with flow data and be more prompt and open in communicating its planned projects on the Indus basin to Pakistan, particularly in the western basin. Pakistan can engage with India within the context of the IWT more positively than defensively, and also educate its media and politicians so as not to sensationalize essentially technical arguments by presenting them as existential threats.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, and Water
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and India

36. Seeking Solutions for Afghanistan: A Report on the Abu Dhabi Process

Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have accepted a generous proposal from the government of Abu Dhabi to host a series of meetings facilitated by the East West Institute (EWI) to complement existing channels of communication between the two countries. Participants in the series, known as the Abu Dhabi Process, discuss areas of their relationship they believe will help build confidence, ensure greater stability, and enhance sustainable development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The meetings are off-the-record, consultative in nature, and governed by the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Arabia, and Abu Dhabi

37. Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation

Author:
Daniel Markey
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
India faces the real prospect of another major terrorist attack by Pakistan-based terrorist organizations in the near future. Unlike the aftermath of the November 2008 attack on Mumbai, in which 166 people died, Indian military restraint cannot be taken for granted if terrorists strike again. An Indian retaliatory strike against terrorist targets on Pakistani soil would raise Indo-Pakistani tensions and could even set off a spiral of violent escalation between the nuclear-armed rivals. Given Washington's effort to intensify pressure on al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated militants operating from Pakistani territory, increased tensions between India and Pakistan would harm U.S. interests even if New Delhi and Islamabad stop well short of the nuclear threshold because it would distract Pakistan from counterterror and counterinsurgency operations, jeopardize the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and place new, extreme stresses on Islamabad.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, Washington, India, New Delhi, and Mumbai

38. Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First

Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
India and Pakistan have consistently subjected Kashmiri interests to their own national security agendas and silenced calls for greater autonomy. With the start of their composite dialogue – comprehensive negotiations to resolve all contentious bilateral issues, including Kashmir, launched in February 2004 – both appeared willing to allow more interaction across the Line of Control (LOC) but failed to engage Kashmiris in the process. As a result, they did not take full advantage of opportunities to enhance cross-LOC cooperation by identifying the most appropriate Kashmir-specific confidence-building measures (CBMs), and bureaucratic resistance in both capitals resulted in uneven implementation of even those that had been agreed. India has suspended the composite dialogue since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks by Pakistan based militants, but neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has backtracked on these CBMs. Nevertheless, the CBM process will only achieve major results if the two sides devolve authority to Kashmir's elected representatives and take other vital steps to win over its alienated public.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Islam, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

39. H1N1 Outbreak in Pakistan: Lessons Learnt

Author:
Sania Nishtar
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
Compared to many other countries in Asia, the outbreak of pandemic influenza H1N1 appeared to be of minor concern to Pakistan. This paper analyses, using qualitative research methods, the extent to which such a notion was justified and the response of Pakistan's health system to the outbreak, exploring the degree to which it is responsive to problems posed by an emerging infection. It looks at the health system measures introduced prior to the H1N1 outbreak (after the implementation of the International Health Regulations 2005) as these came into play during this episode, as well as specific measures introduced subsequent to the H1N1 outbreak.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Globalization, Health, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Asia

40. Pakistan: dealing with peace in the tribal areas?

Author:
Laila Bokhari
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The six Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along Pakistan's western border have long been seen as a hub for militants, some with sympathies to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The region has increasingly come to the world's attention as a recruitment and training base for groups responsible for attacks on Pakistani soil and as a launch pad for attacks on US troops and their allies in Afghanistan. Even though the various groups comprising the Pakistani Taliban have been around for a number of years, it was only in December 2007 that they formally established themselves as a united force.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban