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251. Networks, Trust, and Trade: The Microeconomics of China-North Korea Integration

Author:
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A central hope of engagement with North Korea is that increased cross-border exchange will encourage the strengthening of institutions, and eventually, a moderation of the country's foreign policy. An unprecedented survey of Chinese enterprises operating in North Korea reveals that trade is largely dominated by state entities on the North Korean side, although we cannot rule out de facto privatization of exchange. Little trust is evident beyond the relationships among Chinese and North Korean state-owned enterprises. Formal networks and dispute settlement mechanisms are weak and do not appear to have consequences for relational contracting. Rather, firms rely on personal ties for identifying counterparties and resolving disputes. The weakness of formal institutions implies that the growth in exchange does not conform with the expectations of the engagement model and may prove self-limiting. The results also cast doubt that integration between China and North Korea, at least as it is currently proceeding, will foster reform and opening.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Israel, and North Korea

252. North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability

Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Transitions often present risks to authoritarian regimes, but the succession in North Korea has apparently passed with few problems. With no opposition from the military and China's clear support, there are no signs to suggest that Kim Jŏng-ŭn, the young leader who replaced his father, Kim Jong-il, following his death in December 2011, is anything but in charge in his own right. Far from creating a regency of older family members or generals, the North Korean system has maintained its focus on a single leader and projected an image of stability and unity as it celebrates the centenary of the birth of its founder, Kim Il-sung. While that image appears to be accurate, there is nothing to suggest that the new leader is or will become inclined to take measures that would either improve the lot of the country's citizens or reduce the regional frictions that Pyongyang is at the centre of.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Israel, and North Korea

253. A History of KEDO 1994-2006

Author:
Joel Wit, Robert Carlin, and Charles Kartman
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
When the South Korean fast ferry Hankyoreh sailed out of North Korean waters into the cold wind and waves of the East Sea on the morning of 8 January 2006, it carried a sad and somber group of South Korean workers, ROK officials, and personnel from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). These were all that remained of a decade long multinational effort transforming what in 1994 had been only a paper notion into a modern construction complex of steel and concrete. KEDO's profile on the North Korean landscape was unmistakable, its impact on Pyongyang profound. Yet, real knowledge and understanding about the organization in public and official circles in South Korea, Japan, and the United States was terribly thin at the beginning, and remains so to this day.
Topic:
Development, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and North Korea

254. Can North Korea nuclear crisis be resolved?

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
I thank Kyungnam University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for inviting me to present my views on the situation in North Korea. My area of expertise is in the nuclear arena and that is primarily what I will address in my paper. However, it is not possible to solve the nuclear crisis without addressing the underlying fundamental political issues, so I will offer my views, as a non-expert in this area, at the outset.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Israel and North Korea

255. Continuity and Change in North Korea

Author:
Andrei Lankov
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
Kim Jong-il, the hereditary ruler of North Korea, is dead, and his son—visibly shaken and patently unprepared for the job—has replaced him as the head of the world's last remaining Stalinist state. The start of a new era in the DPRK is a good time to speculate on what we should expect from the “Hermit Kingdom” in future. While crystal ball-gazing has never been an exact science and history often takes quite sudden turns, it is difficult to be optimistic when thinking about North Korea's future. Kim Jong-il's death on the early morning of December 17, 2011, was one of those events which, while expected sooner or later, nonetheless occurred suddenly. It certainly could not be termed a surprise, however. Kim had suffered a stroke in late 2008, and never completely recovered. Soon thereafter, North Korea began preparations for a hereditary transfer of power. Many observers pointed out that these began belatedly. Had Kim Jong-il been more serious about the future of his regime, a successor should have been firmly in place by the early 2000s. Nonetheless, in October 2010 the choice of successor was made public. Kim Jong-un, Kim's youngest (known) son, was suddenly promoted to the rank of four-star general, and thereafter his name began to appear in North Korean propaganda with growing frequency. Nevertheless, it appears that North Korea's policy makers believed that they would have a few more years at their disposal before they would need to finalize the hereditary power transition. For, when Kim Jong-il died, Kim Jong-un had yet to officially become his second-in-command. As of mid-December, Kim Jong-un was, technically speaking, merely one of many members of the country's top leadership: neither a Politburo member nor a member of the National Defense Commission, the supreme executive body of the state. This constituted a major potential handicap. Yet when Kim Jong-il died, no one dared exploit this potential weakness of the heir apparent. Kim Jong-un was recognized as the new leader immediately upon the death of his father and, seemingly, without much resistance. As of this writing, the transition in Pyongyang appears to be unfolding smoothly. The North Korean elite appears to be united—not so much by their loyalty to the Kim family, or by some shared ideological convictions, but rather by an understanding that political infighting at the top might endanger the whole system. They probably never heard of Benjamin Franklin's famous adage that “We must, indeed, all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” Yet they are acting in full accordance with this famous dictum. Still, the smoothness of the transition now taking place in Pyongyang is misleading. North Korea might in the future follow a number of different trajectories, but none guarantees an orderly and gradual transformation of the country.
Political Geography:
North Korea

256. Our Pyongyang Problem

Author:
Peter Huessy and General Michael Dunn (ret.)
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
Today, the overwhelming focus of the United States and its allies is aimed at stopping Iran from securing a nuclear weapon. The ongoing nuclear weapons program of North Korea appears to be, at best, a serious but somewhat secondary consideration. Yet the two programs are inexorably intertwined, and are part of an identical strategy adopted by these two rogue states and their allies to harm U.S. security interests. Policymakers in Washington still appear to believe in both cases that a “deal” of some kind monitoring their respective nuclear programs—as opposed to ending them—is possible. Such a view is naïve at best, and deeply dangerous at worst. This is true for two key reasons. The first is North Korea's “Ten Step” negotiating strategy—an approach that the DPRK has successfully adopted over the past two decades to shake the U.S. and its allies down for oil, food and economic assistance and to “buy time.” The second is that North Korea's true strategic objective—ignored all too often by experts and the media alike—is one of reunifying the Korean peninsula under Communist rule and this requires a nuclear weapons program as a shield. When viewed through these two prisms, Pyongyang's policies in recent years make sound strategic sense. Washington's, by contrast, too often do not.
Political Geography:
United States, North Korea, and Pyongyang

257. Identity Politics and Policy Disputes in U.S.–Korea Relations

Author:
Gi-Wook Shin
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Anti-American sentiments and slogans swept South Korea during its 2002 presidential campaign. These movements were not new for the country, but for the first time, they had a crucial impact on its alliance with the United States. A second North Korean nuclear stand-off had just occurred, and candidate Roh Moo Hyunʼs vows to continue engagement with the North, despite the crisis, were clearly at odds with the George W. Bush administrationʼs desire to isolate Pyongyang. In the past, such a threat would have led the South to consolidate its alliance with the United States for reasons of national security. Also preceding the 2002 election, a massive wave of anti-American sentiment had erupted in response to the handling of a U.S. military training accident that killed two Korean schoolgirls: Catholic priests went on a hunger strike, and tens of thousands of Koreans—not just activists but middle-class adults—protested against the United States.1 According to a 2003 Pew survey, aside from certain Arab states, France, and Russia, South Korea was identified as one of the most anti-American countries.2 A 2004 RAND report likewise showed that many South Koreansʼ previously positive views of the United States had become increasingly unfavorable.3 As new progressive, nationalist policy elites sought to reassess the U.S. role in inter-Korean relations and unification, the rationale for the alliance was being questioned and became a subject of intense debate within the South.
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, South Korea, North Korea, France, and Korea

258. Time for the Strategy of Coevolution: How South Korea Can Shape the Future of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 is a critical time for North Korea as it has proclaimed that from this year it will achieve the status of a “strong and prosperous nation.” With Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, this immense task now falls upon the shoulders of Kim Jong-un. For the past seventeen years under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea has tried to seek a way to ensure its regime’s survival and guarantee its national security through Songun or military-first politics and the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, this has actually resulted in international isolation, economic hardships, and an overdependence on China. For North Korea, it was “lost two decades”. It is natural to wonder about what kind of impact Kim Jong-il’s sudden death will have on North Korea in the short run. However, it is more important now to think carefully about what lies ahead for North Korea over the next 20 years under Kim Jong-un’s rule. Upon such a consideration it is also critical to prepare necessary measures in terms of this long-term perspective. The most urgent priority for the newly established Kim Jong-un regime is domestic stability, which means that the regime will have to pursue the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s rule. In this respect, it will continue to possess nuclear weapons, seek economic gains from negotiations over its nuclear program, and attempt to accelerate its economic development under the banner of a “strong and prosperous nation” to gain political legitimacy. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to “rule by his deceased father’s will,” then North Korea will face the inevitable dilemma it has faced for the last seventeen years. Pursuing regime security by huddling onto nuclear weapons will only continue to ensure Pyongyang’s international isolation. This isolation in turn brings about economic hardship, which consequently has a negative effect on the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime as its legitimacy is still rather weak. These interlinked problems of domestic politics, diplomacy, and economics can be easily locked in a vicious circle. The Kim Jong-un regime must deal with these pending issues in line with a long-term strategy that will guarantee its survival and help North Korea pursue reforms to meet the norms of the twenty-first century civilization. The first stage of this long-term strategy is to seek a policy shift. At some point in the future, Kim Jong-un has to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and switch from the current military-first politics to economy-first politics. Of course, such a shift is an extremely difficult decision to make, but it would be a good chance to prove the strength of Kim Jong-un’s leadership internally and externally. The second stage is transition and reform. With this step, North Korea will finally take measures toward peaceful development under the basis of a more enlightened Suryong or Great Leader Direct Rule system. Those measures include overcoming the demands for excessive security, moving forward to establish a security system without nuclear weapons, and plan for a North Korean-way of reforms and opening. In order to achieve these goals, North Korea will truly require support from South Korea and the international community. The third stage is the transformation of North Korea to meet the international standard of advancement. In this stage, it is crucial to find a way to encourage North Korea to transform into a nation that seeks moderate security capabilities as well as a new momentum for economic development, democracy, and normal diplomacy. If it succeeds, North Korea could then become a model country which serves for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and contribute toward development and stability in Northeast Asia. During this delicate period, it is an imperative to get over single-minded approaches to focus only on the collapse of North Korea or to call for the one-sided effort of either North Korea or the international community to resolve all the issues. Furthermore, it is time to understand the broad range of problems of North Korea and seek a path of coevolution which takes in a bigger picture of peace and stability for not only the Korean Peninsula but also East Asia.
Topic:
Regime Change, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Dictatorship, Totalitarianism, and Transition
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

259. The New U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance and Its Implications for South Korean Security

Author:
Young Ho Kim
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On January 5, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama paid a rare visit to the Pentagon and unveiled his guidelines for the Department of Defense to set the goals and priorities of its defense strategy for the next ten years. The resulting eight-page-long guidelines, entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (hereafter DSG), contain the administration’s assessment of changing global security conditions and propose the roles and shape of the U.S. armed forces for the coming decade. Prepared through “unprecedentedly” close consultations between the President himself and senior leaders in the U.S. defense department and military including both service chiefs and combatant commanders, the DSG defines the present as a historic “inflection point” and envisions the future U.S. military as “smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced.” Moreover, in accordance with the DSG the U.S. defense budget will be cut by $487 billion and the sizes of the Army and Marine Corps will shrink by 80,000 and 14,000 respectively over the next ten years. While a more detailed picture will be revealed next month with the administration’s FY2013 budget request to Congress, the DSG reflects the Obama administration’s arduous effort to rebalance and redirect its defense priorities and spending under severe fiscal austerity. Because of the unusual timing of its publication and the magnitude of the reduction in defense spending, the DSG has generated controversy and concern domestically in the United States as well as internationally. In the United States, particularly people in the conservative wing of the Republican Party have been prompted to criticize the guidelines for putting the nation’s security in danger, whereas some people on the liberal side have advocated seeking deeper and bolder cuts in defense spending. Internationally, China was understandably the first to respond negatively to the DSG. For example, rebutting the DSG’s portrayal of Beijing’s military policy as lacking transparency as “groundless and untrustworthy,” Liu Weimin, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stressed that Beijing was committed to peaceful development and “defensive” policy. What then are the implications of the DSG for South Korean security? Will there be any changes in U.S. defense policy or posture in the region under the DSG that may affect security conditions in South Korea significantly and, if so, require new measures or scrutiny by the South Korean government or the military? In fact, there have been largely four issues raised by the news media in South Korea. I will examine these four issues, and then discuss more challenging concerns that will require closer attention by South Korean foreign and security policy-makers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

260. Chinese Interest on the Korean Peninsula and the Future of North Korea

Author:
Andrei Lankov
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Few people would doubt that the continuing rise of China is the single most influential factor in the evolving geostrategic position of Korea. Over the last 35 years, China has experienced a period of rapid economic growth which is probably without parallel in world economic history, and this period is not over. While China is still far from being in a position to challenge global US hegemony, it is quite possible that it will play a dominant role in East Asia, especially if ongoing changes in the world economy press the US into reducing military spending and downsizing its global role. Indeed, in the last few years China loomed increasingly large in issues of the North Korean politics. Some of the most controversial political problems of present-day Korea are clearly related to China’s rise. The fate of the Jeju naval base, whichever is officially stated, largely depends on whether Korea will eventually chose to balance against or bandwagon with rising China. The problem of the forced deportation of the North Korean refugees attracted much attention of the Korean public to the issues of human rights in China – perhaps, first time when such issues are discussed widely. It seems that the rise of China will present Korea with many a difficult decision. In some cases, confrontation is likely to develop, but usually some kind of compromise is, probably, the best option. Like it or not, most problems in East Asia cannot be effectively solved without cooperation with (or at least the passive support of) China. This is the case with the major long-term issue of Korean politics, that is, the issue of Korean unification.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea